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Abstract 
 
 
 
Imperial Divides explores the history of border policing between the United States and 
Mexico from the 1940s to the 1950s. I examine the links between international security and the 
early efforts to militarize the U.S.-Mexico border, focusing on the cultural production of a 
boundary cast in perpetual crisis. This project traces the construction of the U.S.-Mexico border 
as a global security threat and examines how it was enforced in both countries. It studies the 
relationship between warfare, migration, and boundary enforcement, arguing that the deep 
anxieties concerning the United States’ inability to exercise complete control over its southern 
boundary during World War II and the Cold War were crucial in transforming the U.S.-Mexico 
border into a national security imperative. I contend that public spectacles of border enforcement 
were crafted in large part in response to global warfare, beginning with Axis nationals in the 
years leading up to World War II, and then shifting to Mexican nationals during the Cold War. 
Just as significantly, this dissertation draws attention to the opposition of the early efforts to 
militarize the U.S.-Mexico border. For radical artists, intellectuals, and activists, the joint 
policing of the border, and the Mexican state’s close cooperation with the United States during 
the first decade of the Cold War signaled a troubling rightward shift in the nation. As the 
presidential administrations of Ávila Camacho (1940-46), Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-52), and 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) sought greater political, economic, and security ties with the 
United States, a creative flurry of radical opposition emerged, insisting that the sovereignty of 
the Mexican nation was being undermined by its imperial neighbor.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
On September 20, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, met with members of 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s cabinet to discuss the upcoming Geneva Summit, an important 
diplomatic initiative between the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. State 
Department officials were deeply skeptical about the prospects of forging meaningful 
agreements on the issues at the conference, which centered on nuclear disarmament, European 
security, and German unification.1 In discussing a list of items that had the potential to provoke 
controversy, Dulles pondered the repercussions of the United States openly criticizing the Soviet 
Union’s construction of watchtowers and deployment of guards along the border separating East 
and West Germany. Based on conversations with retired General Joseph Swing, acting director 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), Dulles suspected that the Soviets would 
respond by highlighting the recent militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. Dulles’ main 
concern was that “the Communists” had created a film about the increased police presence along 
the U.S.-Mexico divide, documenting the Border Patrol’s use of bloodhounds to track down 
Mexican migrants, the installation of sharp barbed wire fences to deter would-be crossers, and 
the increased presence of armed guards patrolling the international boundary. In all likelihood, 
Dulles conceded, the United States would have any criticisms it levied at the Soviet military 
presence along the East-German border “thrown back at us.”2  
                                                          
1 Both Dulles and Eisenhower doubted the wisdom of participating in the conference and would have avoided it 
altogether if not for pressure from Western European allies. Richard H. Immerman, “‘Trust in the Lord but Keep 
your Powder Dry’: American Policy Aims at Geneva,” in Gunter Bischof, Saki Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite: 
The Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 35-54. 
 
2 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, September 20, 1955,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1955–1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Document 98. 
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Unfortunately, the memorandum of the conversation between Eisenhower’s cabinet only 
labels those responsible for the film as “the Communists,” making it difficult to pinpoint with 
certainty where the film was made. After all, communists and organizations with ties to the party 
from across the globe condemned the exploitative conditions Mexicans experienced in the 
United States. In 1953, Soviet officials met in Moscow to publicly denounce the systemic abuses 
of braceros—Mexican men contracted to work in the U.S.—in its effort to get the United States 
listed as a country that supported slavery by the United Nations Special Committee on Forced 
Labor.3 In Mexico City, the Taller de Gráfica Popular (Popular Graphic Art Workshop; 
hereafter TGP), a radical international print collective, created broadsides, lithographs, 
woodcuts, and linocuts denouncing the abusive system of low wages, backbreaking work, and 
draconian boundary enforcement practices that shaped the lives of Mexican migrants. In the 
United States, the Asociación Nacional México-Americana (ANMA), and other radical 
organizations with Mexican and Mexican American members, including the American 
Committee to Protect the Foreign Born (ACPFB), campaigned to bring international awareness 
to the heightened boundary enforcement and the racialized “police-state terror” directed against 
Mexicans. These organizations picketed immigration detention centers, raised money for 
immigrants fighting deportation orders, and wrote pamphlets condemning the warlike conditions 
created by the Border Patrol.4  
                                                          
3 After public debate, and a twenty month investigation, the USSR’s complaint that undocumented, easily deportable 
Mexican migrants were being used as modern day slave labor was ultimately rejected. Henry Cabot Lodge, Chief of 
the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, hailed the finding, arguing that this was “a staggering revelation” that 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt that “the loud shouts of communism urging workers to arise and throw off their 
chains now stand revealed as a most brutal and ugly hypocrisy.” Kathleen Teltsch, “U.N. Finds Soviet Enslaving 
Labor,” New York Times, June 24, 1953, 1.   
 
4 These organizations were important pre-cursors to Mexican civil rights groups of the 1960s. ANMA represented 
workers from various unions, most prominently in U.S. cities in the western portion of the United States, including 
Phoenix, Denver, and Los Angeles. In 1951, the organization brought a complaint concerning the abuse of braceros 
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. See, Zaragosa Vargas, “Challenges to Solidarity: The 
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As Dulles’ concern about “the Communist” reaction to U.S. border policing suggests, the 
U.S.-Mexico border and the Mexican migrants who crossed it could not escape the international 
security politics of the Cold War. In fact, the State Department, Border Patrol, and INS justified 
the intensification of border policing in the post-war period in large part through the language of 
Cold War security. INS officials testified in front of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, closely documenting the activism of ANMA and the ACPFB.5 Border Patrol officers 
testified in Congress arguing that communists had repeatedly crossed the U.S.-Mexico border 
without inspection. High profile arrests and extraditions of U.S. communists suspected of fleeing 
the United States by crossing into Mexico, including Gus Hall, National Chairman of the 
Communist Party U.S.A, were cited as proof that more resources were required for border 
enforcement.6 In the summer of 1954, one of the immigration detention facilities used to detain 
Mexican migrants during “Operation Wetback”—the Border Patrol’s policing campaign that 
resulted in the apprehension and deportations of more than one million Mexican migrants—had 
                                                          
Mexican American Fight for Social and Economic Justice, 1946-1963,” in Robbie Lieberman and Clarence Lang, 
eds., Anticommunism and the African American Freedom Movement: “another side of the story” (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189-227; Zaragosa Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers 
in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 276-77. In 1959, the ACPFB sought an 
international audience to hear its criticisms of Mexican labor exploitation, producing a document entitled, “Our 
Badge of Infamy: A Petition to the United Nations on the Treatment of Mexican Immigrants.” See, “Badge of 
Infamy,” ACPFB, Los Angeles, 1959 [reprinted in] Carlos E. Cortes, ed., The Mexican American and the Law (New 
York: Arno Press 1974), iii-50. See also, Richard Griswold del Castillo, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A 
Legacy of Conflict (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 146-47; Jeffrey M. Garcilazo, “McCarthyism, 
Mexican Americans, and the Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born, 1950-1954,” Western 
Historical Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2001): 273-95. The quote equating border policing to state terror is from a pamphlet 
created by the ACPFB. Patricia Morgan, Shame of a Nation: A Documented Story of Police-State Terror Against 
Mexican-Americans in the U.S.A. (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, 
1954). 
 
5 House Committee on Un-American Activities, Communist Political Subversion: Hearings before the Committee on 
Un-American Activities, 84th Cong., 2nd Session, 1957. 
 
6 The capture and extradition of Gus Hall in Mexico City was discussed across the United States. “Hall, Fugitive 
U.S. Red Aid, Reported Arrested in Mexico,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1951, 1; “Hall, Fugitive Red, 
Seized in Mexico, Deported to U.S.,” New York Times, October 10, 1951, 1; “Fugitive Communist Bigwig Arrested 
in Texas by FBI,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1951, 10. 
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been funded two years earlier as a prison camp to hold Soviet subversives in case of war.7 
Trumpeting the success of its deportation regimes, the State Department even invited West 
German officers for a tour of Southern California a few months after “Operation Wetback,” 
insisting that the German visitors would benefit from learning how the United States protected its 
boundaries from the communist threat.8  
By the mid-1950s, the U.S. federal government had transformed the border into a theater 
of enforcement, where actual and symbolic state violence against Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans was deployed in large part in response to the manufactured international security 
crises.9 In the immediate post-war period, the U.S.-Mexico border created deep anxieties in the 
minds of security officials as a site rife with Soviet agents, plotting U.S. and Mexican communist 
party members, and even atomic bomb smugglers.10 Within this backdrop, Mexicans crossing 
the border without legal sanction were not simply conceived of as individuals responding to the 
                                                          
7 “U.S. Prison Overflow Uses 2 ‘War’ Camps,” The Washington Post, July 4, 1954, pg. 2.  Kelly Lytle Hernández 
contends that the number of deportations during “Operation Wetback” were intentionally inflated by the Border 
Patrol and General Swing, and that deportation levels were consistent with those of preceding years. However, the 
incredible effort to create such a spectacle of enforcement, I would argue, is evidence of the perceived need of U.S. 
officials to display control over its border during the Cold War. Kelly Lytle Hernández, “The Crimes and 
Consequences of Illegal Immigration: A Cross-Border Examination of Operation Wetback, 1943-1954,” Western 
Historical Quarterly (Winter 2006), 421-444.  
 
8 “Bonn Visitors Study Border Control Methods,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1955, A8. 
 
9 Renato Rosaldo coined the term “border theater” in reference to the border policing operations of the 1990s, writing 
that "The U.S.-Mexico border has become theater, and border theater has become social violence. Actual violence has 
become inseparable from the symbolic ritual on the border—crossings, invasions, lines of defense, high-tech 
surveillance and more." Renato Rosaldo, “Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism,” in William V. 
Flores and Rina Benmayor, Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1997), 33. On the performance and symbolic nature of the border, See also: Robert Alvarez, “The Mexican-US Border: 
The Making of an Anthropology of Borderlands,” Annual Review of Anthropology (1995): 447-70; Alejandro Lugo, 
“Theorizing Border Inspections,” Cultural Dynamics 12 (2000): 353-73.  
 
10 “Mexican Commie Leader Seized for Deportation,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 14, 1953; Willard Edwards, 
“200 Dangerous Aliens Operate Freely in U.S.” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 23, 6; “Wetback Invaders Include 
Communists,” Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1951, 1; “Washington Alert for Smuggling of Red 
Bombers,” The Hartford Courant, June 27, 1954, 6. 
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logics of a capitalist system that demanded temporary, disposable, and deportable labor.11 
Instead, the very presence of undocumented workers in a time of war was constructed by 
government agencies, journalists, and within U.S. popular culture, as a national security crisis, as 
a terrifying “wetback invasion.” The rise in unsanctioned Mexican migration and the profound 
anxieties of an “open border” resulted in Mexican migrants being perceived as national security 
threats, their lives deeply entangled with the policing regimes of the U.S. Cold War. From 1944-
1954, a period sometimes referred to as the “wetback decade,” the Border Patrol greatly 
expanded, doubling its number of agents while reconfiguring the scope of its operations, 
resulting in the unprecedented return of more than four million migrants to Mexico.12 Such 
extraordinary displays of boundary enforcement by a variety of governmental agencies were 
imagined as legitimate and necessary responses to reassure an alarmed public that the United 
States could reestablish security over its southern border.  
Imperial Divides explores the links between international security and the early efforts to 
militarize the U.S.-Mexico border by studying the cultural production of a boundary cast in 
perpetual crisis. Scholars of U.S. immigration, Cold War security, and the U.S.-Mexico border 
have not fully taken into account how international security concerns shaped the history of 
boundary enforcement in the 1940s and 1950s. Beginning with Axis nationals in the years 
                                                          
11 On immigration law, the construction of “migrant illegality” and expanding deportation regimes in the United 
States targeting Mexican migrants, See especially, Nicholas De Genova, Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and 
“Illegality” in Mexican Chicago (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 213-50; Nicholas De Genova, 
“Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002): 419-47; 
Nicholas De Genova, “The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant ‘Illegality,’” Latino Studies 2 (2004): 160-185; 
Cindy Hahamovitch, No Man’s Land: Jamaican Guestworkers in American and the Global History of Deportable 
Labor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 110-34; Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and 
the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 127-66.   
 
12 This number was up from about 70,000 migrants returned to Mexico in the previous decade. These figures include 
both migrants who were deported and those who chose to “depart voluntarily.” See, Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra: 
A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 122.   
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leading up to World War II, and then shifting to Mexican nationals during the Cold War, the 
imagined security crisis and corresponding border enforcement spectacles were crafted in large 
part in response to global warfare. Just as significantly, this dissertation draws attention to the 
opposition of the post-war efforts to police the U.S.-Mexico border. For radical artists and 
intellectuals in Mexico, the policing of the shared boundary and the Mexican state’s close 
cooperation with the United States during the first decade of the Cold War signaled a troubling 
rightward shift in the nation. As the presidential administrations of Ávila Camacho (1940-46), 
Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-52), and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) sought greater political, 
economic, and security ties with the United States, a creative flurry of radical opposition 
emerged, insisting that the sovereignty of the Mexican nation was being undermined by its 
imperial neighbor.  
 
 
 
Migration, Militarization, and U.S. Empire  
 
 
 
Writing on the contemporary militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, Gilberto Rosas 
explains that warlike enforcement regimes have been crafted in response to the “nightmares or 
dense anxieties about porous boundaries and Other bodies” that seep across the international 
border and “speak to anxieties among race, nation and punitive governance, and to the fictions of 
state sovereignty in a zone of international flows and movements.”13 Rosas maintains that efforts 
to exercise sovereignty on the border by both the United States and Mexico since the early 1990s 
has resulted in the creation of a “new frontier,” which has transformed border security into “a 
                                                          
13 Gilberto Rosas, Barrio Libre: Criminalizing States and Delinquent Refusals of the New Frontier (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2012), 29. 
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kind of warfare that collapses the distinctions between the police and military, between 
regulating life and killing it.”14 Essential in this formulation is Timothy Dunn’s concept of the 
“low-intensity conflict doctrine,” a Reagan era counterinsurgency program deployed by the U.S. 
military and intelligence communities in Central America in the early 1980s and then repatriated 
back to the border region.15 The state’s adoption of low intensity conflict operations along the 
border has resulted in a sophisticated collection of police and military activities directed at 
combatting the flow of illegal drugs and undocumented migrants. Thus, for both Rosas and 
Dunn, the development of warlike border enforcement regimes in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries must be understood in relation to the expansion of clandestine U.S. 
military operations.16 
Imperial Divides studies the relationship between warfare, migration, and boundary 
enforcement in an earlier period, arguing that the deep anxieties concerning the United States’ 
inability to exercise complete control over its southern boundary during World War II and the 
Cold War were crucial in transforming the U.S.-Mexico border into a national security 
imperative.17 As Kelly Lytle Hernández explains in her institutional history of the Border Patrol, 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 7. 
 
15 Though much of Dunn’s analysis on the “low-intensity conflict doctrine” focuses on the 1980s and early 1990s, 
he maintains the techniques developed for the United States’ covert military operations have long been repatriated to 
the U.S.-Mexico border, dating back to the Kennedy administration, and perhaps even earlier. Timothy Dunn, The 
Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (Austin, Texas: 
CMAS Books, 1996), 20.  
 
16 Ibid., 31. 
 
17 Historian Neil Foley suggests that the border enforcement campaigns of the 1950s were the direct antecedents to 
contemporary border enforcement operations of the 1990s, including Operation Gatekeeper (California, 1994), 
Operation Hold-the-Line (Texas, 1994) and Operation Safeguard (Arizona, 1999). Foley contends that “The fear of 
a wetback invasion in the 1950s echoed the fear in the 1940s that the Axis powers might invade the hemisphere 
through Mexico and prefigured the immigration backlash of the 1990s and border fence security measure after 
9/11.” Neil Foley, Mexicans and the Making of America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2014), 123-124. 
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the scope and mission of the agency was fundamentally transformed in preparation for the 
Second World War. The agency underwent a dramatic transformation prior to and during the 
war, essentially turning the organization from one concerned almost exclusively with the local 
interests of growers and border residents to a national police force taking directives from 
Washington. In fact, the Border Patrol, which along with the INS was transferred from the 
Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in 1940, had its budget double from 1939-
1941 and its responsibilities drastically expanded. The agency transported Japanese and 
Japanese-Americans to internment camps in California, guarded internees in Texas, interrogated 
German and Italian nationals in New York, and protected against Axis submarine warfare in the 
Gulf of Mexico. New technologies were adopted by the Border Patrol that strengthened 
coordination between officers and border stations through improved mobile communications in 
the form of car radios and air surveillance from military supplied Stinson L-5 airplanes.18  
After the war, these new technologies were put into practice in unprecedented displays of 
border enforcement largely targeting Mexican migrants. U.S. immigration scholars have long 
pointed to the influences of nativism, racism, and labor control on behest of agricultural interests 
in the design and implementation of policing campaigns directed at Mexican migrants during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s.19 Over the past few years, a surge in scholarship on the Bracero 
Program has greatly enriched and deepened our understanding of a variety of aspects of this 
migration to the United States. Recent scholarship has documented the creation of transnational 
                                                          
18 Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra!, 103. 
 
19 See, for example: James Cockcroft, Outlaws in the Promised Land: Mexican Immigrant Workers and America’s 
Future (New York: Grove Press, 1986); Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (San 
Jose, CA: The Rosicrucian Press, 1964); Juan Ramon Garcia, “Operation Wetback”: The Mass Deportation of 
Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press: 1980).   
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families,20 examined how gender and modernity shaped braceros’ experiences in Durango and 
California,21 complicated the regional depiction of the Bracero Program by studying migrants’ 
labor in the U.S. South,22 and sharpened our understanding of how race, gender, and indigeneity 
operated between migrants through oral histories.23 However, many questions regarding the 
intensification of border policing in this period remain. While it is clear, for example, that the 
ability to secure cheap labor for large farming interests was one central component to U.S. 
immigration policy, this reason alone does not account for why the Truman and the Eisenhower 
administrations conceived of the unprecedented and extralegal deportation campaigns of the 
early 1950s as reasonable political responses to combat undocumented migrant crossings. 
Studying the “wetback invasion” as a reaction to a Cold War security crisis opens up a critical 
avenue for understanding how the state imposed the harsher border policing regimes of the 
period.24 In short, this project helps to explain how the act of policing the U.S.-Mexico border 
became synonymous with protecting national security.  
                                                          
20 Ana Rosas, “Flexible Families: Bracero Families’ Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and Countries, 1942-
1964,” (Ph.D. Diss, University of Southern California, 2006). 
 
21 Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
 
22 Julie Weise, “Dispatches from the ‘Viejo’ New South: Historicizing Recent Latino Migrations,” Latino 
Studies 10:1-2, May 2012. 
 
23 Mireya Loza, “Braceros on the Boundaries: Activism, Race, Masculinity, and the Legacies of the Bracero 
Program,” (Ph.D. Diss, Brown University, 2011). 
 
24 Only scant attention has been drawn to the rhetoric of anti-communism and border security during the Cold War. 
Avi Astor, "Unauthorized immigration, securitization and the making of Operation Wetback," Latino Studies, (1): 5-
29. Likewise, very little scholarship has been produced addressing Mexican and Mexican American activism during 
the Cold War. On interracial coalition building and Mexican and Mexican American membership in the Communist 
Party, See, Enrique R. Buelna, “The Mexican Americans in the Communist party, 1940-1957,” Center for Research 
on Latinos in a Global Society, University of California, Irvine, 1999, http:repositories.cdlib.org/crlgs/wp14; 
Zaragosa Vargas, “Challenges to Solidarity: The Mexican American Fight for Social and Economic Justice, 1946-
1963,” in Robbie Lieberman and Clarence Lang, eds., Anticommunism and the African American Freedom 
Movement: “another side of the story” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189-227.  
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Moreover, Imperial Divides examines how representations of U.S. empire, security, 
emigration, and border enforcement were constructed within Mexico. Much to the concern of 
radical artists and activists, the Mexican state remained a staunch Cold War ally of the United 
States, despite the widespread critiques concerning U.S. imperialism and the deep resentment 
regarding the exploitation of its migrant citizenry.25 As Eric Zolov explains, during the early 
1950s when “the ‘third world’ was the disputed terrain of superpower rivalries, Mexico became a 
model nation in the U.S. imaginary and valued strategic ally.”26 Indeed, the authoritarian nature 
of the Mexican state and its efforts to combat the strength of independent labor unions, radical 
student groups, and leftist political parties, was justified through its own language of anti-
communism.27 Thus, my works seeks to build on efforts to understand how the antidemocratic 
and repressive actions of the state were constructed within Mexican popular and political 
culture.28 Perhaps the most persistent critiques of the Mexican state by radical artists and 
                                                          
25 Gilbert Gonzalez has been a leading voice in the efforts to incorporate the framework of U.S. empire in explaining 
the more than century long process of migration from Mexico to the United States. Gilbert G. González, Guest 
Workers or Colonized Labor? Mexican Labor Migration to the United States (New York: Paradigm, 2005); Gilbert 
G. González, Culture of Empire: American Writers, Mexico, and Mexican Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2004); Gilbert G. González and Raúl Fernández, A Century of Chicano History: Empire, 
Nations, and Migration (New York: Routledge, 2003).  
 
26 Eric Zolov, “Discovering a Land ‘Mysterious and Obvious’: The Renarrativizing of Postrevolutionary Mexico,” 
in Fragments of a Golden Age, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), 248.  
 
27 The last decade has seen a proliferation of interest in U.S. Cold War relations with Latin America. And yet, 
Mexico remains deeply underrepresented in this scholarship. See for example: Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold 
War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010);  Fernando Herrera Calderon and Adela Cedillo, ed., Challenging 
Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982 (New York , Routledge, 2012); 
Greg Grandin and Gilbert Joseph, ed., A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during 
Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010);  Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela 
Spenser, ed., In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008); Daniela Spenser, ed., Espejos de la guerra fría: México, America Central y el Caribe (México, D.F. 
CIESAS/Porrua, 2004). 
 
28 In part a desire to historicize the ongoing drug war and the use of military style tactics and weapons to manage 
civilian populations, scholars have begun to rethink the consolidation of the Mexican state, recentering attention to 
state violence and repression as constitutive practices in the making of modern Mexico. Wil Pansters notes in the 
introduction to his edited volume Violence, Coercion, and State-Making in Twentieth Century Mexico, that there has 
been a “remarkable lack of theoretical and empirical work that critically engages the issues of violence, coercion, 
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intellectuals during the first decade of the Cold War centered on the belief that Mexico’s 
political, economic, and cultural affairs were being unduly shaped by the United States.29  
 
 
 
A note on sources  
 
 
 
In addition to the government documents located in the Archivo General de la Nación 
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, I examine two key sources to better understand the 
divergent responses to the increased policing of Mexican migrants and the cultural 
representations of U.S.-Mexico relations in Mexico during the 1940s and 1950s. The first is 
artwork from the Taller de Gráfica Popular, an international radical art collective based out of 
Mexico City that provides an important thread connecting the critiques of U.S. empire 
throughout this project.30 During World War II, the collective provided tactical support to the 
                                                          
and insecurity in postrevolutionary state-making in Mexico.” Pansters adds that there a multitude of ways that 
Mexico’s “perfect dictatorship”—the roughly 70 years of rule by the PRI from 1929-2000—hinged on military and 
police actions “against rebellious strongmen in the 1920s and 1930s and against electoral opposition in the 1940s 
and military and secret police repression of labor movements during the 1940s and 1950s, students in the 1960s, and 
rural rebellions during the entire period.” Wil Pansters, “Introduction,” in Wil Pansters, ed., Violence, Coercion and 
State-Making in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Other Half of the Centaur (Stanford, California: Stanford 
California Press, 2012), 7-8, 15. While this collection offers valuable insights into rethinking how the PRI was able 
to maintain authoritarian rule in Mexico, there is a conspicuous lack of attention to both migration and the 
transnational processes of state formation. Mark Overmyer-Velázquez notes the lack of attention to emigration in 
much of the scholarship on Mexican state formation in his excellent historiographical essay that traces the major 
trends and practices in twentieth century Mexican migration. Mark Overmyer-Velázquez, “Histories and 
historiographies of Greater Mexico,” xv-xlv, in Mark Overmyer-Velázquez, ed., Beyond la Frontera: The History of 
Mexico-U.S. Migration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xv. 
 
29 The vast majority of this Cold War scholarship in Mexico has focused on the years after the Cuban Revolution. 
Robert F. Alegre, Railroad Radicals in Cold War Mexico: Gender, Class and Memory (University of Nebraska 
Press, 2014); Celeste González de Bustamante,“Muy Buenas Noches”: Mexico, Television, and the Cold War 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012); Renata Keller, “A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption: 
Mexico’s Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959-1969,” Latin American Research Review 47, no.2 (2012): 100-119; 
Julia Sloan, "Carnivalizing the Cold War: Mexico, the Mexican Revolution, and the Events of 1968," European 
Journal of American Studies [Online], Vol 4, No 1, Online since 18 March 2009, connection on 28 July 2013.  
 
30 See, Dawn Ades, Art in Latin America: The Modern Era, 1820-1880 (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 181-194; The most complete work is Deborah Caplow’s examination of Leopoldo Mendez, director of 
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United States’ war against fascism and played an important role in forging the cultural 
diplomacy between the two countries through its promotion of Pan-Americanism.31 However, in 
the immediate post-war period the TGP rejected the conservative and reactionary politics in 
Mexico and the U.S., transforming the collective into one of the most persistent and visible 
critics of the emerging Cold War in Mexico. Artists denounced the inability or the unwillingness 
on the part of the Mexican state to keep American capital, culture, and corruptive politics out of 
the country. Their efforts to critique U.S. empire found a sizeable and sympathetic audience not 
only in Mexico, but with audiences around the globe. By supporting leftist politicians and 
workers engulfed in labor disputes in Mexico and abroad, while opposing U.S. military and 
economic domination in Latin America and Asia, the collective created public art of global 
importance.32 Large collections of the TGP’s work were held in the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York, the Art Institute of Chicago, the Museum of Western Art in Moscow, and the 
National Museum in Mexico City.33 In the immediate aftermath of World War II, TGP members 
travelled throughout the U.S., staging exhibitions in Chicago (1946), New York (1946), Boston 
(1947), San Francisco (1947) Los Angeles (1948), and Hollywood (1949).34 Due to Cold War 
hysteria, TGP artists were prohibited from traveling to the United States under the Internal 
                                                          
the TGP during the most productive years of the group. Deborah Caplow, Leopoldo Mendez: Revolutionary Art and 
the Texas Press (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008).  
 
31 Diane Miliotes, What May Come: The Taller de Gráfica Popular and the Mexican Political Print (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 10. 
 
32 Rebecca Schreiber, Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 17-20.  
 
33 Miliotes, What May Come, 8.  
 
34 El Taller de Gráfica Popular: Doce años de obra, XXIII. 
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Security Act of 1950, and as a result, the collective expanded its reach by traveling widely 
throughout Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China.  
The TGP was committed to an aesthetics of figurative realism over abstraction. As an 
organization committed to ushering in radical social change to the widest possible audience, 
much emphasis was placed on the accessibility of their artwork. The collective’s work is a 
valuable counterpoint to more traditional foreign relations sources, including diplomatic cables, 
international security conferences, and political speeches, especially because these artists worked 
in an era when many Mexicans would not have purchased newspapers or magazines—both 
because cost made it prohibitively expensive, as well as because Mexico continued to suffer 
from a high level of illiteracy. My interpretations of the TGP’s artwork are meant to examine the 
political messages of the art as it was intended to be read by the public, placing the works in the 
political and historical context in which they were created and presented to the world.  
TGP artists offered radical analysis distinct from what was available from mainstream 
outlets, as the works of the collective concentrated on the connections between U.S. empire, 
racism, and poverty experienced across the globe. Among the collective’s most effective means 
of reaching the public was through their popular and inexpensive Calavera circulars. For 
example, published in A la caragada calaveras in 1951, Angel Bracho’s “Este es el circo del 
siglo yanqui” (This is the Circus of the Yankee Century) drew connections between the 
international violence of U.S. imperial policing regimes, economic exploitation of migrants, and 
white supremacy, revealing how each impacted African Americans, Mexicans, Egyptians, and 
Iranians [Figure 1]. Bracho, who was a member of the Partido Comunista Mexicana (PCM), 
depicts a large skeleton representing the United States, or perhaps more accurately, the American 
justice system, overseeing its morally bankrupt empire in the crumbling Roman Coliseum. The 
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skeleton holds under one arm a copy of the Smith Act, legislation originally passed in 1940, but 
revised in 1948, making conspiracy a criminal act and which was utilized to punish radical labor 
activists. While the Smith Act was the legal justification behind the imprisonment of suspected 
communist leaders in the United States, it also was cited in the extradition of Gus Hall from 
Mexico City. In addition, the Mexican government borrowed from repressive U.S. Cold War era 
legislation, perhaps most significantly the anti-labor policies of the Taft-Hartley Act in its largely 
successful efforts to weaken independent labor unions.35 In its other hand, the skeleton holds a 
torch which has a flame that is ominously shaped in the form of a mushroom cloud from a 
nuclear explosion. All of the consumer goods advertised served as a warning of the encroaching 
cultural imperialism of the United States in Mexico: a bottle of Coca-Cola, Mickey Mouse, the 
Ford Motor Company, and Selecciones Reader (Reader’s Digest) were all available for purchase 
in Mexico City in the early 1950s.36 A final sign advertises carne de perro para braceros (dog 
meat for braceros), as a collapsed image of a migrant desperately crawls to reach it. The fleeting 
comfort of American consumer culture were meant only for some, and in this case, the cruelty 
and racism of the capitalist system lowered the Mexican migrant to struggling in the vain hopes 
of simply being able to consume dog meat. The inclusion of the British empire, represented as a 
wounded lion gnawing at the bones of Egypt and Iran, underscores a global reading of America 
imperialism that extends beyond U.S.-Mexico relations as the British and U.S. are literally 
                                                          
35 Michael Snodgrass, “The Gold Age of Charrismo: Workers, Braceros, and the Political Machinery of 
Postrevolutionary Mexico,” in Paul Gillingham and Benjamin Smith, eds., Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture 
in Mexico, 1938-1968 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 181.  
 
36 The editors of Hoy occasionally expressed similar concerns about the growing number of U.S. magazines in 
Mexico. “Amenza una penetracion imperialista,” Hoy, June 28, 1952, 14-15. 
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chained to one another. And thus, as was common for the TGP, the struggle against racism and 
colonialism is shown as a global one, rather than just a Mexican concern.   
Bracho depicts a corrupt and violent police force as necessary to maintain the U.S. 
empire. On the left side of the print, a grotesque pig sits high atop a pedestal on a balcony 
overlooking the decaying empire. One hoof grasps at its protruding belly, cigar dangling from its 
mouth, while the other hoof holds a baton, making it the ringleader of this imperial circus. Along 
with a crown on its head that has the letters “FBI” printed on it, the pig wears a gun and holster, 
and adorns a black patch that reads “G-MEN”.37 At the center of the print, a member of the Ku 
Klux Klan stands on another pedestal where three bodies hang from it. Wearing a gas mask to 
protect him from the atomic explosion, a police officer stands directly to the left of this horrific 
scene and does nothing to stop the lynching, but instead, raises a club to strike a peace protester. 
Both the FBI and U.S. justice system face the Klansmen, giving tactical approval to the system 
of violent white supremacy. Whereas Truman and others in the State Department claimed that 
racial violence in the United States was merely an antiquated and dying part of U.S. Southern 
culture, Bracho and the rest of the TGP insisted that the systemic deployment of racial violence 
was an essential component to post-war U.S. empire.38   
 
 
                                                          
37 On FBI surveillance of Mexican and Mexicans Americans in the United States during this period, see, Jose Angel 
Gutierrez, “Chicanos under surveillance: 1940 to 1980,” Renato Rosaldo Lecture Series Monograph, vol 2, series 
1984-85 (Spring 1986), 29-58; Jeffrey M. Garcilazo, “McCarthyism, Mexican Americans, and the Los Angeles 
Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born, 1950-1954,” Western Historical Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2001): 273-95. On 
the FBI training the Dirección Federal de Seguridad, the Mexican secret police under the Aleman administration, 
See, Sergio Aguayo Quezada, La charola: una historia de los servicios de intelligencia en México (México, D.F.: 
Hoja Editorial, 2001), 66-67, 74, 102, 209;  On the CIA in Mexico during this period, See, Jefferson Morely, Our 
Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 
2008). 
 
38 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 47-49. 
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Figure 1. Angel Bracho, “Este es el circo del siglo yanqui,” A la caragada calaveras, 1951, 
University of California, San Diego, Geisel Library, Special Collections Library.  
 
 
 
This critique highlights the racial and economic violence underpinning the entirety of the U.S. 
Cold War system. It asks readers to make comparisons between the racial terror visible in the 
lynched bodies of African Americans in the United States, to a global system, one that subjects 
Mexican migrants to crawling for dog food, and leaves nothing behind but the bones of 
Egyptians and Iranians. Bracho reveals a dangerous and morally bankrupt empire, but also one 
that cannot last, as it is on the brink of its own destruction. All of this done, as another corrido 
published in the Calaveras collection reads, at the hands of “los gangsters bolillos/ que forman el 
FBI”.  
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The second central source for studying Mexican culture in this project is the magazine 
Hoy, described by visual cultural historian John Mraz as one of the most popular magazines in 
all of Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s. The magazine’s publisher, Jose Llergo, created the 
publication in the style of Life Magazine for the Mexican middle class in 1937. Mexico’s most 
influential journalists, policymakers, intellectuals, cartoonists, and politicians published in the 
magazine. Eric Zolov explains that Llergo closely followed “presidentialism”—meaning 
essentially that all aspects of Mexican political and popular culture were fair game to public 
scrutiny, aside from the president who was expected “unmitigated reverence… as the supreme 
arbiter of political disputes and the standard bearer of the Mexican body politic."39 Hoy’s efforts 
to cast itself as the leading periodical for the worldly Mexican consumer can be seen below in an 
advertisement that contends the reader could find “El mundo en las paginas de Hoy” (The world 
in the pages of Hoy) [Figure 2]. In this advertisement a young, barefoot boy sells the magazine 
with an image of President Dwight Eisenhower on the cover, presumably in Mexico City. The 
international focus of Hoy by a diverse group of writers from across the political spectrum has 
provided an invaluable opportunity to study the competing ways that Mexican popular and 
political culture were crafted during two global wars. Indeed, Hoy has proven indispensable to 
understanding how the middle class were presented with information on Mexico’s political, 
economic, and security relationship with the United States, the Bracero Program, and boundary 
enforcement.  
 
 
                                                          
39 John Mraz, Looking for Mexico: Modern Visual Culture and National Identity (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 153-200. See also, Eric Zolov, "Jorge Carreno's Graphic Satire and the Politics of "Presidentialism" in 
Mexico during the 1960s," in Estudios interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe, vol. 17, no. 1, 2006, 13-38. 
These restrictions were closely followed. In fact, in the spring of 1953, Llergo and a few editors were forced to 
resign from Hoy when the magazine printed an unflattering photograph of President Aleman’s daughter and her 
husband at a burlesque house in France.  
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Figure 2. Hoy, May 23, 1953. 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 examines the important role that border security played in repairing the shaky 
diplomatic relationship between the United States and Mexico in preparation for World War II. 
Both countries emphasized joint border policing and mutual security as necessary to combat the 
perceived threat posed by Axis spies and saboteurs crossing the poorly guarded border. In 
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Chapter 2, I trace the emergence of the U.S.-Mexico border as a Cold War security threat in the 
minds of U.S. policymakers, politicians, and national media outlets. I argue that these border 
crises were critical in framing Mexican migrants as a national security problem and are essential 
to understanding the development of the mass deportation campaigns of the era.  
The final two chapters turn our attention back to Mexico. Chapter 3 examines popular 
depictions of U.S.-Mexico relations in the immediate post war period, exploring the widespread 
sentiment in Mexico that the nation was being irreparably harmed by American capital, culture, 
and Cold War politics. The authoritarian turn under Alemán, coupled with the close relationship 
with the United States, left many critics worried that Mexico’s border was not strong enough to 
keep the United States outside of Mexican territory. In the final chapter, I interrogate how 
notions of racial and class difference in Mexico impacted mainstream and radical understandings 
of anti-imperialism. This chapter begins by asking why despite the strong rejection of U.S. Cold 
War politics and policies, there was not a more robust call to end the Bracero Program or to 
protest the initial efforts to build cooperative migrant policing regimes between the two 
countries. I argue that the construction of migrants as racially and culturally backwards in 
magazines like Hoy played an important role in understanding why migrants became perceived 
as deserving of greater state policing. Contrasting mainstream depictions of migrants to the 
radical anti-racist images created by the TGP, helps to unpack the deep prejudices informing 
mainstream Mexican culture.   
 Taken together, this dissertation broadens our historical understanding of the origins and 
responses to the efforts to militarize the U.S.-Mexico border. These chapters examine the 
development of the border as an imagined site in need of dramatic defense during two global 
wars, one hot and one ostensibly cold. As importantly, it uncovers a history of dissent, 
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documenting early resistance to the transnational efforts to create a territory under permanent 
warfare.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Entangling Boundaries: Hemispheric Defense and Wartime Border Security, 1940-1945 
 
 
 
On the evening of March 30, 1942, in the northern border city of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, 
about two dozen members of a Japanese social club met to celebrate a child’s birthday party 
when it was unexpectedly interrupted by an international assortment of police, military, and state 
officials. Five U.S. soldiers, the U.S. vice-consul, Juárez brigadier General Jaime Quiñones, and 
a small collection of Mexican soldiers and police surrounded the home, expecting to uncover a 
Japanese spy ring operating along the U.S.-Mexico border. The primary person of interest was 
Dr. Tsunesaburo Hasegawa, a naturalized Mexican citizen, who had lived in Ciudad Juárez for 
nearly two decades. While searching the house, law enforcement officers found a device 
believed to be a transmitter used to share information with Japanese warships in the Pacific. 
Hasegawa was escorted out of the party and placed in detention at a nearby police station where 
he was bombarded with questions by this international coalition about his allegiances to Japan 
and any knowledge he had regarding espionage activities by Axis forces. 
Hasegawa’s Japanese ancestry and frequent trips into El Paso had sparked suspicion from 
the United States Naval Intelligence at Fort Bliss a few months earlier. Naval Intelligence passed 
his case to the Special Inspections Division of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) 
which reported that the physician was a community leader with a poor reputation, citing rumors 
in El Paso that Hasegawa was willing to perform abortions for women who travelled from the 
U.S. to Juárez. Members of the Medical Association of El Paso interviewed by Naval 
Intelligence questioned Hasegawa’s morality with one doctor maintaining that he was 
“repugnant to society.” A few months earlier on one of his trips into El Paso, Hasegawa was 
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detained and questioned by intelligence officers who determined “that this Jap is definitely a 
trouble maker and does try to stir up the Japs against the United States.” 1  
The questioning of Dr. Hasegawa led to his eventual arrest despite his insistence of 
innocence and the weak evidence presented against him. Upon learning of Hasegawa’s 
detainment, community members of Japanese descent in Ciudad Juárez protested and strenuously 
denied the governments’ claims that the fifty-seven year old doctor had been orchestrating 
espionage activities. In truth, these police actions reveal much more about the imaginations of 
law enforcement officials in their attempts to maintain international security than it does about 
the threats posed by border residents. The doctor was not a spy and the transmitting device that 
sparked his detention turned out to be nothing more than an ordinary radio.2 Even when this 
information became clear to investigators, Hasegawa was forced to move from Juárez to Mexico 
City so that his activities could be more closely monitored by the Departamento de 
Gobernación.  
Hasegawa’s fate was similar to that of many Japanese and Japanese Mexicans living near 
the U.S.-Mexico border. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Ávila 
Camacho declared war against the Axis powers and passed an executive order that restricted the 
rights of “Axis nationals” in Mexico.3 Japanese immigrants and their children who had received 
Mexican citizenship in the previous two years had it revoked and perhaps most egregiously, the 
                                                          
1 “Memorándum,” AGN, Sala 2, Caja 361, Expediente 54.  
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3Germans, Japanese, and Italians had their bank accounts frozen and some 250 businesses were confiscated and 
became run by the state under the Ley relativa a propiedades y negocios del enemigo (Decree relating to the 
Property and Business of the Enemy). Stephen R Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption 
(Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 117-18. 
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Departamento de Gobernación ordered all Axis nationals living within 150km (about 93 miles) 
from any of Mexico’s borders or coasts to relocate to Mexico City. Officially covering all Axis 
nationals, including Germans and Italians, the president’s directive was only vigorously enforced 
for Japanese and Japanese-Mexicans. Beginning in February 1942, an estimated 80 percent of 
the 5,100 Japanese and Japanese-Mexicans residing along the nation’s northern border and 
coasts were forced to register with the government and move from their homes to the nation’s 
capital.4  
 
 
 
                        
 
Figure 3. Various photographs documenting this particular policing campaign in Ciudad Juárez 
were taken by U.S. intelligence agencies and were stored in the National Archives in 
Washington.  The caption of the photograph reads: “General Quiñones questions Dr. T. 
Hasegawa, apprehended Japanese agent, about radio equipment which was seized in Mexican 
Army raids. Note armed guard of Mexican Army. 1942.” NARA, 111-SC-Box58-136729. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Daniel M Masterson, The Japanese in Latin America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 126. 
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These acts of cooperative border policing were emblematic of a wider set of agreements 
that had been forged between the two governments in the run up to the World War II. Following 
the tumultuous relationship between the U.S. and Mexico during Lázaro Cárdenas’ presidency 
(1934-1940), there was a dramatic turn toward greater political, economic, and security 
cooperation. This momentous shift was marked by a historic meeting between Presidents Ávila 
Camacho and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the northern Mexican city of Monterrey in April, 1943.5 
Thousands gathered to celebrate at the elaborate and well-choreographed events in the city’s 
zócalo and later at a nearby military base, providing an unequivocal visual representation of the 
goodwill and international cooperation shared by the two nations.6 The U.S. press praised 
Mexico’s enthusiastic participation in the allied war effort—noting the considerable sacrifices it 
had made for hemispheric defense—supplying the United States with valuable raw materials, 
granting the use of its citizens as temporary farm laborers, and coordinating efforts to guard its 
borders and coasts from Axis spies and saboteurs. 
For many, the new strategic relationships marked an opportunity to move past the two 
nations’ contentious histories. Only a few years earlier, it would have been unfathomable for a 
sitting U.S. president to visit a Mexican military base and discuss mutual security concerns with 
his Mexican counterpart. Such acts revealed to optimistic observers that the relationships 
between these countries could no longer be described as being one marked by U.S. economic or 
                                                          
5 “Monterrey Crowd Greets 2 Leaders,” The New York Times, April 21, 1943, 11; Charels Leavelle, “Booming Guns 
Hail President in Monterrey,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 21, 1943, 1; “Nations’ Heads pledge unity of 
‘neighbors,’” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 21, 1943, 1; Douglas Cornell, “Avila Camacho Repays visit by 
Roosevelt,” Washington Post, 1; W.H. Lawrence, “U.S. and Mexican Presidents Visit an air station in Texas”, New 
York Times, April 22, 1943, 1; Barnet Nover, ”Good Neighbors,” The Washington Post, April 22, 1943, 14; Bertram 
Hulen, “Mexico Meeting viewed as solidarity gesture,” New York Times, April 25, 1943, E7. 
 
6 “La Vista de Roosevelt,” Hoy, May 7, 1942, 7.  7-8. 
25 
 
political domination. Instead, they argued, that the much heralded Good Neighbor policy toward 
Latin America had helped usher in a new era of good will built on mutual respect and 
cooperation. The editorial page of the New York Times was one of the many U.S. publications 
that celebrated President Roosevelt’s declaration that closer relations between the two countries 
proved that “the day of the exploitation of the resources of one country for the benefit of any 
group in another country is definitely over.”7 In just one meeting, the United States was able to 
claim that it had successfully shed its imperial past, forging a new future built on friendship, 
deep understanding, and mutual aid.  
Roosevelt’s desired clean break from the past was echoed by the binational Mexican-
American Commission for Economic Cooperation. The commission, which sought to develop 
the Mexican national economy by more closely integrating it with the U.S. economy, proudly 
proclaimed that “the days of exploitation or economic imperialism, whether by nations or by 
powerful private groups, are past—no future Mexican or United States government will condone 
or permit their reappearance.”8 Such joint declarations hailing the end of U.S. imperial interests 
in its southern neighbor’s territory were in large part an effort to convince the Mexican public 
that wartime sacrifices were in fact in Mexico’s national interests. Mexican leaders claimed that 
collaboration with the United States and sacrifices made during the war would eventually help 
create a more modern, socially equitable, and just Mexican society. Indeed, the repeated 
rejection of U.S. imperial intentions by leaders from both countries was meant to assure a 
skeptical Mexican public that wartime policy decisions were not being imposed by the “Colossus 
of the North,” but were in-fact being negotiated in good faith between trusting partners with 
                                                          
7 “Two Presidents at Monterrey,” The New York Times, April 21, 1943, 24. 
 
8 “Good Neighbor,” The Washington Post, July 23, 1943, 10. 
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shared long-term interests in developing Mexico’s economy, and a short term imperative of 
keeping the Axis powers out the Americas, to ensure victory in the war.    
Rather than exploring the entire array of diplomatic processes that helped forge closer 
military, economic, and political ties during the war, this chapter focuses on the role that 
Mexico’s shared border played in shaping this new spirit of cooperation. It looks at how 
government and non-government actors perceived threats to national security by the Axis powers 
were mapped on to the borders of each nation. It traces how Mexico’s coastal and border defense 
were entangled with United States’ larger objective of hemispheric defense. This chapter 
examines how boundary threats were mobilized in the development of what historian John 
Mason Hart has described as a new era of United States imperial relations, built on cooperation 
and accommodation, rather than outright confrontation with Mexican political and economic 
elites.9 This chapter lays the foundation for understanding how a Mexican public deeply 
skeptical of U.S. imperial aims were encouraged to embrace the emerging partnership. Border 
security and the threat of insecure boundaries were central to forging this wartime relationship 
between the United States and Mexico.  
 
 
 
The politics of Good Neighbors and Hemispheric Defense, 1930s-1940s 
 
 
 
Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency spurred major changes in diplomacy between the United 
States and Latin America under the “Good Neighbor Policy.” These efforts to alter U.S. foreign 
policy toward Latin America had actually begun to change course under the previous presidency 
                                                          
9 John M. Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 401-31.  
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of Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). Hoover had initiated a different diplomatic approach for a 
variety of reasons, including limited access to federal funds during the Great Depression, public 
discontent over the large U.S. military operations in the region, and the belief by many 
policymakers that cooperation with local elites was ultimately more beneficial to U.S. interests 
than outright occupation of Latin American countries. Hoover’s policy of rejecting direct 
unilateral military intervention in Latin America and the projection of greater respect for national 
self-determination was adopted by Roosevelt. Shortly after Roosevelt came to office in 1933, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull publicly declared at the Seventh International Conference of 
American states in Montevideo, Uruguay, an end to direct U.S. military interventions in the 
Americas. Within months the United States had voluntarily ended formal military occupation of 
Nicaragua and began removing troops from Haiti the following year.  
In the 1930s, as the United States was reconfiguring its policy objectives toward Latin 
America, Mexico was undergoing a rapid period of economic and political transition under the 
direction of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). According to historian Friedrich Schuler, 
the global economic crisis “provided the revolutionary state with a new mandate to act as 
economic financier, developer, and marketing agent.”10 During the early years of the Cárdenas’ 
administration, there was a clear movement to the left in the nation’s political governing 
philosophy, as the Mexican state adopted far greater direct involvement in economic 
modernization programs. Cárdenas’ active state policies were much greater than any previous 
presidents and paved the way for open confrontation between the Mexican state and foreign 
                                                          
10 Friedrich E. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican foreign relations in the age of Lázaro 
Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 12.  
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corporate interests that had long been running profitable enterprises, with minimal state 
intervention.  
In 1935 and 1936 the revolutionary state began to expand its presence in the production, 
exploration, and processing of Mexico’s oil and mining reserves. However, the Mexican 
government was still dependent on more capital rich nations to help extract, refine, and export 
natural resources. The poor economic climate during the worldwide depression encouraged 
Mexico to look to Europe and Asia in order to expand its potential trading partners. Therefore, in 
addition to seeking U.S. investments, the Mexican government sought German, French, Italian, 
Dutch, and Japanese expertise for the development of industries that would maximize revenue 
from Mexico’s natural resources. The Cárdenas administration pit European, Asian, and U.S. 
interests against one another to create competition for access to Mexico’s resources and markets. 
This strategy aided in the growth of revenues for the Mexican state in the mid-1930s and allowed 
it to pursue developmental policies despite the global depression. However, a convergence of 
factors in the summer of 1937, including widespread labor unrest, high inflation, and poor 
weather resulting in diminished crop yields, resulted in a sharp economic downturn that threw 
the viability of the Mexican state’s economic development plans into jeopardy. Ultimately, the 
economic collapse and a strengthening political opposition in Mexico convinced President 
Cárdenas that his only option to maintain power and save the activist state was to seize all 
foreign oil holdings, which he did in March of 1938.11  
The Mexican public, which had long experienced the presence of foreign companies 
extracting natural resources with little evidence of direct economic benefit, responded 
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overwhelmingly in favor to Cardenas’ expropriation, viewing it as a bold and positive step 
toward real and lasting economic independence for the nation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, hostilities 
erupted almost immediately between the Mexican state and the oil corporations. U.S., Dutch, and 
British oil companies operating in Mexico rejected the maneuver, challenging the legality of 
expropriation and the decision by the Mexican government to defer compensation for up to ten 
years.12 However, the political timing of the state expropriation was selected with great care, and 
the business community was ultimately left with few strong options to retain their oil claims.13 
U.S. foreign policy makers proved to be more concerned about Mexico’s political stability, citing 
the burgeoning inter-American alliance, Good Neighbor policy, and most importantly, the fear 
that disrupting the Cárdenas regime could open the door to fascist or communist groups to seize 
power in the country, as reasons for not fighting harder for American oil interests. The United 
States did exert economic and diplomatic pressures to try and ensure “fair compensation” was 
paid to companies, but these measures, including the denial of accesses to silver and oil markets, 
in conjunction with restricting oil extracting equipment, did not prove burdensome enough to 
force Mexico to radically change course.  In the end, for U.S. policymakers—with global war all 
but a certainty—national security concerns trumped the demands of dissatisfied individual 
businesses and corporations operating in Mexico.14   
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Mexican officials were well aware that that the impending international conflict limited 
how European powers and the United States could react to the domestic Mexican economic 
agenda. The United States had begun to articulate concerns regarding hemispheric defense and 
Mexican leaders came to see it as an opportunity to expand on its economic and military 
modernization plans. Minister of Hacienda Eduardo Suarez and Minister of Gobernación Garcia 
Tellez, two advisors close to Cárdenas, actively sought to take advantage of the war and saw it as 
a possible cure for Mexico’s economic crises. They viewed wartime cooperation as inevitable, 
but believed that the situation could be manipulated to Mexico’s benefit by promoting plans to 
build and modernize existing public infrastructure, especially railroads, telegraph systems, 
highways, and electricity plants.15  
By the time of the 1940 presidential election, Cárdenas had begun to shift the country 
rightward as state support for workers’ rights waned once the Mexican government became sole 
owner of commercial operations. Cárdenas’ hand-selected choice was Ávila Camacho, Secretary 
of National Defense, who ran against northern general Juan Andreu Almazán. An independent 
candidate from the Revolutionary Party of National Unification (PRUN), Almazán claimed that 
Mexico was a nation in crisis. In campaign stops across the country he presented himself as the 
sole candidate who could direct Mexico out of the ongoing economic downturn, secure better 
relations with the United States, and prepare a strong domestic response to the war in Europe and 
Asia. Almazán warned citizens that Axis subversives were already operating in the country and 
as the former commander of the Northern military zone, such allegations came with an air of 
authority. Although he would lose what many considered to be a fraudulent election, his claims 
of Axis espionage did garner attention from U.S. officials. After losing the election, Almazán 
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fled to the United States and was convinced that the U.S. would intervene militarily on his 
behalf. While a few supporters took up arms in Mexico to challenge the election results, 
Almazán realized such efforts were destined to fail once it became clear that the U.S. was not 
going to offer its support. U.S. military support was not forthcoming in part because newly 
elected President Camacho worked hard behind the scenes to convince U.S. officials that his 
intentions were to mend the relations that had soured under Cardenas’ presidency. Camacho 
assured skeptics in the State Department that one of his first points of order would be to make 
sure that the two countries would work together on matters of international security.  
In August of 1940, following Camacho’s contested election, Under Secretary Sumner 
Welles and Mexican ambassador Francisco Castillo Nájera met to discuss a variety of issues, 
including trade agreements, a railroad dispute, and cooperation on matters pertaining to 
international defense.16 For the U.S., these initial meetings were viewed as a successful starting 
point. Mexico promised to provide much needed raw materials for the war effort, while in 
exchange, Mexican officials’ secured promises for technological and military aid from the 
United States.  Henry Wallace, who became the first vice-president in U.S. history to travel to 
Mexico City to attend an inauguration of a Mexican President, remarked that for the first time 
since the Mexican revolution the United States had “a good opportunity to clean up sources of 
misunderstanding and irritation” that had plagued the relationship between both nations.17 
As Axis victories mounted in Europe and Asia during the first few months of Camacho’s 
presidency, suspicions grew in the United States about the possibility that Axis spies and 
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saboteurs would target Mexico. In March of 1941, negotiations concerning Mexico’s 
participation in hemispheric defense were made public in statements released by the State 
Department in Mexico City.18 By April, details of the mutual agreements were being reported by 
the press in both nations. U.S. and Mexican army officials planned for worst case scenarios, 
including how to respond to an Axis invasion or devastating acts of sabotage. In preparation, 
Mexico more than doubled its army from 60,000 to 120,000 and received lend-lease aid from the 
U.S. to build highways, railroads, harbors, and airstrips.19 In exchange, Mexico guaranteed to 
cooperate with hemispheric defense, allowing U.S. radars to be set up in Mexican territory. U.S. 
planes were also permitted to refuel at Mexican airports on their way to and from the Panama 
Canal, and U.S. military personnel and intelligence agents were granted access to Mexican 
territory. As F.S. Clark, head of the United States War Plans Division, remarked, this was the 
first time that military representatives from both nations were able to meet and make wartime 
preparations in “complete harmony” with one another. 20 
Mexico also agreed to temporarily loan thousands of agricultural workers to the U.S. 
during the war under the Bracero Program. Southwestern growers and their allies in Congress 
argued that labor shortages caused by the war would leave no one to harvest crops, unless 
Mexicans were permitted to fulfill the required labor. Both countries stood to benefit from the 
program, growers argued, as Mexican migrants would gain higher wages than were available in 
their hometowns and learn valuable modern farming techniques, while the U.S. war effort would 
be bolstered by ensuring agricultural crops were harvested. Like many issues dealing with the 
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wartime cooperation, the emergency wartime program proved to have long lasting consequences, 
as the Bracero Program would persist into the 1960s under a series of negotiated labor contracts. 
On December 8th, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Mexican 
government suspended official diplomatic relations with Japan and prepared for a possible 
Japanese attack in Baja California. President Camacho immediately responded by placing 
restrictive measures on Axis nationals. The attack on Pearl Harbor led to an intensification of the 
cooperative agreements, and in February 1942, Roosevelt signed into law U.S. Executive Order 
9080, which created the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission. As stated in the 
executive order, the purpose of the commission was to study and come up with solutions to the 
“problems relating to the common defense of the United States and Mexico, to consider broad 
plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the United States, and to propose to the 
respective governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion should be adopted.”   
 
 
 
Imagining a “fifth column”  
 
 
 
The Good Neighbor Policy proved useful in cultivating a security coalition in Latin 
America that would serve as a basis for keeping the Americas isolated from the growing 
conflicts brewing in Europe and Asia. Throughout the 1930s, rumors spread within the United 
States about the presence of foreign agents plotting to overthrow governments, blow up valuable 
oil fields, and disrupt the hemispheric stability that U.S. policymakers found so important to their 
own national security. In 1943, during a radio broadcast, President Roosevelt commented on 
these threats, reporting that German airfields had been uncovered in Colombia by U.S. 
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intelligence agencies, though he would later have to backtrack, following a diplomatic firestorm 
that ensued as a result of the unfounded allegations.21 According to military experts, some of the 
greatest risks to hemispheric defense included Brazil, Colombia, and the Panama Canal. 
However, while Latin America as a whole was seen by the military as susceptible to Axis 
attacks, no country received as much attention from U.S. officials as did their southern neighbor.  
The U.S. mainstream press utilized the term “Fifth column” to discuss the potential for 
Axis sabotage throughout the Americas. It was reportedly first used in 1935 during the Spanish 
Civil War by General Emilio de Mola in Seville. De Mola boasted in a radio broadcast that 
General Franco had four columns of troops prepared to attack the Republican stronghold of 
Madrid, while a fifth column, consisting of Madrid residents and supporters of the fascist leader, 
would rise up and aid in defending the city. Ernest Hemingway helped popularize the term in his 
play “The Fifth Column,” which he wrote about his experiences reporting during the Spanish 
Civil War. In the United States, the term proved to be elastic. It would be used interchangeably 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s to refer to anyone or group of people suspected of treason, 
sabotage, or spying. The press reported that Italian fascists, Japanese imperialists, Soviet 
Bolsheviks, and German Nazis operated as fifth columnists.  
Throughout the late 1930s, charges of fifth columnist activities were occasionally found 
in newspapers and in radio commentary highlighting Axis espionage in Europe.  However, it was 
not until the German blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940 that resulted in the fall of Poland, Norway, 
Holland, Belgium, and France in Europe that the fifth column fear really began to permeate U.S. 
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popular culture.22 News agencies searching for a way to explain the rapid success of the Nazi 
blitzkrieg in Europe blamed fifth columnist saboteurs who had sold out their respective countries 
to aid the Nazi army.23 The New York Post, for example, ran a story proclaiming that traitors 
within Norway were responsible for surrendering with the Nazis without resistance.24 From this 
point onward fifth-columnists would be associated most closely to Axis nationals and anyone 
who aided them. Harold Lavine, writer for the New York City newspaper PM and later the editor 
of Newsweek, explained that prior to the fall of France the attitude from most newspaper editors 
was that the multitude of reports on the fifth column were largely written off as “crackpot stuff.” 
Such reports were crafted by a variety of sources with varying levels of credibility, including the 
Department of Justice and the Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as groups like the American 
Jewish Committee and the American Committee Against Nazi Propaganda, along with a variety 
of veterans’ groups. But after the spread of the Nazi army across Europe, much to the dismay of 
Lavine, newspapers in the United States reevaluated the stories they had once dismissed and 
“newspapermen, who once had derided [reports on an American Fifth Column], laughed no 
more, and stories which had gathered dust for years hurled into print.”25 These “crackpot” 
stories, as Lavine called them, found a place in the mainstream media and helped promote the 
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idea that there was an active and dangerous fifth column lurking in the United States that was a 
threat to U.S. national security.  
Part of the power of the fifth column concept was that it conjured up images of a standing 
army that was waiting for the most opportune time to attack. News reports claimed that fifth 
columnists used every means at their disposal, including inciting rumors, publishing propaganda, 
and planning military attacks. One paper went so far as to claim that one million fifth columnists 
were known to be operating in the United States.26 According to these papers, the large number 
of potential enemies and the wide diversity in their underhanded tricks required vigilance on the 
part of U.S. citizens. Readers were instructed to be aware of the actions of friends and neighbors 
who could have secretly been acting as spies and saboteurs. This vigilance took a number of 
different forms during the height of the fifth column hysteria. Harold Lavine paints a vivid 
picture of the impact that the growing attention and mounting anxiety had on the American 
public:  
 
 
 
Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, an innocent group of religious fanatics who 
refuse to salute the Stars and Stripes because of their religion forbids the worship 
of symbols, were mobbed in the streets. A foundry worker in Sparta, Mich., killed 
his neighbor because ‘he was in the Fifth Column.’ In Sapulpa, Okla., it was 
decided that Technocrats were Fifth Columnists, and one was actually jailed. An 
Erase-the-Fifth-Column, Inc, was formed in Los Angeles. Jeff Davis, self-styled 
King of the Hoboes, appointed One-Eye Connolly, the hobo gate crasher, to 
watch the Fifth Column on freight trains riding the rods. Some fifty women, 
meeting in New York, started an organization pledged to shoot down German 
parachutists, with the acting regional director of the National Legion of Mothers 
as their head. The Erie County, New York, American Legion mobilized to keep 
Fifth Columnists from crossing the border at Niagara Falls.27 
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Despite the lack of credible evidence, high-level public officials were insistent about the 
possibility of a fifth column attack in the United States. William J. Donovan, head of the Office 
of Strategic Services, laid out the problem succinctly for the America public, explaining that 
there were lessons to be learned from the quick German victories across Europe. Donovan 
pointed to fifth column propaganda campaigns as being particularly important as they lowered 
national morale, created divisions of national unity, and most importantly, created suspicion 
among the American public. In particular, Donovan was worried that fifth columnists were 
planning to “incite jealousy and antagonism between different classes of society as well as 
between various political, racial, and religious groups.”28 Along with the possibility of being 
attacked from within, public officials circulated information that fifth columnists may be 
working just outside the reaches of U.S. law enforcement. Edward L. Bernays, who had worked 
for the Committee on Public Information, the propaganda commission charged by Woodrow 
Wilson to drum up support for United States participation in World War I, formed the Counsel 
on Public Relations, a pseudo-scientific group seeking to manufacture public opinion through the 
use of modern media systems during the Second World War.29 Bernays’ speech entitled 
“Fighting the fifth column in the Americas” laid out a bleak picture of the outlook in Latin 
America. Bernay singled out Mexico as having a significant problem with Germans spies who 
posed as tourists, but who were actually engaged in espionage.30 It was within this context that in 
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1939 the INS commissioner reasoned that “The international situation which is developing in 
Europe furnishes strong reason for strengthening the Border Patrol without undue delay.”31 
 The U.S. press began to focus on Mexico as a place where fifth columnist activity was 
likely to be brewing. Reports cited Axis nationals, the Spanish Falange, and communist 
sympathizers as capable of sabotaging the U.S. war effort. The problem was not simply that such groups 
existed, but that Mexicans were possibly unwittingly aiding the enemy’s cause. For example, a drawing 
appearing alongside a Washington Post article entitled, “Germans Developing Fifth Column Which is 
Serious Threat to U.S. Security,” depicted German tourists, engineers, and Japanese fishing boats as a 
grave cause for concern. In one panel of the drawing an unsuspecting Mexican wearing a sombrero and 
poncho gives directions to a German. While the Mexican believes he is simply helping a tourist, he is 
actually unknowingly contributing to German espionage by directing the spy northward to the United 
States.32 Such concerns were stated by INS officials, who advised Border Patrol agents that it was 
entirely possible that “Axis agents may endeavor to look the part of a local farmer or at night may even 
black their hands and faces, particularly in isolated areas, to look like negroes.”33  
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Figure 4. Russell B. Porter, “Germans Developing Fifth Column Which is Serious Threat to U.S. 
Security,” The Washington Post, September 1, 1940, B5. Caption: A Nazi tourist… A Japanese 
fishing boat…  A German engineer… potential “Fifth Column” menace in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
 
 
The quality of newspaper reports and the potential for Axis sabotage varied greatly. For 
its part, The New York Times documented the mobilization of the Mexican military on its western 
coast in preparations for a possible Axis invasion, while other dailies depended on headline 
grabbing sensationalist articles warning of an imminent attack on the United States.34 In an 
article entitled “100,000 German Spies in the Americas!”, for example, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune reported that the United States was in grave danger due to the inability of Latin 
American governments to wage successful campaigns against German espionage. This full paged 
article, complete with photographs of fugitive Axis agents, documented the treacherous activities 
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of the thousands of spies plotting throughout the Americas.35 These agents were mostly 
described as well-trained radio and submarine technicians, or as communications and 
propaganda specialists who had snuck into the hemisphere through illicit means, while posing as 
salesmen, trade promoters, and tourists.  
The list of offenses supposedly carried out by Axis nationals in Mexico varied greatly. 
Some reports claimed that enemy sympathizers were attempting to manufacture an economic 
crisis by spreading unfounded rumors concerning likely food shortages.36 Newspapers reported 
that Axis spies were travelling widely throughout Mexico with agents showing special interests 
in Mexico’s ports and harbors, the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific coastline, and its valuable oil 
fields. Rumors circulated in the press suggesting that large swaths of land had already been 
purchased in Acapulco and along the west coast by Axis nationals, which ultimately would be 
used for an attack on harbors that were crucial to Mexico’s strategic defense. The coast along 
Baja California was viewed as one of the more likely places for an invasion due its sparsely 
settled population, relatively large Japanese community, and its proximity to the U.S.-Mexico 
border.   
Journalist Betty Kirk, who worked as the foreign correspondent to Mexico for numerous 
British and U.S. newspapers including the Christian Science Monitor, commented extensively on 
the growing troubles along the U.S-Mexico border and the Pacific coastline. Kirk’s book, 
Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of Europe versus America (1942) concluded with a 
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chapter warning of the possibility of an imminent attack on United States soil. Kirk ominously 
informed readers that in Mexico:   
 
 
 
Japan has a skeleton army in the direct command of Premier Hideki Tojo. This 
skeleton army…has two plans. One is to direct the invasion…of the United States 
through the Mexican states of Sonora and Sinaloa. The other is to promote in 
cooperation with the Spanish Falangista allies, the rebellion of Mexican Indians 
against the whites—in particular, against the ‘Yankees’. These race riots will be 
coordinated with the invasion attempts.37  
 
 
 
Kirk’s work highlights the highly malleable nature of the threats looming along the U.S.-Mexico 
border. It also shows how hearsay, rumor, and innuendo were passed off as plausible war 
strategies to a veteran news correspondent. Importantly, Kirk affirmed that that the Japanese had 
a well-established wartime plan for invasion in Mexico, and that as it had in the case of Pearl 
Harbor, the Japanese army was simply biding its time to attack the United States when it least 
expected. Secondly, Kirk draws on various threats to the global order, including a possible 
Japanese alliance with Spanish fascists, who were also rumored to be active in Mexico. Finally, 
this passage reflects some of the concerns of William J. Donovan, who worried about racial 
tensions in the United States being used to incite discord and conflict amongst the American 
populace. Drawing on one of the key tropes of the fifth column threat, Kirk suggested that the 
Japanese would be able to take advantage of the racial discrimination experienced by indigenous 
people in Mexico to launch a race war that would ultimately cause disruptions or distractions 
allowing for the Japanese invasion to occur. Although it may not be surprising that a journalist 
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would report on such rumors, it is noteworthy that Kirk’s contemporaries looked upon her work 
favorably despite the fact that she supplied very little compelling evidence to support her claims. 
James Ferguson King, a Latin American historian at Northwestern University, went so far as to 
proclaim in a review of Covering the Mexican Front that Kirk’s writing was not “just another 
superficial journalistic account,” but was a “responsible, eye-witness report on recent history in 
Mexico by a specialist.”38  
 While the most important result of the Axis fifth column threat was that it was used to 
justify the relocation orders of Japanese in both Mexico and the United States, it is worth noting 
that like most countries in the Americas, including the United States, there was Axis propaganda 
published in Mexico. Most of it was pro-Nazi materials spread by German migrants living in 
larger cities, including Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City.39 Much to the dismay of the 
U.S. Consulate, some German migrants printed pro-Nazi pamphlets and handed them out 
directly to Mexican citizens. Local newspapers accepted money by these groups to print pro-
German and pro-Axis stories. The propaganda sought to highlight the strength of the German 
army, to place the blame of poverty in Mexico on Jews working in the United States, and to 
stress that many of the economic hardships in Mexico were due to the nation’s semi-colonial 
status with the United States. The noise made by these groups was far greater than any threat 
they actually could have carried out in Mexico or the United States. However, for a U.S. public 
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reeling from the bombing of Pearl Harbor and fearful of subsequent attacks, the ubiquitous 
reports on the operations of a fifth column operating in Mexico were viewed as a frightening 
possibility.  
 
 
 
Cultivating a Culture of Cooperation  
 
 
 
The United States’ imperial history in Mexico made a quick and seamless transition to 
closer military and economic relations between the two nations politically unfeasible. A 
systematic propaganda effort by the governments in Mexico City and Washington D.C. sought to 
obscure the imperial past and craft a public image of two nations working together on equal 
footing to defeat a common enemy. Essential to this process were the public campaigns arguing 
that the shared U.S.-Mexico border represented a legitimate threat to hemispheric security and 
that the Allied war effort was necessary to ensure peace and prosperity in Mexico. Images of 
Axis spies and saboteurs lurking throughout the hemisphere intensified in both countries 
following the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The Mexican government launched propaganda 
campaigns that equated public participation in the war effort as synonymous with good 
citizenship. It sold a closer relationship with the United States to a weary Mexican public as a 
means to ensure domestic security, while also being critical to jump starting economic 
development in a struggling economy, all of which would further the goals of the Mexican 
Revolution.40 While the results of the propaganda campaigns in Mexico did not always lead to 
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popular enthusiasm that officials intended, the relations between the two nations’ governments 
continued to grow stronger through wartime preparation. 
One of the major hurdles the Mexican government faced in convincing its citizens to get 
behind the war effort was in persuading them that that the war being waged in Europe and Asia 
represented a direct threat to the Mexican nation. This was accomplished in part by projecting 
the potentially catastrophic results of an Axis victory to Mexico’s revolutionary ideals of 
democracy and racial equality. Similar to reports circulating in the United States, espionage and 
propaganda activities by Germans, Italians, and Japanese were printed in Mexican newspapers 
and government sponsored publicity campaigns. Reports surfaced claiming saboteurs were 
operating in various locations within the country, from the major cities of Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, and Monterrey, to more remote pueblos located along the coastlines and border 
areas in the north and the south.  
From the beginning of Avila Camacho’s presidency, the U.S. press wrote mostly 
favorable accounts of the Mexican federal government’s commitment to the Allied cause.41 
There were, however, a few skeptics that were not convinced that Mexico would be a strong ally, 
questioning whether the Mexican people were capable of making real contributions to the war 
effort. An article in the Washington Post doubted whether Mexican society was developed 
culturally or economically enough to be an adequate partner. Numerous examples were cited that 
could hinder Mexican participation in the war, including the lack of training among military 
leadership, language barriers that military personnel faced in instructing its large indigenous 
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population, and the limited financial resources at the government’s disposal. The article was 
accompanied by a picture of a Mexican campesino sitting siting on a donkey with a caption 
reading: “This Mexican, living near Mexico City, typifies the problem his government has in 
selling the war to the population. Left alone, most of them would prefer not to worry about such 
a complicated venture.”42 The picture reinforced the notion that the valiant efforts on the part of 
the Mexican state were likely to be hindered by the large population of small-scale farmers who 
had difficulties grasping concepts outside of their direct lived experiences. Some Mexicans, the 
Washington Post argued, simply were unable to understand the impact of global affairs on their 
provincial lives. Indeed, it was difficult for the newspaper to fathom how the United States could 
possibly expect the Mexican military to successfully be able to prepare for the war.  
Other national newspapers raised concerns regarding the Mexican military’s professed 
desire to work with the United States on thwarting Axis advances. On a practical level some 
wondered whether the Mexican Navy was well-enough equipped to guard the thousands of miles 
of coastlines along two oceans. Others believed that the Mexican army had been irrevocably 
corrupted. Rumors surfaced claiming that Germans had made large inroads with the Mexican 
Army and that these foreigners had crafted a “strong impression on Mexican military men, many 
of whom have expressed strong pro-German sentiments.”43 Perhaps most concerning was that 
these Nazi sympathizers had reportedly maintained close personal relationships with former 
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President Cárdenas who had symbolically agreed to take charge as the Secretary of War 
stationed in Baja California.   
By and large, however, national and local papers in the U.S. praised Camacho for his 
ability to stand up against the Axis powers at a time when few other Latin American nations had 
been willing to do so. The Hynes-Clearwater Journal’s editorial page praised “our gallant 
Mexican allies” who were exhausting all efforts to take care of the espionage on the Pacific 
Coast. It praised the work of the Mexican government, but also the enthusiastic response by the 
Mexican people, concluding that it would be grateful if “Mexico would loan some of her 
enthusiasm in the war effort to a lot our indifferent American citizens.”44 Likewise, the St. Post-
Louis Dispatch hailed Mexico’s uncompromising stance against the Axis powers, publishing an 
editorial cartoon depicting the Mexican national symbol of an eagle strangling the Nazi swastika 
in its talons, suggesting the paper’s appreciation for its neighbor’s commitment to the war.45 
Despite the glowing international reviews that Camacho received from the United States, 
the president remained worried about the potential domestic political fallout from forging closer 
ties with its northern neighbor. Many Mexicans questioned the economic development policies 
that included large amounts of wartime materials and foodstuffs being exported to the United 
States, even as food shortages were being experienced in Mexico. Camacho attempted to calm 
these concerns and cultivate support for the war by frequently broadcasting addresses on the 
radio directly to the Mexican public, by organizing a large civilian reserve army, and by holding 
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numerous public events displaying Mexican military might. Local branches of the civilian army 
were established throughout the nation, ostensibly to train and prepare Mexican citizens for a 
possible attack on its soil, but which also functioned as a medium for the government to unify its 
citizenry behind its wartime policies. Indeed, according to Hoy, one of the unexpected benefits of 
wartime preparation was that it helped bridge social divisions in Mexico between young men 
from distinct racial and economic backgrounds. In a photo-essay titled “Ciudadanos de la 
república,” the magazine celebrated how it was now possible for a dark skinned young man from 
the countryside to forge a meaningful friendship with a light skinned recruit who was a “son of 
capitalists” [Figure 5]. In such accounts, obligatory military service was changing the national 
character, as young men from radically different racial and class backgrounds had the 
opportunity to interact with one another, and by doing so, to strengthen the nation. The caption 
of the image read: 
 
 
  
Las diferencias de clases, de raza y de color no solamente desaparecen en el 
cuartel de conscriptos, sino que se establecen inquebrantables lazos de amistad 
entre los jóvenes de la ciudad y del campo, entre obreros, campesinos e hijos de 
capitalistas. Ahí todos son soldados con los mismos derechos y las mismas 
obligaciones.  
(Differences in class, race and color, not only disappear in conscription rooms, 
but create an equality and friendship between the youths from the city and 
countryside, between workers, campesinos and sons of capitalists. In the 
conscription rooms everyone is a soldier with the same rights and same 
obligations.)  
 
 
 
Thus, one of the benefits of the war, according to supporters of Mexico’s wartime preparedness 
campaigns, was that it gave an opportunity to forever alter the long-standing racial questions 
plaguing the Mexican nation. Working together, these men were capable of forging a stronger 
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and better Mexico—one in which histories of racial difference and class privilege were erased, 
and men from vastly different racial and socio-economic backgrounds took up arms to fight for 
la patria.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Ignacio León, “Ciudadanos de la república,” Hoy, January 1, 1944. 
 
 
 
In addition to forever altering the domestic racial and class divisions between fellow 
countrymen, optimistic Mexican observers argued that the war would lead to breaking down the 
United States’ imperial relationships with Mexico. As evidence, magazines like Hoy pointed to 
scenes of defense and solidarity between the two nations that would have been unthinkable just a 
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few short years earlier. For example, Hoy congratulated the women of the American Colony 
Committee in Mexico City for their eager contributions to war effort. The article documented 
how these women were preparing for the war by learning to fix tractors and shoot pistols [Figure 
6].46 In addition, women in the group devised elaborate plans for how their organization would 
respond in the event that the Axis powers managed to invade Mexico City, explaining to the 
magazine that they planned to turn their recreation areas at their golf course into hospital rooms 
and to turn the golf course into a shooting range.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. “Esfuerzo femenino para la guerra, desde México,” Hoy, January 30, 1943, 22. 
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Figure 7. “Esfuerzo femenino para la guerra, desde México,” Hoy, January 30, 1943, 25. 
 
 
 
This article stressed that wartime preparation was being adopted by Mexican women as 
well.  Mexican film star, Dolores del Rio, appeared in Hoy handling a machine gun [Figure 7]. 
The accompanying article congratulated her efforts to support the American Colony Committee. 
Thus, wartime cooperation provided many new ways for the two nations to rethink their security 
relationship to one another. Even the idea of armed white American women in the capital was 
not out of the realm of possibility, should the borders of Mexico be comprised by the Axis 
powers.  
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Office of Inter-American Affairs and Oficina Federal de Propaganda 
 
 
 
The Mexican government regularly put its wartime preparation on display, revealing to 
the public the extent to which the nation had transformed in response to the war. The Mexican 
Army participated in public spectacles celebrating cooperation with the United States, such as 
parades on the international bridge in El Paso by U.S. and Mexican military personnel. These 
events made visible the shared wartime commitment, reinforcing the idea that the imperial 
relationship between these countries were as President Roosevelt and the Binational Mexican-
American Commission for Economic Cooperation had stressed, something to be relegated to 
history books. Indeed, not unlike like the Mexican soldiers from distinct racial and class 
backgrounds who fundamentally altered their relationships to one another by forging a sense of 
national solidarity through wartime preparation, both the U.S. and Mexico were for the first time 
on an equal footing, made possible through the shared interests in defeating the Axis powers.47  
According to the U.S. State Department, despite all the work being done by the Mexican 
government, a sympathetic press, and President Camacho, it appeared that the Mexican public 
often lacked interest and expressed apathy toward the war effort. These concerns about Mexican 
public opinion help explain the role the United States Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) 
assumed in Mexico. This agency, headed by Senator Nelson Rockefeller, was established in 
1940 to bolster security efforts through hemispheric defense and advocated close and lasting 
commercial relations with Latin American nations. The OIAA adopted numerous responsibilities 
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in Mexico. It published and distributed materials asserting the power of the United States army 
and its desire to work in harmony with all of Latin America. The agency paid for much of this 
pro-U.S. literature to appear in Mexican newspapers, magazines, and radio programs. It also 
supported modernizing Mexico’s communication infrastructure and monitored companies and 
programs that were deemed to be pro-Nazi. According to historian Julio Moreno, the OIAA 
spread the idea that the U.S. and Mexico “had common goals: the pursuit of democracy, material 
prosperity, and upward mobility. It suggested that Mexicans could achieve these goals through 
mutual cooperation and friendship with the United States under the Good Neighbor Policy. It 
presented the United States as a partner instead of a threat to Mexican nationalism.”48 
Responding to the success that the specter of the fifth column had on the U.S. public, the OIAA 
paid for hundreds of articles to be printed in Mexican newspapers warning of the encroaching 
quinta columna. 
Even with the specter of the quinta columna operating in Mexico, crafting the image of 
an equal partnership was not easily accomplished. Shortly after President Ávila Camacho 
declared war on Axis powers following the sinking of two Mexican merchant ships in the Pacific 
in 1942, the Oficina Federal de Propaganda (OFP, Federal Propaganda Office) was established 
to get the Mexican public behind the war effort. The OFP frequently broadcast reports regarding 
Nazi atrocities on radio programs, created posters that were plastered on buildings throughout 
Mexico urging citizens’ vigilance in a global war that was quickly encroaching onto Mexican 
soil. The propaganda efforts incorporated figures of Mexico’s past including heroes from the war 
of independence and the 1910 Revolution, which sought to show that the Mexican nation had a 
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tradition of fighting to protect its democratic principles.49 Other campaigns launched by the OFP 
focused on the need to develop Mexico’s industrial infrastructure and to modernize the army. 
This propaganda spread the message that Mexico’s economic, political, and national security 
hinged on the willingness of the Mexican people to work together to ensure the safety of its 
nation against the Axis menace.   
Various propaganda posters printed by the OFP agency and were distributed throughout 
Mexico. One example pictured two men working in an industrial worksite, pouring smelt, with a 
caption in bold lettering that read Trabajo: Fortaleza de nuestras frontera (Work: the strength of 
our borders). This poster, like much of the wartime propaganda, reinforced the proximity of the 
wars waging in Asia, Africa, and Europe to Mexico, and attempted to create a sense of sympathy 
and solidarity with the United States.50 It highlighted the importance of a cooperative citizenry, a 
workforce that looked out for the interests of the nation by forging a strong industrial sector. 
Finally, it highlighted security concerns that were circulating about the border, informing a 
knowing public that the dangers along the border could only be alleviated through hard work and 
dedication by men looking out first and foremost for the best interests of the nation. 
The message that Mexican national sovereignty and security were dependent on stronger 
relations with the United States was carefully crafted as the OFP worked with the OIAA.51 
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Mexico’s most famous cartoonist, Arias Bernal, who worked for Hoy amongst other 
publications, forged a partnership with the OIAA to create twelve war posters in English, 
Spanish, and Portuguese, which were distributed throughout Latin America. The artwork was 
based on two interrelated themes, “What we are fighting for” and the need to maintain inter-
American solidarity. One representative poster, printed by the OIAA in 1941, depicts a soldier 
who has one foot firmly planted in North America and the other in South America. The soldier 
holds a rifle and stands guard against a possible Axis attack. In this image, Bernal implores each 
nation to work together “Como un solo hombre” [Figure 8] to ensure hemispheric security.   
Both the U.S. press and the Mexican press were eager to show the scope and scale in 
which the Bernal’s work impacted Latin America.52 In addition to local newspapers, examples of 
his posters were printed in LIFE and Collier’s during the war.53 After interviewing Bernal, the 
New York Herald praised Bernal’s work as being critical in hemispheric defense because they 
had a profound impact “on the minds of the people of Mexico, where a high degree of illiteracy 
exists among the Indians and peons.” The New York Times would later comment that Bernal 
“was the most strident voice against dictators in Latin America during World War II. His bitter 
cartoons of black-booted Nazis and Fascists were published in papers from Mexico to the 
southern tip of the hemisphere.”54 It noted that hundreds of thousands of booklets of his cartoons 
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were distributed by the OIAA and that his work was particularly well positioned to explain the 
importance of hemispheric defense and pan-Americanism.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Arias Bernal, “Como un solo hombre,” Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.]: El 
Coordinador de Asuntos Interamericanos, 1941.  
 
 
 
Artists in the Taller de Gráfica Popular (TGP) also lent their talents for wartime 
propaganda, publishing works with both the OFP and OIAA. Deeply concerned about the rise in 
fascism, the radical art collective turned out hundreds of illustrations for the anti-fascist press 
during the Spanish Civil War, created backdrops for political rallies, and a graphic exhibition 
titled “Against Nazi Terror.” The TGP published thousands of posters with the slogan “Mexico’s 
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first line of defense is on the Soviet front.” To defray costs, the organization sold a collection of 
their wartime drawings, etchings, and woodcuttings, titled the Libro Negro del Terror Nazi (The 
Black Book of Nazi Terror).55 Co-founding TGP member, Pablo O’Higgins, made the following 
print, entitled “Buenos vecinos, buenos Amigos” or “Good Neighbors, Good Friends” for the 
OIAA. In it, we see Benito Juarez and Abraham Lincoln, suggesting a shared democratic 
revolutionary history between the two countries. In the image, a Mexican campesino and 
American extend their arms across the U.S.-Mexico border to shake hands with one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Pablo O’Higgins (Mexico City: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1944). Princeton University, 
Digital Archives. 
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In addition to printed artwork, the OIAA initiated a campaign to show the Mexican 
public U.S. propaganda and newsreels about the war. However, these film viewings did not 
always function to build the type of goodwill and solidarity hoped for by its U.S. promoters. The 
American Consulate in Monterrey, for example, expressed concern about one of the film 
screenings in particular, in which two men in charge were disrespectful to the audience. The 
consulate gave a long list of complaints about what transpired when the film operators, an off 
duty Texas Ranger and an official with the Highway Department, showed up to run the film. 
Working class audience members in Monterrey were disturbed that both men showed up with 
their badges and guns in full display. In addition, the films that were shown, “Bombing of 
Marshall and Gilbert Islands” and “Bombing of Pearl Harbor” were intended for U.S. audiences 
and the consulate argued that the films had no relevance to Civilian Defense in Mexico, 
particularly because the films did not show the U.S. military in a strong light. In addition, the 
films had not been dubbed in Spanish, did not have subtitles, and the two men acted abrasively, 
soliciting applause from the audience in the scenes in which U.S. troops appeared.  The consulate 
worried that “these Gringos” were poorly received and were convinced that “one such incident 
create more ill feelings among the working class than can be regained in a considerable period of 
time.”56 In addition, Mexican viewers were aware that what they were watching was intended to 
be propaganda. Consulates complained of the jeering and laughter that would accompany the 
screening of films whose overt purpose was meant to elicit sympathy from the audience.  
One way to counteract concerns being expressed in Mexico about the growing presence 
of overt U.S. propaganda was by funneling money secretly to Mexican run propaganda agencies. 
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The OIAA helped fund and oversaw the creation of feature length films that were produced and 
shown in movie theaters in Mexico, including the wartime films Espionaje en el Golfo (1942) 
and Soy Puro Mexicano (1942).57 In Soy Puro Mexicano, released on September 16, 1942, 
Mexican Independence Day, Guadalupe Padilla, played by Pedro Armendáriz, was a northern 
revolutionary leader that escaped from jail and stumbled upon a spy ring operating in Mexico.58 
The spy ring consisted of Japanese, German, and Italians that were distributing propaganda and 
sending military information by radio to submarines off Mexico’s Pacific coast. Padilla is the 
quintessential revolutionary figure, a paunch and bearded norteño, wearing a large sombrero, 
complete with cartridge belts strapped across his chest. The film provides an excellent example 
of the central tensions involved in creating a sense of Mexican nationalism while simultaneously 
displaying the benefits of cooperation with the United States. The plot of the film served as a 
thinly veiled answer to the question of how someone that was unmistakably a “puro Mexicano” 
could support Mexico getting involved in a global conflict on the side of the United States.     
At the start of the film Padilla hears on the radio an address that announces that Mexico 
was soon to partner on the side of the United States in a war in Europe. It is apparent that this 
highly masculinized revolutionary leader is unimpressed by the announcement, questioning what 
his country could possibly gain by joining a global conflict. He summarily dismisses the prospect 
that the United States and Mexico could ever work with one another as equal partners, doubting 
that the nations had any shared interests. The reasoning for Padilla’s contempt is meant to be 
self-evident to viewers and goes unstated. His outright rejection of fighting alongside the United 
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States in a global conflict is not attributed to any particular U.S. military, economic, political 
policy or action. Choosing not to elaborate on Padilla’s hesitancy to ally with the United States 
makes the inevitable collaboration between the two nations far less complicated.  Eventually an 
alliance is forged between Padilla and a FBI agent, a self-identified “pocha” (a Mexican-
American woman) from Texas, who was working to uncover the plans of a spy ring in the 
northern state of Chihuahua. Like many such films representing the collaboration of the two 
nations during World War II, the United States is signified through the character of a woman, 
thereby alleviating some of the threats associated with the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies 
operating in the country.59 The fact that this woman was of Mexican descent posits that a strong 
bond existed between Mexico and the United States, and it suggests a long-standing, shared 
history between the two nations.  
In addition to the inevitable plot line that results in the U.S. and Mexico fighting on the 
same side together, Padilla helps to define those who are incapable of making legitimate claims 
to the Mexican nation and national culture. When Padilla stumbles upon the group of Italian, 
German, and Japanese, they are clearly marked as “foreign” and out of place through dress, 
accents, and phenotype. Padilla demands to know the identity of this group of foreigners and 
what business they have in Mexico. When Padilla questions the real identities of these men, they 
each respond in a heavily accented Spanish, insisting that they are in fact Mexicans. Padilla 
indignantly replies “Amigo, a usted lo engaño su madre.” (Friend, your mother must have fooled 
you). The spies were arrested through the planning between Mexican intelligence agents, Padilla, 
and the Mexican-American FBI agent.  Through films like Soy Puro Mexicano a Mexican 
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audience could see positive examples of the U.S. and Mexico partnership, without the visible 
fingerprints of the United States’ propaganda agencies being legible to the film-going public. 
The Mexican state sought to get its public behind the wartime effort through various 
projects, including state propaganda, the civilian army, and the assistance of the OIAA.  Such 
examples in popular culture were important as they created a possibility for the public to rethink 
Mexico’s place in the world and its obligations to hemispheric security. These films and the 
other forms of government propaganda were not enough to erase the histories of U.S. empire or 
skepticism of U.S. wartime intentions, but there is evidence to suggest that wartime nationalism 
and fear of Axis attacks resonated with members of Mexican society. Thousands became 
involved in civilian defense measures, although the success of these programs, as reported by 
weary U.S. consulate officers, varied greatly throughout the nation. The propaganda campaigns 
and the ubiquitous stories of the quinta columna along Mexico’s borders and coasts, along with 
the sinking of Mexican merchant ships, did seem to have some effect on the public and at least 
made palatable the idea of forging an alliance with the United States during the war.60  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 ‘Editorial: México pelea por la libertad y defiende su honor y su vida,’ El Continental, 9/20/42, AGN; El 
Continental, MAC, 550/44-32; “Elocuente mensaje de Ávila Camacho en la creación  del Consejo Supremo 
anoche,” El Continental, 9/25/42, 1., 53; AGN, MAC, 550/44-32 The secretary of foreign relations received 
numerous letters from the Mexican public describing the fears of an Axis invasion in the north. Reports on possible 
fifth column activities were also reported by Mexicans residing along the southern border with Guatemala. See, 
AGN, MAC, “Extranjeros Baja California—territorio norte Japoneses Permanencia,”550/9-1.  
61 
 
Despite a rocky start to the 1930s, the United States and Mexico underwent a profound 
shift in their bilateral relations due the impending global conflict, and the rightward turn in 
Mexico’s domestic politics. The looming threat of an outside enemy operating throughout the 
hemisphere and along Mexico’s coasts and borders, created the opportunity for a new culture of 
cooperation between the countries. The war helped usher in a new era of inter-American defense 
that actively sought the support and cooperation of the political elite in Latin America. In 
explaining the success of inter-American defense, Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, 
reflected on the shared histories between the U.S. and Latin America, claiming that “for the first 
time in the history of our hemisphere joint actions of the highest political character has been 
taken by all of the American nations acting together without dissent and without reservation.”61   
Closer economic, political, and military ties forged in the 1940s would shape Latin 
America for decades. Nowhere, with the possible exception of Brazil, were its affects more 
strongly felt than in Mexico.62 As the southern neighbor to the United States, Mexico and its 
2,000 mile long shared border held a special place in the imaginations of U.S. military and 
policymakers preparing for war. The spirit of wartime cooperation marked an important shift in 
boundary management and enforcement as the Camacho administration made clear its intentions 
to work with the United States to ensure closer regulation of its shared national boundaries. The 
changes in border policy did not occur exclusively at the top secret meetings in governmental 
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offices in Washington D.C. and Mexico City. Nor did the closer relations only alter the day-to-
day operations and security management in the region. Narratives of border security were 
carefully crafted within the larger wartime context and resulted in state-sponsored efforts to 
create public awareness of the looming Axis threat along the nations’ coasts and borders, as well 
as the bilateral actions required to guard against them. 
Thus, a border that had been forged through U.S. imperialism was reshaped into one that 
created a cooperative spirit between the two nations. Images of border threats were crafted in the 
popular press, as well as through government agencies actively seeking ways to demonstrate 
friendship, hemispheric solidarity, and political goodwill. Wartime cooperation would have 
consequences for long-term economic and military cooperation in the following decades as 
Mexican governmental officials tied themselves more closely to the United States. While 
suspicions and distrust did not altogether disappear between the nations’ policing agencies, a 
fundamental shift occurred as border security was viewed as best addressed through bilateral 
cooperation. For border residents, migrants, and potential border crossers, joint border policing 
represented a new era of uncertainty amidst the promise of ever greater boundary enforcement.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Combatting a “Wetback Invasion” along a Cold War Divide 
 
 
 
In February of 1955, the United States hosted Kurt Lemke and Karl-Ulrich Hagelberg, 
two executive officers of the West German Federal Border Police for a tour of the U.S.-Mexico 
border. Their visit took place some six months after the completion of “Operation Wetback”—
the Border Patrol’s highly publicized, quasi-military campaign, which had U.S. public officials 
proudly touting the deportations of more than one million undocumented Mexican migrants from 
across the country.1 At the behest of the U.S. State Department, the two German officers and the 
United States Border Patrol spent one month exchanging border policing techniques and 
strategies with the expectation that the recently formed West German Federal Border Police 
would be able to apply what they learned in the U.S. Southwest to the increasingly volatile East-
West German border. At the same time, the State Department believed that the Border Patrol 
would benefit from the insights offered by men working in the shadow of the “Iron Curtain.”  
Despite the insistence by the Border Patrol that the U.S. southern border with Mexico 
represented a strategic site for potential communist sabotage, the Los Angeles Times did not 
report any run-ins with Soviet spies or saboteurs during Lemke and Hagelberg’s visit. Rather, the 
newspaper reported that the two guests witnessed the Border Patrol’s far more mundane efforts 
to capture, detain, and deport Mexican “wetbacks” who had surreptitiously crossed the United 
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States’ southern border.2 At the risk of being viewed as ungracious guests, the German agents 
detailed the limitations of this collaborative border policing exchange. Judging by the answers 
they gave to reporters, Lemke and Hagelberg returned to Germany largely unimpressed with 
their visit. They doubted that there was much value in such collaborative exchanges, insisting 
that boundary policing within Europe was far more complex than the comparatively easy task 
assigned to U.S. immigration officers. As they had just witnessed firsthand—the Border Patrol 
primarily used race to distinguish U.S. citizens from Mexicans, but the two Germans argued such 
racial profiling methods would be useless in West Germany as “All Germans look alike.”3 This 
made the West German job of preventing “the subversive [sic] dangerous elements among the 
people crossing from East Germany” more challenging than the comparatively simple task of 
keeping easily distinguishable Mexican migrants out of U.S. territory.4  
It became clear pretty quickly that the two Germans thought their hosts’ anxieties about 
communist sabotage in the U.S. Southwest were greatly exaggerated. In fact, Lemke and 
Hagelberg may have been wary of U.S. Cold War politics even prior to leaving for Los Angeles 
as they were from Bonn, Germany, a city that had experienced the anticommunist tactics of 
Joseph McCarthy first hand. About a year and a half earlier, two of McCarthy’s aides had been 
widely ridiculed in the Bonn press for attempting to root out an imagined communist conspiracy 
in the United States Information Service overseas library program.5 Whatever their reasoning, 
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the men downplayed suggestions that the United States’ southern border with Mexico carried 
legitimate risks of communist infiltration, instead explaining that a communist invasion was far 
more likely along the West German border with the “Iron Curtain.”  
In discussing the differences between the two countries, the Germans pointed out the 
much greater investment their nation had made in boundary enforcement. The West German 
Federal Border Police consisted of more than 20,000 patrolmen, far surpassing the 1,200 men 
stationed along the much longer U.S.-Mexico divide. In addition, the West Germans worked 
within shouting distance of Soviet military personnel, while the United States shared borders 
with reliable Cold War allies in Canada and Mexico. Lemke and Hagelberg saw firsthand how 
closely Mexican officials worked with the INS in processing migrants contracted as braceros. 
They probably also witnessed the close collaboration between the two countries as immigration 
officials on both sides of the border detained and processed undocumented migrants.6 By 1955, 
for the West Germans, such cross-border collaboration with East Germany would have been 
unimaginable.  
What the Germans did not fully grasp, and what historians have since failed to adequately 
address, is that in the minds of U.S. officials, the U.S.-Mexico border and the hundreds of 
thousands of migrants who crossed it without state permission in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
were Cold War threats. This chapter contends that the mass detentions and deportations of 
Mexicans in the U.S. were made possible through Cold War thinking. Susan Carruthers argues in 
Cold War Captives that the U.S. public States perceived the American capitalist system as 
promoting freedom and choice, while the Soviet system produced corporeal, mental, and 
                                                          
6 Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra!, 127-130. 
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spiritual enslavement wherever communism spread. 7 As I show in this chapter, the distinction 
between slavery and freedom was a central trope in the construction of undocumented Mexican 
migrants.  
Mexican men laboring as farmworkers embodied a serious Cold War threat, not so much 
because they were thought to be communists or communist agents—though this was 
occasionally claimed—but because the mass movement of a population imagined as “modern 
slaves” and “peons” had no place in the U.S. society.8  Indeed, “illegal” Mexican migrants 
garnered so much attention in large part because they had bypassed the rule of law, allowing 
themselves to surrender their free labor. U.S. politicians, policymakers, and the popular press 
made distinctions between legal bracero workers and “wetbacks.” Braceros were free—
processed through international agreements and afforded labor contracts, guaranteeing fair 
wages, meals, and housing. In sharp contrast, “illegal” immigrants crossed the U.S.-Mexico 
border without inspection, and their labor was much more likely to be exploited by unscrupulous 
farmers. As highly racialized “wetbacks,” Mexicans were imagined as a horde of dark-skinned, 
humble, illiterate, and easily taken advantage of masses—an international disgrace, the antithesis 
of America’s Cold War self-projected image of a land of liberty, freedom, and progress. U.S. 
government officials found themselves in an awkward position, promoting the Bracero 
Program—the largest contract labor system in human history—while simultaneously 
                                                          
7 Carruthers, Cold War Captives, 5. 
 
8 Gilbert Gonzalez argues that the terminology of peonage was first crafted by U.S. capitalists and journalists in the 
late nineteenth century. This collection of U.S. government, business, and literary production, he argues, 
“orientalized” Mexican migrants into a homogenous group in desperate need of paternal care. It was this imperialist 
mindset that shaped public opinion and policy toward Mexican migrants. Gilbert Gonzalez, “Mexican Labor 
Migration, 1876-1924,” in Beyond la Frontera, 28-78.   
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condemning “illegal” Mexican workers, who were subjected to exploitation akin to slavery.9 In 
addition, during the first years of the Cold War, Mexican migrants were harbingers of a 
tremendous amount of anxiety because their very presence in the United States evoked an image 
of an unguarded border that could easily crossed by Soviet spies and saboteurs. 
This chapter examines the efforts to construct the U.S.-Mexico border as a critical Cold 
War site. In the post-war period, Mexican migrants were not viewed as simply a large number of 
individuals following the dictates of the international marketplace, but rather, came to represent 
something far more sinister—a “wetback invasion.” Thus, the draconian and unprecedented 
border policing operations of the early 1950s were in large part a response by the Cold War 
security state’s efforts to ease the domestic alarm over a poorly protected border. Examining the 
“wetback invasion” through the context of the Cold War sheds much needed attention on how 
national security concerns helped shape the initial calls for mass deportation. 
 
 
 
Cold War Politics and Border Policing 
 
 
 
In the 1950s, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), made explicit 
the connection between Mexican migration and communist subversion.10 It entered into evidence 
dozens of examples of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) propaganda and efforts to organize 
                                                          
9 These facile constructions ignored the fact that these supposedly different groups of men often worked with one 
another in the same fields. It was complicated even further as braceros frequently would leave the farms where they 
were contracted in search of better working conditions. In breaking the terms of their contracts these men became 
part of the dreaded “wetback invasion.”  
10 “Atom Spies in U.S., Say Legion Chief: Red Ages Go unhindered, D.A.R. Told,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 
1947, 1. 
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around the mass detentions and deportations of Mexican migrants in the post-war period. The 
fact that the Soviet Union and radical organizations in the United States condemned the 
exploitation of the Bracero Program pushed Mexican migrants and the border they crossed into 
the forefront of Cold War discussions.11   
INS officials added their voice to those who insisted that “illegal” Mexican migrants 
were international security threats, repeatedly informing the American public that the large 
presence of undocumented border crossers made the United States less safe from the global 
communist enemy. Ben Habberton, acting commissioner of the INS, declared in front of 
Congress in February 1954 that the agency had discovered at least 100 members of the 
Communist Party who had unlawfully entered the United States from Mexico.12 This accusation 
was similar to ones made by INS officials a year earlier to the House Appropriations 
subcommittee. In their sworn testimonies, which were part of repeated requests for increased 
government funding, the agency stressed that the U.S.-Mexico border was out of control and the 
situation represented nothing less “than a threat to the security of the United States.” Estimates 
provided by the INS indicated that 1,500 members of the Mexican Communist Party resided 
directly across the border from El Paso, and that the CPUSA and the Mexican CP collaborated 
with one another. In fact, according the INS, the open border was “an easy avenue of entry…for 
almost any number of Communists or foreign agents from Mexico, Guatemala, from Dutch 
Guiana and, entry into Mexico being as easy as it is, from any country in the entire world.”13 In 
                                                          
11 House Committee on Un-American Activities, Communist Political Subversion: Hearings before the Committee 
on Un-American Activities, 84th Cong., 2nd Session, 1957. 
 
12 “Heavy Influx of Reds Into U.S. Reported,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1954, 23. 
 
13 “Reds Slip into U.S., Congress Warned,” New York Times, February 10, 1954, 23.  
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this way, the INS attempted to insert the agency into the Cold War, insisting that border policing 
was indispensable to the global battle against communism, and that the frontline of the global 
struggle against the Soviet Union was actually located along the U.S.-Mexico border.   
The pervasive anticommunist sentiment in the United States helped the INS find 
powerful allies in the Senate in faithful Cold War warriors like Pat McCarran (D-Nevada), who 
lambasted President Eisenhower’s refusal to increase allocations to the Border Patrol as 
tantamount to “trifling with the security of this country.”14 The vulnerabilities created by these 
unchecked border crossers were reinforced in a series of high profile deportations of U.S. 
communists from Mexico, as well as extraditions of suspected communist Mexican labor leaders 
from the United States to Mexico.15 Immigrants who were deported were often apprehended 
deep in the interiors of both nations in major urban areas like Chicago and Mexico City.16 Thus, 
in the deportation procedures for labor leaders like Refugio Martinez, who had worked with the 
United Packinghouse Workers of America, his presence as a foreign born communist was 
constructed as an argument for bolstering border security, despite the fact that he had lived in 
Chicago for more than two decades.17      
                                                          
14 “Jenner Group Sees Red Peril in ‘Wetbacks’?” The Washington Post, May 3, 1954, 2. 
 
15  Barry Carr, Marxism and Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992); 
Rebecca Schreiber, Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008), 13-15. 
 
16 The capture of Gus Hall, the national secretary of the American Communist Party, in Mexico City as he prepared 
to travel to the Soviet Union was perhaps the most widely circulated example. “Hall, Fugitive U.S. Red Aid, 
Reported Arrested in Mexico,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1951, 1; “Hall, Fugitive Red, Seized in Mexico, 
Deported to U.S.,” New York Times, October 10, 1951, 1; “Fugitive Communist Bigwig Arrested in Texas by FBI,” 
The Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1951, 10. 
 
17 Rick Halpern, Down on the killing floor Black and white workers in Chicago's packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997), 186-188. 
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In the months preceding “Operation Wetback,” the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee explicitly linked the border to Cold War security concerns. Members of the 
committee announced that they would investigate the “subversive dangers inherent” in Mexican 
farm workers crossing into the United States without proper government inspection. The 
chairman, Senator William E. Jenner (R- Indiana) appointed Senators McCarran and Herman 
Welker (R- Idaho) to investigate. McCarran described the increasing numbers of Mexicans 
migrating into the United States as “a direct threat to the internal security of the Nation because 
it is an open door for Communist agents.”18 In a prime example of the grossly exaggerated 
security threats, McCarran wrote an open letter to the subcommittee, part of which was 
reproduced in the Washington Post, claiming that “Red spies” were “crossing and “re-crossing” 
the border after successfully infiltrating the ranks of Mexican laborers.19 Such claims about the 
insecure nature of the border were not limited to conservative members of Congress. Even in 
locales with few Mexican migrants, far from the United States’ southern boundary, the prospect 
of illicit border crossings were perceived as a grave security problem. The two liberal Senators 
from Minnesota, Herbert Henry Lehman and Hubert Humphrey, for example, highlighted the 
vulnerabilities of the southern border, warning that at a minimum one hundred, and “perhaps 
many hundreds” of communists crossed from Mexico into the United States daily.20 
As described more fully in the Chapter 3, the Mexican press often ridiculed the over-the-
top hyperbole of U.S. security culture of the late 1940s and early 1950s. While there were plenty 
                                                          
18 Senator Welker became so closely associated with the red scare and McCarthyism that he was known as “Little 
Joe from Idaho.” “Jenner Group Sees Red Peril In ‘Wetbacks’?” The Washington Post, May 3, 1954, 2. 
 
19 “Brownell Scouts Spy Ring Reports,” New York Times, May 4, 1954, 12. 
 
20 “Senate Passes Bill for Hiring of Mexicans,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 4, 1954, B9.  
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of concerns in Mexico about the large number of emigrants “abandoning” the nation, the 
mainstream press remained consistent in its dismissive attitude toward the idea that these men 
were likely to be sympathetic to communism. Instead, media outlets paid close attention to the 
hardships, harassment, and abuse that Mexican migrants faced at the border, detailing the 
inhumane inspections that Mexican nationals were forced to endure in the name of national 
security. In an article from Hoy in 1954, for example, an U.S. immigration official presses his 
thumb against the outreached hand of an aspirante hoping to gain admission to the United States. 
Complete physical inspections for braceros were part of the contracting procedure, and while 
thick callouses were evidence of intimate familiarity with agricultural work, it also was part of 
the security screening process. The caption explains that even after these humiliating inspections, 
migrants were accused of being “communist infiltrators” by Texans who sought to avoid paying 
migrants their rightfully earned wages. Mexican migrants were thus forced to submit to 
demeaning physical inspections of their bodies in the name of U.S. national security, only to then 
be accused of being Cold War threats by Texas growers so that they could maximize profits. 
Such arguments were mobilized in the Hoy to suggest that the politics of immigration and 
security were more about controlling migrants, rather than having anything to do with the safety 
of United States citizens.21  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 “El peso de Mr. Suárez,” Hoy, February 27, 1954, 83. 
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Figure 10. Hoy, “El peso de Mr. Suárez,” February 27, 1954, 83. Caption: Comprobación de que 
el bracero tiene encallecidas la manos. No obstante, después son acusados por los texanos de 
‘comunistas infiltrados’. (Caption: Checking the bracero's calloused hands. Nevertheless, they 
are later accused by Texans as being “communist infiltrators.”) 
 
 
 
Crafting a “wetback invasion”:  Slavery, Peonage, and an Open Border  
 
 
 
Beginning in the late 1940s, newspaper articles from all across the country began to 
directly link the failure to prevent undocumented migrants from crossing the United States’ 
southern border to the growing fear of communist infiltration in the United States.  The U.S.-
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Mexico border became a blank canvas for sensationalist communist plots as major newspapers 
published articles with ominous sounding titles like “‘Wetback’ Invaders Include Communists,” 
and “200 Dangerous Aliens Operate Freely in U.S.”22 Some articles even warned that atomic 
weapons could easily be smuggled across the border.23 In a three part series entitled “Red 
Dagger at our Back,” Manuel Morris, journalist of the northeastern paper The Hartford Courant, 
cautioned readers to be vigilant of the growing threat of communism in Latin America, which 
was after all, “the back door to the United Sates.”24   
What prompted the most persistent connection between the language of Cold War 
invasion and the U.S.-Mexico border, however, was not actual communist spies, but the 
heightened awareness and near hysterical resistance to the presence of undocumented Mexican 
migrants in the United States. In the ten years following World War II, the perceived 
international security threats along the U.S.-Mexico border underwent a remarkable 
transformation. U.S. efforts to protect its southern boundary from German and Japanese spies 
were firmly redirected toward the illicit border crossings of Mexican migrants. In the 1950s, 
Mexican laborers who had been largely celebrated during the war, were transformed nation-wide 
into “wetbacks,” as disruptive and undesirable elements in the national body. Within U.S. 
popular imaginaries, Mexicans were constructed as the prototypical “illegal” subjects. Their 
undesirability was nearly universally expressed by the two major political parties, the INS, 
                                                          
22  “Mexican Commie Leader Seized for Deportation,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 14, 1953; Williard Edwards, 
“200 Dangerous Aliens Operate Freely in U.S.” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 23, 6; “Wetback Invaders Include 
Communists,” Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1951, 1. 
 
23 “Washington Alert for Smuggling of Red Bombers,” The Hartford Courant, June 27, 1954, 6. 
 
24 Manuel Morris, “Red Dagger At Our Back: Reds in Mexico Active but their Power Wanes,” The Harford 
Courant, May 12, 1953, 10. 
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popular press, as well as many national labor unions. If Morris was concerned about an “open 
back door” allowing communist infiltration, then for many in the United States, the presence of 
undocumented migrants was a startling reminder that this door had been left ajar for hundreds of 
thousands—and perhaps even millions of Mexicans—who surreptitiously entered into the United 
States without state inspection. 
While the dehumanizing term “wetback” was first conceived of in the 1920s, it was not 
until the end of the Second World War that it became widely used in U.S. popular culture. As 
“wetback” was not recognized nationally as a term defining the legal immigration status for 
Mexicans, it had to be perpetually defined for its audiences.25  As a typical article in the 
Washington Post warned in 1953, “Last year more than three-quarters of a million immigrants of 
the unfortunate variety known as “wetbacks”—poverty-stricken Mexican agricultural workers 
who have slipped across the border illegally—were put out of the country.”26 Such language 
functioned to strip migrants of their humanity, relegating their existence to a transgression of 
U.S. immigration law, transforming them into a single homogenous, highly racialized group, 
whose legal presence in the United States by definition always required greater scrutiny.27 
Corresponding with the second red scare, the term “wetback” was ubiquitous throughout 
the United States and was utilized by politicians, academics, immigration officials, and the U.S. 
public at large. It became part of everyday discourse, appearing regularly in the nation’s most 
                                                          
25 The Chicago Tribune, for instance, informed its readers that “wetbacks are illegal entrants, so designated because 
in many cases they cross the Rio Grande and get wet in the process.” As this definition suggests the process of 
crossing the Rio Grande was not by itself a prerequisite for the use of the label of “wetback,” only that this was true 
in “many cases”. “Senate Passes Bill for hiring of Mexicans,” Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1954, B9. 
 
26 “Southern Border,” The Washington Post, 7/25/1953, 6. 
 
27 Nicholas De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 
31 (2002): 419-47. 
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respected newspapers, including The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, and The 
Washington Post. As a term first gaining traction in this period, it was further reinforced through 
its usage in a wide array of media, from radio dramas and comic strips, to the titles of major 
motion pictures, and was even the subject of an academy award winning short film produced by 
the Walt Disney Corporation titled The Wetback Hound.28  
It was perhaps through popular fiction that the imagined peril along the border most 
dramatically reached the majority of Americans. The border became a favorite location for the 
dangerous tales of border patrol agents and cowboys, depicted as heroes, protecting the nation 
from a myriad of border problems that often merged together, from the large presence of 
undocumented Mexican migrants and thieves to drug smugglers and communist agents. Indeed, 
the imagined lawlessness of the border made it an ideal setting for comic books.29 A story 
entitled “River of Blood,” for example, recounted the stories of two U.S. border smugglers who 
recruited undocumented Mexican migrants to help them harvest marijuana in Texas. In one 
dramatic scene, these men led a group of Mexican migrants across the Rio Grande even though 
they were fully aware of the possibility of a flash flood.30 As the migrants get caught in quickly 
rising waters and drown, one of the smugglers, showing no emotion or remorse, exclaimed 
“What’s the difference as long as we made it! We can always get more wetbacks where they 
                                                          
28 See, “Wetbacks” MGM [1956]; “The Wetback Hound” told the story of Paco, a lost hunting dog that had become 
distracted and wandered away from its owner, and then proceeded to travel across the U.S. border. “The Wetback 
Hound” Disney [1957];  Children would have also had the opportunity to learn about the vulnerabilities of the U.S.-
border from the Mexican cartoon mouse, Speedy Gonzales, who in a short released in 1955, aided a group of his 
friends by stealing cheese located across the Mexican border in United States territory. The border was only 
haphazardly guarded by Sylvester the cat, who acted as a U.S. border patrol agent. “Speedy Gonzales,” Warner 
Brothers, 1955. 
 
29 See also, “Men Without Fear,” Danger (New York: Allen Hardy Associates) 1:4, July, 1952; “Wise Guy of the 
Prairie,” Roundup (Rockefeller Plaza, New York: D.S. Publishing Company) 1:2 , Sept-Oct, 1948. 
 
30 “River of Blood,” Underworld Crime (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc), 1:5, March 1953.       
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came from!” Mexicans were presented as tragic figures who were subjected to violence and 
caught up in a dangerous business operation that they did not fully grasp until it was too late. 
Importantly, even the horrific violence of migrants drowning is not enough to convince the 
smugglers to rethink their business operations as there were plenty more migrants willing to 
come to the United States [Figure 11].  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. “River of Blood,” Underworld Crime (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 
Inc), 1:5, March 1953.  
 
 
 
In addition to comics, newspapers, and popular magazines, the depiction of the “wetback 
invasion” would have been brought into American homes by way of radio and television 
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programming. NBC’s radio program “Tales of the Texas Rangers,” reenacted the “real stories” 
of the Rangers, many focusing on the persistence of Mexican thieves and migrants. Jayce 
Pearson, a fearless Texas Ranger, kept the lone star state safe from rough and tumble cowboys, 
as well as drug smugglers and Mexican lawbreakers that snuck their illicit goods across the 
border.  Stories entitled “Illegal Entry,” “Cover Up,” and “Paid in Full” told the pitiful and tragic 
tales of a Mexicans farmworkers along the border.31 Through many different mediums the U.S. 
Mexico border was crafted as a site of illegal activities and as a looming threat national security.  
In suspenseful tales, government officials were charged with securing the safety that was 
disrupted by those failing to abide by the laws governing the nation. Death along the border, 
which was an increasingly common occurrence in the 1950s, was documented in these popular 
films and comics, as well as in newspaper articles discussing the border crossing deaths.  The 
fault was placed on either unscrupulous coyotes—men who made a living by guiding migrants 
across the border without being detected—or as simply bad luck by migrants who chose to risk 
crossing the treacherous dessert terrain just so they could be treated as slave labor.32 
                                                          
31 This program was later turned into a television series that continued to deal with contemporary issues as well as 
those from the “Old West.”  Tales of the Texas Rangers, “Illegal Entry,” NBC Broadcast, June, 6, 1952; Tales of the 
Texas Rangers, “Cover Up,” August 17, 1952; Tales of the Texas Rangers, “Paid in Full,” May 13, 1951. Another 
television program “Border Patrol” ran for a few seasons on NBC in the late 1950s. Many of the same topics were 
addressed, including ones that addressed the prevention of Communist plots: See, Border Patrol, "The Party Line," 
NBC Broadcast, March 29, 1959.  
 
32 The U.S. Border Patrol was largely responsible for these deaths as its efforts to put greater emphasis at policing 
popular crossing points forced migrants into more difficult and dangerous treks across desolate desert areas. The 
documentation of migrants’ deaths—a topic that also has not been fully accounted for historically—within the 
popular press failed to make the link between increased policing and death. For mention of migrant deaths along the 
border in the mainstream press in the early 1950s, See, “Mexican ‘Wetbacks’ Crossing Border Risk Death in 
Torturous Desert Trek,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1950,  3; “Four Men Found Dead in Gasoline Tank Car,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 10, 1952,  1; “3 Pinned by Steel Pipe Miss Death by Inches,” Los Angeles Times, March 3, 
1953,  1; 3 Found Dead in Tank Car,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1953,  12”;  The dangers faced by  border 
crossers were also picked up by nationally circulated magazines:  See, “The Wetbacks” Time,  April 9, 1951, 24; 
“Ants: Mexican Wetbacks” Time, April 27, 1953, 29; “Wetbacks Swarm In,” Life  May 21, 1954; “Bulge of 
Braceros at the Border.” Life, February 15, 1954, 26-29; “New Wetback Answers?” Newsweek, August 21, 1953, 
26; “War with the Wetbacks,” Newsweek, June, 28, 1954.  
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Importantly, in the context of the Cold War, the “wetback” as seen through these popular 
media outlets represented a lamentable return to debt peonage, and unacceptable forms of 
mental, as well as physical slavery. The “wetbacks’” inherent foreignness—as illiterate, meek, 
racially inferior, easily exploitable, and ultimately tragic figures—made them unassimilable into 
a modern and free American society. Journalists blamed farmers for placing profit over 
patriotism, by taking advantage of migrants’ backwards ways. In exchange for the farmers’ 
greed, U.S. citizens had to deal with narcotics, disease, and migrants’ immorality, all of which 
disrupted American ideals of freedom, equal economic opportunity, and democracy.  
In the early 1950s, Gladwin Hill, special correspondent to the New York Times, relied 
heavily on the tropes of peonage and slavery in his Pulitzer Prize winning condemnations of the 
“wetback invasion.” Cold War anxieties were evident in the more than two dozen articles Hill 
wrote on the national emergency of the invasion. Undocumented border crossers were discussed 
in militarized language in Hill’s work, which included articles with titles such as: “‘Wetback’ 
Invasion is Broadening Despite All U.S. Counter-Moves,” “‘Wetback’ Influx Sets Record High; 
175 an Hour Jump Border,” and a front page article “Tide of ‘Wetbacks’ Reaches Crest; 
1,5000,000 in Southwest in 1952.”33   
In 1954, after a one year study of the Southwest in which Hill interviewed politicians, 
academics, and white residents of the region (but not migrants themselves)—he wrote that “a 
recent 5,000 mile tour of the border area, shows it to be a phenomenon whose real economic and 
social implications should shock the average American when fully known and comprehended.” 
                                                          
33 Gladwin Hill, “‘Wetback Invasion Is Broadening Despite All U.S. Counter-Moves,” New York Times, February 
11, 1952, 12; Gladwin Hill, “‘Wetback’ Influx Sets Record High; 175 Mexicans an Hour Jump Border,” New York 
Times, February 16, 1953, 23; Gladwin Hill, “Tide of ‘Wetbacks’ Reaches Crest; 1,500,000 in Southwest in 1952,” 
New York Times, January 12, 1953, 1. 
 
79 
 
Occasionally, Hill made a direct link between an open border and communist threat, as when he 
wrote, “it has lately been realized that the ‘wetback’ traffic offers a wide-open avenue for 
Communist spies to enter the country…and that in cold fact Joseph Stalin might adopt a 
perfunctory disguise and walk into the country this way.”34 What should shock the conscious of 
his readers, however, had little to with communists, as Hill found it unfathomable that the U.S. 
could allow the large farming interests to return the country to an earlier era of debt peonage and 
a labor system “like the Southern slave owners of a century ago.” 35   
Hill certainly was not alone in comparing the exploitation of Mexican farmworker to an 
earlier era of slavery. A critical congressional investigation likened a cargo ship used to deport 
migrants from Port Isabel, Texas to Veracruz, Mexico to “an eighteenth century slave ship” and 
a “penal hell ship.”36 Organized labor also voiced its opposition to the Bracero Program and the 
large number of undocumented laborers in the country, arguing that Mexican migrants lowered 
wages for all workers and that their treatment was akin to modern day slavery. In the following 
example, from a machinist trade magazine, Alfred Green informed readers about the growing 
number of millionaires among the factory farms in California. It was “starvation wages” offered 
at these industrial farms, Green contended, that forced Mexican migrants northward to the 
Midwestern factories. In the article, Green quoted the President of the American Federation of 
Labor National Farm Labor Union, H. L. Mitchell, who argued that the large scale farmers were 
“engaged in the most vicious practices of labor exploitation or slavery known in American 
history.” Drawings accompanying the article make clear the stakes of modern day slavery for 
                                                          
34 Gladwin Hill, “Southwest wink at ‘Wetback’ Jobs,” New York Times, March 28, 1951, 1, 34 
 
35 Gladwin Hill, “‘Wetback’ Drive Irks ‘The Valley’, New York Times, August 2, 1954, 8.  
 
36 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 156.  
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American industrial laborers and farmers. In the first image [Figure 12], the capitalist lashes the 
Mexican laborer who pulls the men in a cart.  Dollar bills fall from the capitalist’s hands as the 
poor campesino allows this humiliation—we learn from the article—in return for as little as 20 to 
25 cents an hour. In the second drawing from the same article, we see how Mexican migrants 
displace the honest, hard-working white American worker, who would never permit himself to 
be exploited like the Mexican slave, the Mexican strikebreaker [Figure 13].37 Historian Mae 
Ngai contends that “The use of slavery and concentration-camp metaphors emphasized the 
unfree nature of contract labor aimed to evoke sympathy for the victimized braceros,” but 
importantly, while doing so, this discourse had “the effect of constructing braceros as a foreign 
element entirely outside the American labor force and society, obscuring the many points of 
contract and integration that braceros had with other ethnic Mexicans in the United States and 
the transnational character of agricultural workforce.”38 The language and imagery of slavery not 
only cast migrants as an unmistakably foreign element—but taking place during the red scare—it 
suggested that migrants were a danger to U.S. society precisely because they were willing to 
submit to being unfree laborers. In Edward Murrow’s Harvest of a Nation (1960), which is often 
attributed for shocking the public conscious and for being partially responsible for the demise of 
the Bracero Program, the question of slavery is front and center. From the beginning, Murrow 
explains how close migrant farm work resembled peonage and slavery, which he insisted had no 
place in modern American society. In the first scene the camera opens to poor black migrant 
farmers, men, women and children, Murrow’s distinct voice situates the viewer, explaining:  
“This is not taking place in the Congo. It has nothing to do with Johannesburg or Cape Town. It 
                                                          
37 Alfred Green, “Ripple of ‘Wetbacks’ Becomes a Tide,” Machinist Monthly Journal, December 1951, 364-365.  
 
38 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 161. 
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is not Nyasaland or Nigeria.  This is Florida. These are citizens of the United States—1960.”  
The language of slavery is present throughout, with a farmer being quoted saying “We use to 
own our slaves, now we rent them.” 39 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Alfred Green, “Ripple of ‘Wetbacks’ Becomes a Tide,” Machinist Monthly Journal, 
December 1951, 364-365. 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 CBS Reports: Harvest of a Nation (1960). 
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Figure 13. Alfred Green, “Ripple of ‘Wetbacks’ Becomes a Tide,” Machinist Monthly Journal, 
December 1951, 364-365.  
 
 
 
It was, after all, the Mexican male “peasant” or “peon”—with their close proximity to 
indigeneity—that obsessively inhabited the imaginations of those writing and thinking about the 
U.S.-Mexico border during the Cold War.40 While exploitation and peonage were troubling 
aspects that should be erased from American society, this was made profoundly more difficult 
because the migrant not only embodied exploitation, but also Cold War contagion—or, as 
                                                          
40 Historian Deborah Cohen vividly explains how a diverse group of migrants, from different social backgrounds, 
attempted to perform easily discernable characteristics of indigeneity that were expected by U.S. officials and 
growers. The migrant reception centers, Cohen argues, were in essence a “casting call” for indigeneity. Race and 
class expectations on the part of U.S. participants created “scenes in which men—bakers, mechanists, waiters, 
carpenters, construction workers, and agricultural wage laborers—were required to perform backwardness for U.S. 
officials and growers down to the last detail: no belt, cowboy hat, or shoes; only huaraches (sandals), the 
quintessential sign of indigeneity. No city slickers, with schooling beyond their life’s station, need apply. Men were 
reduced to their hands, calluses, and muscles. Those chosen performed this backwardness well, acting like the docile 
humble Indians that growers sought.”40 Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens, 100. 
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Gladwin Hill noted, the migrant “has baneful effects on the citizenry with which they mingle.”41 
The fusion of multiple border threats, including disease, communism, and the “wetback 
invasion” served to reinforce one another.42 Thomas Sutherland—chief executive of the 
commission on Texas race relations in the 1950s—wrote in the Saturday Evening Post that he 
preferred to think of migrants as victims of modern culture which they were ill equipped to fully 
participate in. In contrast to the small group of educated middle-class Mexicans, most Mexicans 
in Texas tended to be “an earthy folk, rooted in an ancient culture more in harmony with the 
thirteenth century than with ours.” Where U.S. citizens would have seen “abject poverty,” the 
“patient and indestructible Indian” saw merely a “way of life.” Fortunately, Sutherland informed 
readers, the large scale raids and mass deportations were fixing the problem—soon the “dollar-a 
day Mexican” and the “social evils of uncontrolled and immigration of cheap labor” were going 
to be a relic of the past, thanks largely to the diligent efforts of federal immigration officers.43 
The stakes for allowing peonage within the borders were incredibly high.  As Hill’s 
article entitled, “Peons in the West Lowering Culture,” explained in its byline, “Health, 
Education, Democracy—in Areas Where ‘Wetbacks’ Work Are Deplorable.”44  Hill described 
                                                          
41 Gladwin Hill, “Southwest wink at ‘Wetback’ Jobs,” New York Times, March 28, 1951, 1, 34.  
 
42 As other scholars have noted, the press documented the imagined threat of a horde of disease ridden Mexicans 
sneaking into and infecting the nation with tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. “‘Wetback’ Control 
Sough to Curb Disease Spread,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1952, A20; Agnes E. Meyer, “Life on the Rio Grande 
1946 Model,” Washington Post, April 22, 1946, 1; “Eisenhower Backs ‘Wetbacks’ Drive,” New York Times, August 
18, 1953, 16; “Patrol Increased to Stop ‘Wetbacks,’” New York Times, September 5, 1953, 23. See, Alexandra 
Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern American (Berkley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 21 and “Nationalism on the Line: Masculinity, Race, and the 
Creation of the U.S. Border Patrol, 1910-1940, in Samuel Truett and Elliott Young, eds., Continental Crossroads: 
Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 299-324; 
Priscilla Wald, Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), 157-212. 
 
43 Thomas Sutherland, “Texas Tackles Race Problem,” Saturday Evening Post, January 12, 1952. 
 
44 Gladwin Hill, “Peons in the West Lowering Culture: Illegal Migrants from Mexico Form Vast Unassimilable 
Block of Population,” New York Times, March 27, 1951, 31.  
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the prototypical Mexican migrant as a “penniless fugitive,” whose “traditional housing is the 
crudest form of shack or hovel, where he can find it, or just the open air. His status denies him 
access to regular community legal and welfare agencies.” A photograph of the living conditions 
accompanied Hill’s account, again made the connection between peonage and indigeneity—
referring to the “grass hut” that migrants lived in near McAllen, Texas [Figure 14]. Such images 
of migrant backwardness were incongruous with post-war life in the United States. Certainly the 
individuals residing in grass huts were incapable of adding to or benefitting from the modern 
systems of health, education, and democracy outlined in Hill’s work.45   
                                                          
45 Writing in 1950, U.S. colonial and labor historian Richard B. Morris, cited Hill’s series on Mexican migration in 
an article exploring the legal origins of the term “peonage,” making clear the dire stakes of Hill’s reporting in Cold 
War America. For Morris, the question of slavery and peonage was one of grave importance—whether of black 
tenant farmers in the South or Mexican contract laborers. Allowing the persistence of these forms of labor put into 
jeopardy the very question of whether the U.S. was fit to maintain “leadership among the democracies.” Morris 
argued, “At no time in our history since the Civil War have the American people been as sensitive to the shadowland 
between freedom and slavery as they are at the present day. Recent prosecutions for violations of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, revelations of sporadic cases of peonage and foreign contract labor, and the exposés of the continued 
version of tenant farming into a form of debt bondage constitute, however minimal, that freedom demands 
unceasing vigilance. If by proper example we are to maintain our position of world leadership among the 
democracies and at the same time strive to contain successfully a competing ideology disseminated from an area 
supported forced labor must accept responsibility for preserving and enlarging the orbit of freedom at home. We 
ought to know how much freedom we have, how much freedom we want, and the processes, both legal and 
economic, by which freedom was achieved in this country.” Richard B. Morris, “The Course of Peonage in a Slave 
State,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 65, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), 238-263. 
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Figure 14. “Peons Net Farmers a Fabulous Profit,” New York Times, March 26, 1951, 25. 
Caption: “United States border patrol inspectors from McAllen found ‘wetbacks’ living in this 
grass hut and caves in the bank of an irrigation canal.” 
 
 
 
Taken together, Hill’s rhetoric made clear that nothing less than the integrity and national 
security of the United States were at stake in the battle to gain control over the nation’s southern 
border from the horde of modern day slave laborers. In August of 1953, Hill highlighted the 
high-volume and the overall ease in which Mexicans crossed the border. It was accompanied by 
a map titled “The ‘Wetback’ Invasion—As Administration Plans Action,” which showed the 
growth of Mexican migration into the U.S. Southwest [Figure 15]. Arrows placed just across the 
U.S. side of the border pointed northwards, signifying where the border had been breached by an 
army of more than one million Mexican migrants. The map illustrated the migrant invasion in 
dramatic detail and would have resonated with readers who had seen many similar maps printed 
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during the Korean War. Indeed, the uncanny similarities between Hill’s illustration and those of 
the North Korean army’s invasion of South Korea two years earlier suggest how Cold War 
geographies were quite literally mapped onto the U.S.-Mexico border in response to a migrant 
“blitzkrieg” [Figure 16].46 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Gladwin Hill, “‘Wetback’ Problem is attacked Anew,” The New York Times, August 
30, 1953, E7. Caption: Nobody knows exactly how many “wetbacks” enter United States each 
year, but figures in insert chart on deportations and voluntary departures of Mexican aliens are 
considered an indication of “wetback” traffic. 
 
 
                                                          
46 Gladwin Hill, “‘Wetback’ Problem is attacked Anew,” The New York Times, August 30, 1953, E7; Hanson 
Baldwin, “Korea’s Battle Picture: Our Defense is Stiffer,” The New York Times, July 23, 1950, E5. 
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Figure 16. Hanson Baldwin, “Korea’s Battle Picture: Our Defense is Stiffer,” The New York 
Times, July 23, 1950, E5. 
 
 
 
The Border Patrol, National Security, and the “Wetback invasion”  
 
 
 
Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, the Research and Education Department of the INS 
was devoted to shaping the public image of the Border Patrol, highlighting the professionalism, 
dedication, and “all American” qualities of the force while shaping the debates about national 
security and border enforcement. The department provided photographs, case files, and other 
materials for stories appearing in national magazines, newspapers, documentaries, and films. The 
Saturday Evening Post, Time Magazine, and Look Magazine all published dramatic INS-
approved photo essays highlighting the national security threat that illicit border crossings 
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represented. In return for this cooperation, however, the INS demanded the right to review 
materials prior to its publication and to have final say in what would be released. 
The Research and Education Department played a critical role in producing the border as 
a Cold War threat. Readers from every corner of the U.S. learned that the immigration inspectors 
were modern-day cowboys, whose preparation demanded specialized skills, from the ability to 
track footprints to a rigorous physical fitness routine that many had mastered while serving in the 
United States Army.47 Standing in sharp contrast to the foreign Mexican “peon,” was the tough 
and disciplined image of INS agents who fought to keep the nation secure from unwanted 
migrants and communist threats. Embracing the new security responsibilities of the late 1940s, 
Nick Collaer, Chief of the Border Patrol, explained in an interview published in Mechanic 
Illustrated the immediacy of the “unprecedented situation in American history that the INS had 
been entrusted with guarding.”48 A black and white map of the continental United States with a 
bright red line around the nation’s border suggested that all borders and coasts were vulnerable 
to foreign infiltration [Figure 17].  Collaer cited the smuggling of “Mexicans…Chinese…Central 
Eurpeans and Hindus” as major problems facing the department. After citing “humorous” 
examples of migrants being caught attempting to illicitly cross into the United States, Collaer 
proclaimed that border security was no laughing matter, noting that “Aliens who try to crash our 
borders may be subversive, criminal or even diseased. But, in any event, all are breaking U. S. 
immigration laws and must be stopped.” Thus, Collaer rendered all border transgressions as 
                                                          
47 Historian Stanley Cork, for example, has argued that Westerns during the period were “offering narratives that 
resonate at some symbolic or allegorical level….At their best, they effectively conjoin history and myth to appeal 
powerfully to incipient nationalism in the U.S. audiences.” Stanley Corkin, Cowboys as Cold Warrior: The Western 
and U.S. History (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), 6. 
 
48 Nick Collaer, “10,000 Miles of Trouble,” Mechanic Illustrated, September, 1949.  
 
89 
 
potential matters of national security, concluding with personal assurances to the U.S. public that 
“your Border Patrol is meeting the challenge. Day and night you’ll find us keeping vigil over 
America’s 10,000 miles of trouble.”49 Importantly, while Collaer described a variety of “illegal” 
immigrants the Border Patrol was charged with arresting, and he argued that the nation’s 
boundaries constituted “10,000 miles of trouble,” the numerous photographs accompanying the 
article only depicted groups of Mexican male laborers who were captured along the U.S-Mexico 
border. Even when the agency sought to highlight the wide range of problems that the agency 
addressed, the U.S.-Mexico border took center stage as the place that represented the most 
pressing security concerns. 
 
 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
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.
 
 
Figure 17. Nick Collaer, “10,000 Miles of Trouble,” Mechanic Illustrated, September, 1949. 
 
 
 
The Research and Education Department honed its message on the heroic quality of the 
Border Patrol, tapping into long running narratives of frontier justice and the rough and tumble 
image of the Texas Rangers. This carefully crafted imagery proved to be enticing story material 
for Hollywood studios, which, with the aid of the INS, produced numerous films and television 
shows about the agency. One such collaboration between Hollywood and the INS resulted in the 
film Illegal Entry [1949].  Collaer was presented with an early draft of the film and he personally 
sent back script revisions, clearing up factual errors such as the names and locations of INS 
inspection stations to give viewers a more authentic experience. In these early drafts, Collaer was 
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particularly critical of representations of the agents. It was unacceptable, Collaer wrote, that 
agents be portrayed as either “cops or sloppy detectives.” Instead, they needed to be depicted as 
“the young, trim, educated young men that they are.”50 Collaer insisted that the Border Patrol be 
presented as an unambiguously white, “all-American” police force that resembled a branch of the 
military. Scribbled in the margins of the script, Collaer noted his objections that the main 
inspectors’ name “sound[ed] foreign,” recommending that it be changed from “Buonomi” to the 
more “American sounding Westlake.” The revised character, he insisted, had to be a “more 
dignified, reserved, almost military person.”51 In the early years of the Cold War, during an era 
of U.S. military engagement and preparedness throughout the globe, it is noteworthy that a 
leading officer of the domestic border security agency was compelled to make sure its members 
reminded viewers of military men. The Border Patrol did in fact view itself as a military-like 
agency, almost an extension of the army.52   
In return for adhering to the script suggestions, the studio was permitted to use the 
official seal of the Department of Justice and allowed to market the films as real life docudramas 
based on previously secret INS case files.53 Studios attempted to create buzz for the film by 
claiming the authenticity of stories and the close proximity in which filmmakers had worked 
with governmental agencies. The movie posters promoting Illegal Entry [1949] boasted that 
Attorney General Tom Clark made a personal appearance in the film. Additional INS officials 
                                                          
50 NARA 623927, “Man Hunt,” Box 114.  
 
51 Ibid.  
 
52 Former military men, like retired General Joseph Swing were put in charge of the INS in the 1950s, and former 
members of the armed forces were given first priority to become Border Patrol agents. 
 
53 Despite being from “secret files”, the story circulated in the press prior to its being the subject of the MGM film.  
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had small cameo roles in the film and attended the film’s premier.54 Similar publicity tactics 
were established in subsequent films produced with the aide of the INS, including the use of 
Border Patrol uniforms and weaponry for the opening of the MGM film Border Incident [1949]. 
Similar to Illegal Entry, the film praised the Bracero Program, claiming that it was fundamental 
to the U.S. agricultural economy and ensured public safety as it required inspections of all 
would-be Mexican laborers prior to their arrival to the United States. It was the unchecked, 
unknown subjects, who clandestinely snuck into the United States who posed immediate risks to 
the U.S. public. The film revolved around the exploitation and murders of undocumented 
agricultural laborers, who were susceptible to violence and exploitation due to their docile, 
pathetic, and dependent nature. A murderous transnational gang of Mexican and U.S. border 
thieves trafficked in the “illegal” Mexican migrant “slave markets.”   
The theatrical trailer marketed the film as a real life story of the dangers found along the 
U.S-Mexico border, claiming it to be “sensational,” “amazing,” and “unbelievable,” but based 
completely on fact. Indeed, the viewer learns early on in the film that just like Illegal Entry, the 
plot of Border Incident was based on the “secret files of two governments,” and as such, the film 
became more than just another fictional police drama—it was a contemporary informative piece 
of “a savage border in peril.”55    
 The presence of Mexican migrants working in the agricultural fields is portrayed as being 
mutually beneficial for the workers and absolutely necessary to the U.S. economy. The opening 
scene of the film takes place in California’s modern and efficient Imperial Valley as the 
                                                          
54 “Illegal Entry,” New York Times, June 11, 1949; “Random notes on the Movie Scene,” New York Times, June 12, 
1949, X5. 
55  Border Incident, MGM Studios, 1949. 
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voiceover concisely explains to the audience that a contingent labor force is essential to 
agriculture industries, as each year “A vast army of farm workers…must be available when 
needed. And this army of workers comes from our neighbor to the south, from Mexico.”  Most 
Mexicans, the audience is told, entered the United States legally, but there were some who chose 
not to follow the law. At this point, the opening scene abruptly changes from the daytime footage 
of the impressively modern looking and orderly Imperial Valley to a nightmarish desert 
landscape, consisting of a barbed wire fence in bleak desolate terrain. According to the script, 
three “obviously Mexican” men wearing “the big straw hats of field hands”—run towards the 
border fence, hoping to return safely back to Mexico. Moments after crossing into Mexican 
territory the migrants are brutally robbed and murdered by a small band of Mexican and 
American border thieves. The narrator explains that this is not an atypical occurrence. 
Undocumented migrants “are often victims of the robberies by bandits who infest both sides of 
the border.”56 
The plot revolves around the collaborative efforts of the United States and Mexican 
police forces to regain control of the shared border from a transnational gang of modern day 
“border slave-traders.” The two main characters are Jack Bearnes of the United States’ INS and 
Pablo Rodriguez, investigator of the Policial Judicial Federal (described as the Mexican F.B.I.). 
These men go undercover to dismantle the transnational gang responsible for the exploitation 
and deaths of the migrant laborers. After infiltrating the organization, Bearnes was murdered, 
crushed by a large turbine driven by a gang member who discovers the agents’ true identity. 
Bearnes’ brutal death highlighted the risks police officials faced while attempting to protect the 
nation from such individuals law-breaking elements. Indeed, the film’s lobby card vividly 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
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portrayed the grave danger and imminent violence faced by the Border Patrol [Figure 18]. 
Mexican men representing the illegal organization were highly racialized, grotesquely drawn 
thieves and thugs with sharp daggers and thick wooden clubs attacking white border patrol 
agents. A white woman grasping a revolver—who does not actually appear in the film—is 
displayed prominently in the upper left hand corner of the card showing that “The shame of two 
nations!” is powerfully corrupting the security, as well as the perceived morality of the United 
States.57 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Border Incident, MGM Studios, 1949. 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
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Importantly, the men commenting on the film from the Research and Education 
department were pleased that the entire Mexican nation was not portrayed as a problem, but only 
the more target figure of the Mexican “wetback.”  After all, the United States and Mexico 
worked closely together on the transnational policing of Mexican migrants and despite 
occasional disagreements on the logistics of contracting bracero workers, the two countries were 
partners. The agency went to great lengths to ensure that the Mexican government was not too 
sharply disparaged for having so many of its citizens migrating into the United States. In his 
letter approving the final script, the Los Angeles District Director Carmichael commented that 
“‘Border Incident’ is an excellent story and if properly done should have a high entertainment 
value.” As important, “The script appropriately stresses cooperation between Mexican officials 
and the US INS.”58   
Perhaps recognizing that the racialized image of Mexicans attacking the Border Patrol 
would not sit well with audiences outside of the United States, the lobby card was completely 
redesigned for its Latin American audiences [Figure 19]. While the card still depicts violence, 
gone were the racialized Mexican gang members beating down desperate Border Patrol agents. 
Additional changes included Mexican-born actor Ricardo Montalbán receiving top billing and 
the central scene displayed in the lobby card was an international meeting about border security 
between the U.S. immigration officers and the Mexican Policial Judicial Federal. The title of the 
film in Spanish, “Mercado humano” (Human Market) emphasized the illicit trafficking of 
migrants, evoking the image of a slave trade. The tagline on the lobby card reads “Una lucha 
desesperada y sin tregua en torno a la igominia del” (A desperate and relentless struggle over the 
                                                          
58 W.A. Carmichael, District Director, to Raymond Farrell, Acting Special Assistant to the Commissioner, n.d., 
NARA  623927, Box 109.   
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dishonor of the) “Mercado Humano” (Human Market). It was a savvy decision to market the film 
in Mexico in relationship to the question of modern day slavery, as it aligned with the language 
and descriptions adopted by the mainstream media in Mexico to describe its emigrant population. 
Indeed, as described more fully in Chapter 4, within Mexico there were repeated calls in the 
press to increase border policing in order to prevent the exploitation of the nation’s migrants.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Mercado Humano  (Border Incident), MGM, 1949.  
 
 
 
Cold War Exceptionalism: The case of “Wetback Joe”   
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Occasionally, there were examples of migrants who did not fit into the dominant 
narrative that “illegal” Mexican migrants posed a threat to the national order. Such stories keyed 
in on particular qualities or circumstances of a migrant which made them different from the 
standard tropes of peonage and slavery, and thus put into question the state’s incarceration and 
deportation policies. Historian Gary Gerstle has written about the inherent tensions that exist 
between U.S. “civic tradition” and U.S. racial nationalism in the twentieth century. In the 1950s, 
the civic tradition, which was constructed in opposition to communism, placed great value on 
liberty, equality, and democracy, at the same time, it functioned in a political and cultural climate 
built on a nationalism informed by white supremacy that made people of color and even some 
European migrants’ second-class citizens.59 The story of José Toscano, a sixteen year old boy 
who was arrested in Los Angeles in the early 1950s illuminates the tensions between American 
civic nationalism on the one hand and white racial supremacy on the other. Toscano’s story, as 
first presented in the Los Angeles Times and then broadcast to outlets across the country, 
illustrates the particular racialized logic of Cold War deportation regimes in which, as Kelly 
Lytle-Hernandez explains, the Border Patrol’s “narrow focus” was on “policing poor brown-
skinned Mexicans.”60 According to sympathetic portrayals in the Los Angeles Times, at the 
young age of thirteen, Toscano had determined to leave his small town in Mexico and travel to 
the United States by himself, following the death of his father. Through his ingenuity and 
                                                          
59 Citing the attention paid to Anglo-Americans, as opposed to the largely Jewish radicals of the 1920s, Gerstle 
argues that “from the first Red Scare through the late 1930s, the threat of communism had been conflated with the 
threat of unwanted immigrant or radical groups. This conflation began to break apart in the Cold War, and the 
‘radical other’ began to lose the ethnic or racial connotations to which it had long been tied.” While Gerstle’s 
suggestion that Anglos were targeted is undoubtedly correct, he fails to address the massive increase in deportations 
for Mexicans in the 1950s, which I contend can only be understood when it is placed within the context of the 
second red scare. Gerstle, American Crucible, 245.  See especially, Chapter 6, “The Cold War, Anticommunism, 
and a Nation in Flux,” 238-267. 
 
60 Kelly Lytle-Hernandez, Migra!, 201. 
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determination, Toscano found a job washing dishes at a local restaurant, began to learn English, 
and excelled at a local Catholic middle school. However, only one month prior to his eighth 
grade graduation someone anonymously reported him to the INS for working unlawfully in the 
United States. While just one example of the thousands of monthly planned deportations taking 
place at the time in the Los Angeles area, Toscano’s misfortune quickly was transformed into a 
compelling human interest story. Toscano first came to the public’s attention when a picture of 
him receiving his middle-school diploma from two nuns while awaiting deportation orders in a 
juvenile detention center was printed in the Los Angeles Times.61   
The press was incredulous. José Toscano, who was quickly dubbed “Little Joe” or 
“Wetback Joe,” was an acceptable “foreigner” and he embodied none of the traits of Mexican 
“wetback” who represented national security threats. The decision to deport Toscano was 
challenged by the Los Angeles Times’ editorial page, which evoked the founding fathers in their 
strong support of “Wetback Joe.” Editorials insisted that if he were alive, Benjamin Franklin 
would have fought to support the right to keep Toscano in the country. While they understood 
that Toscano had technically broken the letter of the law, his case was fundamentally different 
from the vast majority of Mexican migrants residing without permission in California. Toscano 
did not belong in the category of most undocumented workers, who were characterized in the 
press almost exclusively as darker skinned, middle-aged male migrants, with little or no formal 
education—whose only productivity in the U.S. was limited to stoop labor in the agricultural 
fields. Unlike these men, Toscano was not a slave-like “peon,” he had never been “a burden on 
                                                          
61 “Wetback, 16, Gets School Diploma in Jail,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1953, A3; “Deported Mexican Boy 
Back as Legal Resident,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1953, A20; “Wetback Joe Says Thanks to All Who Helped 
Him Return to U.S.A.,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1953, 5. 
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the taxpayers,” and as the young man informed reporters, he had always had a higher calling or 
higher purpose.  Revealing a deep understanding of the Mexican “peon” trope, Toscano 
explained that “I had this dream to come to the United States for education. Not for the dollars, 
not to work in the camps for 65 cents an hour—but to study, to learn.”62 
Certainly this was not the typical story of undocumented migration appearing in the Los 
Angeles Times in the early 1950s. The paper had focused its attention to documenting the rapid 
growth of “illegal” migrants, and the inability of the Border Patrol to successfully prevent these 
crossings. Approval of the INS’ raids and large scale deportations were tempered in the paper by 
the sense that the underlying threat of Mexican migrants was never completely removed.63 Many 
articles explicitly noted the difficult, if not impossible task that the border patrol agents were 
assigned. Even after undocumented migrants were captured and deported, it was reported that 
nothing prevented them from easily crossing once again.64 In fact, some claimed that migrants 
were able to make it across the border more quickly than the planes that deported them.65  In 
sharp contrast, the paper lamented the difficulties Toscano would have in returning from Mexico, 
                                                          
62 “Wetback, 16, Gets School Diploma in Jail,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1953, A3; “Ben Franklin Would Have 
Backed Him,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1953, B4. 
 
 
63 “Raid Bring Arrests of 400 Aliens,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1949, 11; “Wetbacks’ Rounded up,” Los 
Angeles Times, March 26, 1951, A6; “Air Flight of Workers Continues: Additional 180 Men Taken Into Mexico 
from Imperial Valley,” Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1951, B7; “120 Wetbacks Nabbed,” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 
1951, 2; “Airlift Hurries Wetbacks Deep into Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1952, 10; “Wetback Rounded 
Up,” Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1952, 14; “97 Wetbacks Put on Bus for Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, July 17, 
1952, 28; “‘Wetback’ Raid at Oxnard Nets 51 Nationals,” Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1953, A6; “Porterville Raids 
Net 100 Wetbacks,” Los Angeles Times,  May 23, 1953, 11 
64 “Wetbacks Seized for Third Time,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1953, 6 
65 “Wetbacks Get Back Faster Than Plane Hauls Them Off,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1951, 9. 
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arguing that his case must be “tempered by higher considerations” than immigration law. 66 
Toscano was “a Mexican boy of intelligence and promise,” and astonishingly, the U.S-Mexico 
border that he crossed was described as nothing more than “an arbitrary geographical line.”67 In 
comparison to the unassimilable  “wetbacks”—the dark-skinned peons and slaves who had no 
place in modern America—these articles focused on how well Toscano had found a place in U.S. 
culture, noting how he had won the admiration of immigration officers through his poise and 
good demeanor. Officers had even reportedly offered him legal advice, telling the newspaper 
they “made no secret that they were on Joe’s team.”68 Toscano’s story resonated strongly with 
some Los Angeles residents. Marnie Norlan, a widow who had learned of Toscano’s impending 
deportation through the stories in the newspapers eventually was successful in securing the 
necessary paperwork to allow him to return to the United States. Los Angeles’ adopted son 
would occasionally reappear in newspapers even years later, with stories published when he 
earned his high school diploma, when he married, and six years after his story first appeared, 
when he finally received U.S. citizenship.69   
                                                          
66 Toscano was not the lone case of Mexican Cold War exceptionalism.  Additional stories focused on 
characteristics that made these migrants unique from the typical Mexican “peon”, and thus perhaps worthy of 
consideration for U.S. citizenship, or at a minimum, would render their deportation questionable.  The age of 
migrants was one of most persistent characteristics that were exploited by newspaper reports. One such case was 
that of the twelve year old Felix Chavez, celebrated in the Los Angeles Times as “world’s youngest wetback”. See, 
“Mexican Boy’s Long Trek to L.A. in Vain,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1951, 5; “Juvenile Wetbacks Seized by 
Detectives,” Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1953, A; “Seized Child Wetback Pleads to Keep His Dog,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 18, 1953, 21. 
 
67 “Wetback Student May Return to U.S. Legally,” Los Angeles Times, May 2,, 1953, A1. 
  
68 Ibid. 
 
69 “Elopement of Former Boy Wetback Hinted,” Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1954  29; “Happy Climax to Story: 
Wetback Who Made Good Takes a Bride,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1954,  4; “Youth, Former Wetback, 
Keeps Promise to remain Out of Jail,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1956,  A1; “Dancer, Once Victim of Nazis, 
Becomes Citizen: Mexican Wetback Who Dreamed of Being American Also Among Class of 169,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 12, 1959,  B1.  
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The press attention given to Toscano’s story helps clarify the underlying logic behind 
what precisely constituted the “wetback invasion.” The overriding belief was that middle-aged 
men comprised nearly all of the undocumented Mexican migrants in the United States. However, 
immigration law pushed women, children, and families to cross the border without permission as 
the Bracero Program only provided the legal possibility for some men to migrate legally.70 
Despite the fact that women and children composed of large numbers of those captured by the 
Border Patrol, they were not often mentioned by the press. It was only within this context that 
Toscano’s capture could be considered an anomaly.   
Central to the articles praising Toscano were how quickly he learned to speak English, 
adopted American dress, and grasped a thorough understanding of the civic ideals of the United 
States. The various photographs that appeared of Toscano presented hin a manner that was quite 
different from other migrant workers who had been detained by INS officials. Rather than 
appearing in photos after crossing desolate areas, or surrounded by border patrol agents, Toscano 
was well prepared for photographs, wearing either a suit or his work uniform.71 The first article 
written about him was accompanied by a picture of Toscano in juvenile detention with Sister 
Agnes and Sister Therese [Figure 20]. Rather than constituting a figure capable of violating the 
law, Toscano was an anomaly, a victim of an unjust circumstance.  He represented the model 
migrant, someone for whom the nation could be proud, not simply another field hand that had no 
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legitimate claims or real understandings about U.S. ideals of democracy, independence, and 
equality that made-up these Cold War national narratives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. “Wetback, 16, Gets School diploma in Jail,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1953, A3. 
Caption: Graduation in Jail—Joe Toscano 16, center, in Georgia Street Juvenile Jail for illegal 
entry to United States receives diplomas from St. Turibius School, presented by Sister Therese, 
left, and Sister Agnes. He faces deportation. 
 
 
 
A large part of Toscano’s charm was in how he spoke of the United States as a land of 
opportunity, despite being placed in a juvenile detention center for being in the country without 
permission. In a thank you letter that he sent to the Los Angeles Times, and which was later 
printed in the paper, Toscano spoke glowingly of the newspaper and the United States. He 
wondered:  
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How such a great and powerful newspaper selected the case of a poor wetback to publish 
a story about in its important Sunday editorial page is beyond my understanding, except 
that only in America could such a thing happen to one like me. I do understand and know 
that the fact that you did carried much weight withy my own government in permitting 
me to leave the country and come to America, and did much to get my passport through 
quickly so that I would not miss school in September.72  
 
 
 
Toscano’s narrative spoke to those qualities that his readers most admired about their 
own nation.  The ability to change his immigration status with the help of the Los Angeles Times 
spoke not to the harsh and unforgiving immigration system in which hundreds of thousands of 
Mexicans were interrogated and deported every year, but on the contrary, Toscano’s story 
revealed even in the midst of a “wetback invasion,” at its core, the United States was still a proud 
nation of immigrants. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
When Kurt Lemke and Karl Ulrich travelled from Germany to the U.S. Southwest, they 
did not fully understand how completely most Mexican migrants were cast as Cold War subjects, 
whose status as “illegal” workers were crafted within the heightened security panic set off by the 
second red scare. From the Pulitzer Prize winning articles about a “wetback invasion” to Disney 
films, and Border Patrol approved scripts for “B” films, the U.S. public learned about the myriad 
of dangers presented by the Mexican “wetback.” Mexican agricultural laborers were produced as 
undesirable foreigners whose decision to cross the U.S.-Mexico border without authorization 
                                                          
72 “Wetback Joe Says Thanks to All Who Helped Him Return to U.S.A.,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1953, 
5. 
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was responsible for bringing slavery and peonage back to the United States in period which these 
not only contradicted long standing American ideals, but made the sharp distinctions between the 
U.S. and Soviet Union more difficult. With sharper attention given to the Cold War, the politics 
behind “Operation Wetback” and the mass deportation campaigns of the 1950s becomes more 
understandable. Efforts to rid the nation of Mexican migrants corresponded within a decade’s 
long backdrop of a “wetback invasion” that both showed the vulnerability of the U.S. border to 
spies and saboteurs and the return to slavery and peonage, labor practices that were unacceptable 
in Cold War America.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Drawn into the Cold War: Anti-imperialism and Border Anxieties in Mexico  
 
 
 
U.S. Border Agent: [In heavily accented Spanish] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de derrocar  
al gobierno de los Estados Unidos?  
 
[Do you intend to overthrow the United States government?] 
 
Cantinflas: Hay, mire. ¡Hay no sea payaso hombre! ¡Pues solamente que yo tuviera 
armas, y esas las acaparan ustedes!  
 
[Oh, come on. Don’t be a fool! It’s not like I own any weapons. The United States hoards 
them all!] 
 
U.S. Border Agent: No me refiere a los medios, sino a las intenciones.  
 
[I am not referring to whether or not you have the means (to overthrow the government),  
but whether you intend to do so.] 
 
Cantinflas: Pues ¿qué de plano me ve usted muy mal intencionado ¿o qué? 
 
[Well, do I look like I have bad intentions?] 
 
U.S. Border Agent: Nunca sabe uno. Además, éste es el cuestionario de rutina. 
 
[One never knows. Plus, this is the routine questionnaire.] 
 
Cantinflas: Bueno pues ahí apúntenle que pueden dormir tranquilos en Washington. Por 
el momento no tengo así, pensado derrocarlos. Eh. Que no me hagan enojar, ¡eso sí! 
Porque un día amanece el capitolio de Washington tapizado de zarapes de Saltillo. 
¡Hmm! ¡Derrocar al gobierno! Lo derroco y, ¿luego quién nos presta la lana?  
 
[Well, you can write and tell them they can rest easy in Washington. At the moment, I 
have no plans to overthrow the United States. But tell them not to annoy me. Yes, tell 
them that! Because if they do, then Washington will wake up with a serape from Saltillo 
hanging in the city. Hmm! Overthrow the government? Why, then who would lend us 
money?]  
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In the above scene from the film Por mis pistolas (1968), Mexico’s most famous 
comedian, Mario Moreno—better known as Cantinflas—confronts in his typical roundabout 
fashion anxieties in Mexico over U.S. border enforcement, economic power, and military 
influence. As Moreno attempts to cross the border to collect an inheritance from a deceased 
relative in Tucson, he encounters a buffoonish American border agent, who is no match for 
Moreno’s double-entendres, word play, and apparent nonsense and non sequiturs. While 
answering the barrage of questions from the official, the shabbily dressed star asks whether the 
guard thinks every Mexican is a bracero and jokes about being a first class tourist as he struggles 
to keep his donkey from wandering onto U.S. territory. The absurdity of the scene reaches its 
apex when the officer demands to know whether or not the comedian intends to overthrow the 
U.S. government. Pausing briefly, gazing incredulously at the agent, Cantinflas dismissively 
responds: “Oh, come on. Don’t be a fool! It’s not like I own any weapons. The United States 
hoards them all!” The bemused border agent, limited by language, imagination, and bureaucratic 
directives from Washington D.C. is incapable of seeing what Moreno does—the absurdity of the 
logic that turned the comedian—and in fact all Mexicans crossing the border—into a Cold War 
national security threat. Cantinflas relishes in shining light on the illogical nature of this 
exchange, permitting the audience to take pleasure in the fact that the border guards of the most 
powerful nation on earth feared him.  
This border crossing encounter was meant to satirize Mexico’s asymmetrical relationship 
with the United States. In doing so, Cantinflas was adding his voice to political sentiment that 
was shared by many in the country who had for the previous two decades warned that Mexico 
was being irreparably harmed by the expansion of U.S. power during the Cold War. For these 
critics, the U.S.-Mexico border was a rhetorical and symbolic point of emphasis, deployed to 
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show a nation under attack from a diverse collection of U.S. political, cultural, and economic 
forces. While the strengthening relationship between the U.S. and Mexico in the 1950s helped 
usher in an era of unprecedented economic growth for some in the country, it occurred at a great 
cost. The Mexican state sought to limit dissent, breaking independent labor unions, detaining 
radical activists, and adopting anticommunist politics meant to ensure foreign companies that the 
nation was a safe place to invest.73 Aided by the U.S. Embassy and FBI, the newly formed 
Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) kept close watch over labor organizers suspected of 
being communists.74 DFS agents were initially trained by the FBI and eventually adopted many 
of the same techniques as U.S. intelligence agencies, including wiretapping and relying heavily 
on input from paid informants.75  
This chapter examines popular perceptions of the imperial relationship between the U.S. 
and Mexico during the first years of the Cold War as Alemán’s administration sought to create a 
closer ties to the United States and construct a more welcoming economic climate for American 
capital. By highlighting the dissent emerging from Mexican artists, journalist, and intellectuals, 
this chapter explores a diverse group of individuals who viewed Mexican sovereignty as one of 
the first victims to the United States’ expanding Cold War. This chapter examines a series of 
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events that provoked the strongest condemnation of U.S.-Mexico relations during Alemán’s 
sexenio, including: President Truman’s goodwill tour of Mexico City, the Mexican state’s use of 
anticommunism to protect American mining interests in northern Mexico, rumors about the 
forced participation of Mexican migrants in the Korean War, and the spread of the Red Scare 
into Mexico City. By focusing on critics of the U.S. Cold War, I show a broad and highly visible 
critique centering on the popular perception in Mexico that the nation had lost control of its 
ability to keep the United States outside of its political borders.  
 
 
 
Truman and the Legacies of Conquest  
 
 
 
In March, 1947, President Harry Truman visited Mexico City as part of a good will tour 
marking the 100th anniversary of the United States’ occupation of the capital during the 
Mexican-American War (1846-1848). During this memorable meeting, Truman assured 
President Alemán that the United States remained committed to the Act of Chapultepec, a 
resolution approved by the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at the 
conclusion of World War II. The treaty stressed mutual assistance and hemispheric defense as 
cornerstones to U.S.-Latin American relations, promoting cooperation rather than unilateral 
military actions. Even still, non-intervention was not inviolable, Truman lectured during a 
banquet held in his honor, explaining that “Non-intervention does not and cannot mean 
indifference to what goes on beyond our borders.” Because the post-war world was intricately 
connected, Truman explained that each nation in the hemisphere had a stake in ensuring that the 
rule of law was applied throughout all of Latin America. No nation could be allowed to put 
hemispheric security in jeopardy by permitting communism to flourish within its borders, lest 
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“the lawlessness of one nation…threaten the very existence of the law upon which all nations 
depend.”76  On the final day of his visit, Truman stopped at the Chapultepec Castle where a few 
months earlier, representatives from Latin America had agreed to the treaty bearing its name. 
Rather than expand on his earlier remarks on the limits to the non-intervention treaty, Truman 
spoke to the bright future of U.S.-Mexico relations. At the end of his remarks Truman laid a 
wreath at the tomb of Los Niños Héroes—a monument commemorating the six cadets 
mythologized in Mexican history for wrapping themselves in the Mexican flag prior to killing 
themselves, rather than accept surrender to the U.S. occupying troops during the Mexican-
American War. 
While U.S. newspapers praised Truman’s gesture as symbolizing a new era of 
cooperation in Latin America, the Mexican press was far less charitable.77 To many Mexican 
critics, Truman’s non-intervention message rang hollow as the president’s emphasis on non-
intervention in Latin America—except to prevent the spread of communism—sounded like a 
thinly veiled threat, a signal to Latin American governments to engage in post-war politics that 
could not be mistaken as remotely communistic.78 Moreover, it was widely known in Mexico 
                                                          
76 “Nonintervention,” Washington Post, March 5, 1947, 8.  
 
77 Reciprocating this gesture, President Alemán laid a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier during his visit to 
Washington D.C. a few months later. The wreath laying was even the subject of a comic book “Mexico’s Man of 
Action,” True Comics, (December 1947). A few years later the two nations exchanged flags that had been captured 
during the war in elaborate ceremonies depicted in Hoy: “Banderas,” Hoy September 23, 1950, 9, 14.  
 
78  At the time, many in the United States viewed this as a grand symbol that signaled a lasting change in the 
relationship. The Washington Post’s editorial page noted that “Truman’s informal gesture did more to cement 
genuine understanding with Mexico than a thousand cold orations on the good neighbor policy.” “Truman’s 
Gesture,” The Washington Post, March 6, 1947. While the New York Times reported on its front page that “People 
shouted [Truman’s] name, with the inevitable “viva,” wherever United States citizens appeared on the streets or in 
cafes.” Felix Belair, “Mexico is Touched as Truman Honors Her Heroes of 1847,” New York Times, March 5, 1947, 
pg. 1.  Since that time, some have presented the wreath laying ceremony as an important example of goodwill and 
trust shared by the U.S. government and Mexican public. David McCullough writes “with one simple, unheralded 
gesture, [Truman] did more to improve Mexican-American relations than had any President in century. Within 
hours, as the word spread, he had become a hero.” David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1993), 542.  Truman’s presidential goodwill gesture elicited numerous literary responses in the United States and 
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that the U.S. Embassy referred to nearly all critiques of the United States as dangerous examples 
of “Yankeephobia” and clear evidence of the firm grasp that communism held in parts of the 
country. Although the Mexican Communist Party was numerically small, Embassy officials 
chose to see communism as a looming international security threat. 79 “The traditional 
background of anti-Americanism in Mexico,” Embassy officials argued, made the “task of 
Communists relatively easy and far more effective than their numbers would indicate to be 
possible.”80 While Mexican critics cited the history of American imperialism in the country as a 
legitimate reason for being skeptical of the expanding U.S. Cold War, American officials viewed 
the long history of opposition to U.S. imperialism as evidence that communists would take 
advantage of a culture of “Anti-Americanism” permeating throughout the nation. One writer who 
captured the U.S. Embassy’s attention was the young Mexican intellectual José Iturriaga, whose 
“satirical and clever” work was deemed a dangerous example of the sentiment in leftist 
newspapers, pamphlets, and organizational meetings. An article Iturriaga published in May of 
1951 in El Popular levied a series of complaints directed at the United States by humorously 
masking them as criticisms of the Soviet Union. This piece cited a long history of imperialism in 
Mexico by the Soviets as reason why it was impossible for a “Mexican patriot” to support the 
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Soviet war in Korea, urging its readers to recall that it was after all “Esteban Austinev,” “Samuel 
Houstonoff” and  the Russian Czar “James Polkove” who were responsible for the military 
conquest of Texas.   
Like much of the criticism leveled against the U.S., Iturriaga viewed U.S. economic, 
military, and cultural imperialism as a direct threat to Mexican sovereignty. Highlighting the 
belief that U.S. imperial actions were causing harm in Mexico, Iturriaga argued that the U.S. 
displays of power in the post-war period were eerily reminiscent to an earlier period of U.S. 
domination. Further, he claimed that American capital—or what he shrewdly referred to as 
“ruble imperialism”—was responsible for ruling over Mexico, especially in the northern part of 
the country near the U.S.-Mexico border where American corporations held Mexican mineral 
deposits. These companies, notably the “Russian Smelting Company”—a reference to the 
American Smelting and Refining Company (ARASCO)—“shorten the miners’ lives through 
hunger salaries.” A long series of complaints followed that noted the impact of “Soviet” 
imperialism in his country:    
 
 
 
Soviet Russia, possessed of a laughable stupidity, wants us Mexicans to 
forget the disputes and offenses of more than a century just because in January, 
1957 [1947] Stalin [sic], the ineffable Stalin, came to Chapultepec Park and 
theatrically placed a wreath on the monument to the young Chapultepec Heroes. 
In exchange for this Stalin wants us Mexicans to go and fight a war which is 
obviously not ours, and wants us to die defending a culture which sprang from I 
know not what cardinal point of the planet. 
And, even if we were too forgetful and were sufficiently “Coca Cola-
Ized”—pardon, “vodka-ized”—we could not ignore the daily information that 
reaches us from the Moscow Tass agency – the biggest news monopoly in the 
world which indicates to the average man of every country the manner in which 
he must think every day regarding the humiliations suffered by our wandering 
farmers, who, because they want to earn a few rubles on the other side of the 
Volga, are discriminated against and ill-treated because they are guilty of not 
being Slavs.  
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Finally, in order for me to become russofile [sic] it would be necessary 
that the economic imperialism, exercised by the Soviets over our country, 
disappear, in order that Mexico may attain its most authentic economic and 
political sovereignty. 81 
 
 
 
In this passage, Iturriaga captured the dilemma of Mexico’s geographic proximity to the 
world’s leading superpower during the initial tumultuous years of the Cold War. On the one 
hand, Mexico was unable to prevent economic integration efforts, as U.S. businesses crossed 
Mexico’s northern border with few restrictions placed on them by the Mexican state. American 
cultural imperialism prevailed as the country became “Coca-Cola-Ized” and the United Press 
inundated Mexico with U.S. propaganda that informed the “average man of every country” what 
to think. On the other hand, Mexican farmers who migrated in response to the economic crises 
created by the United States, faced racial discrimination and violence if they crossed the Volga—
the Rio Grande in search of work. Within this backdrop, it was with “laughable stupidity” that 
the United States sought Mexican support to engage in a Cold War battle over Korea’s borders.82 
As a result of Iturriaga’s criticisms, the U.S. Embassy subjected him to greater 
surveillance. It did not matter to U.S. officials that many Mexican intellectuals in contact with 
the Embassy insisted that Iturriaga was not a communist. By travelling to Havana to attend the 
Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom, a leftist gathering, and then publishing 
harsh criticisms of the United States, the Embassy reasoned that  “if [Iturriaga] is not actually a 
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member of the Communist party” he might as well have been one as “all his work and thoughts 
support the Communist position.”83   
Much to the concern of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. State Department, Iturriaga’s 
sentiments were hardly a lone voice in Mexican political circles, as broad support of the United 
States during World War II turned to heated condemnation of America’s global Cold War. Like 
Truman, the Mexican-left also commemorated the 100 year anniversary of the U.S. occupation 
of Mexico City, though predictably, they did not share the American president’s belief that the 
centennial should be used to symbolize goodwill and friendship between the two nations. 
Instead, they used the anniversary to link the ongoing inequality and disparities of wealth in 
Mexico to histories of U.S. military incursions onto Mexican territory. In 1947, Arturo Garcia 
Bustos, a young member of the TGP, was recognized for his painting condemning U.S. empire at 
an art exhibition held by the Universidad Nacional de México. Artwork supportive of U.S. 
policies, such as Pablo O’Higgins’ World War II era painting “Buenos vecinos” [Figure 9], no 
longer matched the political objectives of the art collective. Bustos’ painting depicted the United 
States’ invasion of Mexican territory through outstretched arms reaching across Mexico’s 
northern border. Illustrating resistance to the attack, a Mexican peasant uses a machete to cut off 
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the hands labeled “imperialismo” before they are able to grasp the entirety of the Mexican 
nation. The penalty for this outright theft is as swift as it is righteous [Figure 21].  
 
 
Figure 21. Arturo García Bustos, “Cartel contra el Imperialismo,” El Taller de Gráfica Popular: 
Doce años de obra artística colectiva, 87. 
 
 
 
Much of the power of this image is in how Bustos successfully blurs the line between an imperial 
past and present. Resistance to U.S. imperialism is portrayed through the machete of a 
campesino, an image meant to evoke the mid-19th century struggle against the U.S. invasion. 
Standing in front of the campesino are men dressed as modern factory workers—expected to take 
the mantle of the vanguard—they are dressed in overalls and caps, and carry banners in support 
of the effort to cut off the hands of the American empire.  The overlapping of past and present is 
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a call for preparedness, as the Mexican people may be required to cut off America’ imperial 
reach once again. 
Nueva Rosita and the “Caravan of Hunger” 
 
 
 
Anticommunism was an important tool in the political and economic development 
strategies of the Mexican state in the 1950s. Seeking a better investment climate for foreign 
companies, President Alemán pushed through a series of tax concessions, removed protective 
tariffs, and replaced suspected communist labor leaders from national unions with men who were 
sympathetic to the industrial development agenda. Perhaps the most dramatic fight over the 
conservative shift in the political and economic climate in Mexico was waged in the mining 
towns of the northern border states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon. In 1950, head of the Mine and 
Metallurgical Workers Union local 14 union, Antonio Garcia Moreno, was fraudulently removed 
from his seat, prompting five thousand miners to declare a strike against the American Smelting 
and Refining Company (ARASCO), a U.S. owned company that accounted for nearly 65 percent 
of all mining operations in Mexico. 84  After a series of setbacks for the independent union, 
including a federal ruling declaring the strike illegal, Alemán sent in national troops to restore 
order in the company towns of Nueva Rosita, Cloete, and Palau. The anti-democratic legacy of 
the Alemán government was secured as it imposed martial law and waged its own anticommunist 
battle against Mexican miners. As historian Michael Snodgrass describes, “Soldiers blockaded 
highways, expelled journalists, and patrolled city streets to enforce a prohibition against the right 
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to assemble.”85 The miners and their families found themselves increasingly isolated and with 
few options for winning the concessions they sought. In hopes of gaining an audience with the 
president, many of the towns’ residents began an eight-hundred mile march to Mexico City. 
Dubbed the “Caravan of Hunger,” the failed effort represented in the words of Ian Roxborough, 
“the last gasp of militant unionism of the 1940s.”86  
The Mexican left rallied against ARASCO, arguing that its close relationship with 
Alemán revealed the president’s dangerous strategy for modernizing the country by giving into 
the demands of U.S. corporations. Throughout the duration of the strike, ARASCO’s efforts to 
break the work stoppage hardly made the company appear sympathetic to the public, as 
management decided to cut electricity and water to the miners’ homes, and even shut down the 
only health clinic in the town, resulting in the deaths of several children.87 The men, women, and 
children who joined the trek to Mexico City received mixed responses from the press. Some 
outlets chastened the miners and the families as little more than pawns of communist organizers 
who enjoyed watching the strike from the comforts of their luxury hotels.88 More sympathetic 
accounts included a short series in Hoy, which published a stunning set of photographs 
documenting the group’s harrowing march to the capital. Miners and their families were 
presented in these photographs carrying various banners made by the TGP. Protestors carried 
posters depicting a mother and child who died as a result of the company’s efforts to break the 
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strike, as well as images of the Mexican police with rifles and bayonets that included the words 
“stop the war on the working class!” Others held handmade signs that read simply “No soy 
comunista.”89  
For the TGP, the impunity in which ARASCO acted was understood as directly related to 
the close ties that had been forged between President Alemán and Truman.90 In the print below, 
for example, Angel Bracho depicts the “Sometimiento de los sindicatos” (Subjugation of the 
unions). Bracho illustrates the rapid deterioration of workers’ rights under Alemán’s 
conservative administration and places the blame on Mexico’s close partnership with the United 
States [Figure 22]. The choice of the chess board most likely were taken from comments made 
by Truman during his visit to Mexico City in 1947, when the American president touted his 
administration’s collaboration with Alemán, boasting of the shared commitment to progress 
through economic, cultural, and military cooperation. In public remarks to the Mexican 
president, Truman stated:  
 
 
 
International relations have traditionally been compared to a chess game in which each 
nation tries to outwit and checkmate the other. I cannot accept that comparison with 
respect to the relations between your country and mine, Mr. President. The United States 
and Mexico are working together for the mutual benefit of their peoples and the peace of 
the world.”91  
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91 Harry S. Truman: "Address in Mexico City," March 3, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12841. Last accessed July 24, 2013. 
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In the linocut, Bracho reveals the sordid result of both governments working together on the 
same side of the chess board.  Alemán sits at a large table in complete control of Mexico. Each 
piece represents a different social group within Mexican society. Alemán’s pieces include two 
rooks, representing the wealthy elite, the military police in the figure of a knight, and the 
charro—or corrupt government-appointed union leader—as the pawn held in the president’s 
hand. The Mexican popular classes are Alemán’s opponents, as represented by the striking 
railroad workers, campesinos, and a woman who closely resembles the Virgin of Guadalupe. 
These figures were under direct assault on the chess board, but also above it where miners from 
the ARASCO Corporation are shown locked out of the company town, and to the right of the 
board, where workers are hit with the butts of police rifles and the fumes from a smoke bomb.  
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Figure 22. Ángel Bracho, “Sometimiento de los sindicatos,” in 450 años de lucha: homenaje al 
pueblo mexicano, (Ciudad de México: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1960). 
 
As a description of the print in 450 años de lucha explained: 
 
 
 
También distinguió el Gobierno de Miguel Alemán por su ataque a los derechos de la 
clase obrera. Los principales sindicatos fueron asaltados (ferrocarrileros, petroleros, 
mineros, etc.) y se instauró el nefasto “charrísimo”, o sea la casta de los líderes obreros 
corrompidos, traidores a su clase.  
The government of Miguel Alemán distinguished itself by attacking the rights of the 
working class. The principal unions were assaulted (railroad, oil, mining, etc..) and 
nefarious "charrísimo" was implemented, that is the caste of corrupt labor leaders, traitors 
to their class. 
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Bracho depicts the Mexican military as little more than strikebreakers, protecting the interests of 
U.S. capital. In the top left hand corner of the drawing, President Truman and Alemán conspire 
on how to break the democratic union. Thus, for Bracho, the United States was a destructive 
force in large part responsible for the plight of the miners and the state violence they 
experienced. For organizers of the strike, the presence of the United States was perhaps even 
more insidious, as they claimed the FBI was watching and reporting on their actions.92 The 
anticommunist backlash resulted in striking workers being placed on blacklists, unable to work 
in any of the northern mines or to earn contracts as braceros.93    
 
 
 
Rallying Opposition to the Korean War 
 
 
 
During the Korean War, the United States looked toward Mexico for material goods, 
sought Mexican soldiers to join the conflict, and continued to insist braceros were a critical 
wartime necessity.94 However, a robust opposition to U.S. involvement in the Korean War 
developed within Mexico, and an even larger majority were against Mexico supporting the 
conflict by sending its own troops to the front lines.95 Across the Mexican-left but also within 
                                                          
92 Mario Gil, La huelga de Nueva Rosita (México: Impreso México, 1959), 54.    
 
93 Ibid., 75-76. 
 
94 In fact, U.S. containment efforts in Asia found little support throughout Latin America.William Stueck, The 
Korean War: An International History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 292-293.  
 
95 In the United States, Mexican opposition to the war was blamed on communist influence. The New York Times 
argued that communists were responsible for Mexico’s refusal to sign on to the Mutual Security Act, an agreement 
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mainstream publications, there was a belief that as the U.S. flexed its postwar power across the 
globe, it became more likely the reverberations of the actions would be felt in neighboring 
Mexico.   
Opposition to the Korean conflict in Mexico was brought to the public’s attention from 
the center and the left. Moderate observers condemned both the Soviet Union and the United 
States’ proxy wars, fearing that Mexico would be irrevocably harmed if global warfare broke 
out. Communists and the Mexican-left often focused on the profiteering of U.S. warfare and the 
neocolonial relationship of the United States with Latin America, in which American capital 
extracted material resources necessary for the wars being waged around the globe, while the vast 
majority of Latin Americans remained impoverished. For its part, the TGP relentlessly attacked 
the Korean War as being counter to the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. In “Sociedad 
Alemán,” Angel Bracho shows the corruption of Alemán and the deleterious impact that the 
United States’ escalating Cold War had on Mexico [Figure 23]. In the collection’s introduction, 
Bracho’s print is described as making visible the consequences of U.S.-Mexico foreign relations 
during the Cold War:  
 
 
 
El Gobierno del Presidente Alemán se distinguió entre otras cosas, por su 
inclinación a la alianza con el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América. En 
realidad se constituyó una sociedad entre Truman y Alemán… Se aplicó la 
política llamada de “puertas abiertas a las inversiones extranjeras” y la política de 
Guerra fría de los norteamericanos fue secundada por régimen de Alemán. 96  
                                                          
for economic and military aid in exchange for a shared responsibility of defense. Sydeny Gruson, "U.S.-Mexican 
Arms Parleys Collapse After Red Pressure," New York Times, February 22, 1952, 1. 
 
96 Ángel Bracho, “La sociedad Alemán -Truman,” 1949, in 450 años de lucha: homenaje al pueblo mexicano, 
(México: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1960). 
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President Alemán’s government distinguished itself, amongst other things, for its 
eagerness to ally itself with the United States Government. The alliance 
constituted a partnership between Truman and Alemán… They initiated a policy 
known as the “open door policy for foreign investments” and the Cold War 
policies of the North Americans were supported by the Alemán regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Ángel Bracho, “La sociedad Alemán -Truman,” 1949, in 450 años de lucha: 
homenaje al pueblo mexicano, (México: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1960). 
 
 
 
Echoching many of the concerns in Iturriaga’s article that were flagged by the U.S. 
Embassy, Bracho’s print vividly condemns the open trade between the two countries. It shows 
U.S. businesses flooding consumer goods onto the Mexican market, while uranium used to 
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manufacture atomic weapons, perhaps to be used in the Korean conflict, are sent back across a 
non-existent border between the two countries. Mexican national sovereignty has been given 
away as the nation’s culture is corrupted and wealth is pillaged by Alemán’s underhanded, pro-
business administration.  By undermining the trust of Mexico’s people, President Alemán stands 
to personally profit by selling out the nation. Indeed, there can be no mistaking this point as 
Bracho depicts Alemán quite literally handing over the nation to President Truman and U.S. 
business interests.97 Behind Truman a grotesque rat wears a suit and top hat as it stands on the 
pillared steps of the Capitol Building next to an engraving in marble that reads “Wall Street.” In 
other versions of this print Bracho switches the face of a rat for that of John Foster Dulles. The 
lack of any meaningful border separating the two nations allows the rat to simply dump harmful 
U.S. material goods, including whisky, Coca-Cola, cigarettes, and Life Magazine, into Mexico. 
The large pipeline being stuffed with U.S. consumer goods represents the major changes 
allowing for outside capital investments in PEMEX, the state-run oil company.98 On the opposite 
end of the pipeline, the United States extracts Mexico’s mineral wealth. Robbing Mexico of 
national resources, the United States had the audacity to sell back worthless consumer goods to 
the Mexican people. Even worse, the national resources being plundered, like uranium, were 
                                                          
97 Historian Stephen Niblo confirms the rampant corruption under the Alemán regime, which included the pilfering 
of millions of dollars worth of government loans for private businesses, political rewards for major corporate 
executives, and the use of violence and intimidation to break independent labor unions. According to Supreme Court 
Justice Luis Corona, the Alemán administration was a “moral cesspool.” These actions no doubt contributed to 
Alemán being named by Fortune Magazine as one of the world’s wealthiest men a few years after leaving office. 
See, Stephen Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly 
Resources, 1999), 207-16, 253-303.  
 
98 Within days of coming into office Alemán ordered the military to break a work stoppage and left-leaning labor 
leaders in the petroleum workers’ union were eventually expelled in response to the government crackdown. 
“Inversion, No Invasion,” Hoy, March 12, 1949, 9. 
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meant to be used in an escalating Cold War in which Mexico had very little voice, but could 
potentially forever feel the reverberations of nuclear warfare.99  
Importantly, the burdens of all these transactions are most acutely felt by the Mexican 
family—as a man, woman, and child maintain the structural integrity of the pipeline over their 
backs. This entire transaction was made possible by Alemán who oversaw an era in which 
Mexico’s national borders were rendered meaningless due to the free reign of the U.S. 
government and business interests.100 While the United States imagined a group of committed 
communists fomenting international conspiracies by illicitly crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, 
the Mexican left was far more worried about the deleterious impact of Yankee capital, culture, 
and war within Latin America. Printed at a time of growing suspicion that the United States was 
to blame for a series of problems in post-war Mexico, including high inflation, the decline in the 
value of the peso, and debilitating food shortages, Bracho’s artwork informed viewers that the 
hunger and anguish felt by Mexican citizens was directly tied to U.S. political and economic 
policies.  
The U.S. State Department kept close watch on the types of criticism offered by Bracho. 
In a letter addressed to President Eisenhower, U.S. Ambassador Henry White explained that the 
Mexican left had often focused its attention on issues that had widespread support amongst the 
Mexican public, especially the prevailing feeling that Mexico’s national sovereignty was under 
attack by the United States. Leftist organizations like the TGP, White wrote, sought to widen 
their political base by adopting “causes which find a responsive chord among many Mexicans 
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irrespective of political outlook.” These criticisms were numerous but often centered on “the 
possibility of the betrayal of the national patrimony.” The litany of concerns by ordinary 
Mexicans cited by the ambassador included:     
 
 
 
[the loss of] petroleum and, more recently, supposed uranium deposits—to 
foreign interests; the invasion of Mexican markets by United States firms, 
especially chain stores; the bracero question; the electric power question; land 
reform and the division of the remaining large tracts, some of which are owned by 
United States interests; the foreign mining companies; military cooperation for 
continental defense; and the general question of the economic “invasion” of 
Mexico.101 
 
 
 
The language of invasion was worrisome to the Embassy because of the imperial reputation—
from the American president on down—that U.S. officials were hoping to escape. In an era of 
expanding U.S. military presence in the world, the ability to keep the U.S. out of Mexico’s 
political, economic and cultural activities was proving nearly impossible.  
Journalists in Hoy were also critical of the Korean conflict. When a syndicated American 
newspaper columnist cited U.S. military history with Mexico to frame the possible outcomes of 
military engagements in Korea, Mexican journalists were indignant that the violent histories of 
American imperialism would be rehashed to justify war in Southeast Asia.  In 1950, as the 
United States debated whether to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea, David Lawrence wrote 
in his column, “Today in Washington,” that the history of U.S. military intervention in Mexico 
provided compelling evidence in favor of invading North Korea. Lawrence likened North 
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Korea’s invasion of South Korea to the raids of Columbus, New Mexico, by Pancho Villa during 
the Mexican Revolution. Just as President Woodrow Wilson had not hesitated or sought 
international permission to send forces across the international boundary into Mexico to capture 
Villa, neither could President Truman wait for international approval to send U.S. troops across 
the 38th parallel. In Lawrence’s view, U.S. military action during the Mexican Revolution had set 
the precedent for the United States to cross into North Korea, and like the 1916 Pershing 
expedition, the U.S. Army would simply “withdraw after the United States felt that adequate 
reprisal had been achieved.”102   
Not surprisingly, the comparisons made by Lawrence were not well received in Mexico. 
Writing from Mexico City, journalist José Rubén Romero, lambasted Lawrence for his “Yankee 
arrogance” and “ignorant” belief that U.S. imperial histories in Mexico offered a blueprint for 
U.S. military actions along Korea’s 38th parallel. Romero argued that such arrogance typified 
U.S.-Mexico relations and that it shed light on the policy decisions being made in Washington. 
The only way Lawrence could have displayed greater arrogance, Romero reasoned, would have 
been if prior to printing the article, he traveled to Veracruz and placed a wreath on a monument 
commemorating the lives of Mexicans lost in the U.S. occupation of the port city during the 
Mexican revolution.103 According to Romero, Mexico had no business in this war and U.S. 
                                                          
102 David Lawrence, “Today in Washington: No Reason to Halt at the 38th Parallel,” Lewiston Daily Sun, September 
30, 1950, pg. 4.   
 
103 This was a not too subtle shot at President Truman’s goodwill trip to Mexico City, which occurred a few years 
earlier, but had left a lasting imprint in how Mexicans viewed America’s Cold War military expansion. José Rubén 
Romero, “Se levanto el Telón y Comenzó el Drama,” Hoy, July 8, 1950, 16-17.  
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efforts to forge strong relations with Mexico were jeopardized when prominent American voices 
cited the history of U.S. conquest in Mexico to justify the use of military force in Korea.104  
The TGP also rigorously protested military action in Korea and the United States’ efforts 
to secure Mexicans to fight in the war were ridiculed mercilessly by the art collective.  In a 
drawing printed in Calaveras aftosas (1947), a publication released to commemorate the Day of 
the Dead, the monument to the Niños Héroes at the Chapultepec Castle is shown with Truman’s 
wreath of flowers encircling the tomb. Skeletons, representing the cadets, are crushed by the 
weight of the American flag located at the bottom of the image.105   
 
 
 
                                                          
104 José Rubén Romero, “La Guerra No es Negocio de México!,” Hoy, July 29, 1950, 16-18. 
 
105 This was printed as part of the Taller’s popular calaveras series—pamphlets produced for the día de los muertos 
celebrations. Members of the Taller saw these as amongst their most influential pieces due to the low cost of the 
printing and its wide circulation.  
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Figure 24. Jesus Escobedo, Calaveras Aftosas, 1947, University of California, San Diego, Geisel 
Library, Special Collections Library.  
 
 
 
To the left, American canons are pointed directly at the monument, suggesting the implicit threat 
of warfare that accompanied Truman’s visit. The corrido printed alongside the drawing asks why 
U.S. politicians had suddenly reveresed course, now appearing remorseful for its military 
incursion onto Mexican soil. It contends that Truman’s goodwill tour was all about the United 
States’ need for troops in the event that a full scale war broke out in Korea. The corrido reads, in 
part:  
 
 
 
Scott vino hace cien años  
En actitud altanera,  
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Y asesinó a nuestros héroes 
Después de una guerra artera 
 
Truman llegó hace muy poco  
Y ‘pa borrar los rencores” 
Colocó en Chapultepec 
Una corona de flores 
 
¿Por qué este cambio tan raro, 
---me preguntará Encarnación? 
“Es porque urge a los gringos  
Tener carne de cañón”  
 
Pues Truman y sus agentes 
Con mucha zalamería 
Quieren llevarnos muy pronto 
A nueva carnicería106 
 
[In a haughty attitude, 
Scott came a hundred years ago 
And killed our heroes  
After a deceitful war 
 
Truman came very recently 
And to “erase the bitterness” 
Placed in Chapultepec  
A wreath of flowers 
 
I ask Encarnación— 
Why such a strange change? 
 “Because the gringo needs 
To have cannon fodder" 
 
With much flattery 
Truman and his agents 
Want to take us very soon 
To a new butcher] 
 
 
 
Mexican readers were reminded that General Winfield Scott, who served as military 
governor of Mexico City from 1847-1848, arrived in Mexico a hundred years earlier to “kill our 
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heroes.” In the very next stanza, there is a seamless transition into Truman’s visit to Mexico 
City. Even though the Cold War had created strange occurrences, foremost among them, 
Truman’s goodwill tour, the corrido pleaded with readers not to be fooled by empty symbolic 
gestures. Truman’s visit had nothing to do with honoring the young boys who died in the unjust 
American imperial venture, but instead, reflected the United States’ need for Mexican soldiers as 
cannon fodder in Korea.  
In addition to the calavera prints critical of the war efforts, the TGP produced a filmstrip 
in 1949, ¿Quienes quieren la guerra—quienes quieren la paz? (Who Wants War, Who Wants 
Peace?), that highlighted the precariousness of Mexican sovereignty should the United States 
begin a war in South East Asia. The film graphically explained what might happen in the event 
that an American war with North Korea turned into a global conflict: 
 
 
 
A third world war would destroy democracy and our constitution. The imperialists 
would control the unions, democratic political parties, work contracts, and the 
prices of basic necessities…Our factories, field and our homes would be invaded 
and occupied by armed forces of the United States…Our youth, brothers, and 
children be enlisted as cannon fodder to fight under the orders of the Yankee 
helmets…Our Mexican earth would be totally occupied by the army of the United 
States…Our raw materials and our natural resources would be expropriated to be 
converted into products of war by the United States.107  
U.S. military action in Korea meant a complete erasure of the border between the United States 
and Mexico, as a likely third world war would cause irreversible losses to Mexican democracy. 
Mexican “youth, brothers, and children” would be sent to die on the front lines and a ruthless 
occupying U.S. army would transform Mexico into nothing more than a colonial outpost.  
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Building on these anti-war sentiments, Mexican artist David Alfaro Siquieros 
dramatically brought the issue of Mexicans being used for the Korean War to the Mexican 
public. His painting, “The Good Neighbor, Or How Truman Helps the Mexican People,” depicts 
the campesino as the victim of the United States. Siquieros, a lifelong member of the Partido 
Comunista Mexicana, depicts the Mexican campesino becoming cannon fodder for American 
imperialism. A rifle is slung across the shoulder of a grim looking man, his hands are bound by 
chains, as he kneels completely nude in front of the American president [Figure 25]. 108 In stark 
contrast to the soldier, Truman is dressed in a hazardous waste suit, protecting himself from 
possible nuclear fallout, while holding a small wad of cash in his hands. The bounded hands 
suggest that the Mexican is not a paid mercenary, but rather, that Truman’s money is more likely 
reserved for the unscrupulous Mexican politicians willing to sacrifice their citizens for personal 
profit.    
 
 
 
                                                          
108 Although Siquerios produced prints for the TGP, lasting tensions between Siquerios and the organization were 
created when Siquerios and a group of miners used the TGP’s workshop without permission to change into 
paramilitary disguises prior to their assignation attempt of Leon Trotsky. TGP members were questioned by the 
police and some briefly detained in connection to the crime. Caplow, Leopoldo Méndez, 154-158. 
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Figure 25. “The Good Neighbor, Or How Truman Helps the Mexican People,” 1951. 
  
 
 
Philip Stein, an American artist and associate of Siqueiros, living in exile in Mexico, 
estimated that some 30,000 people, mostly from working class backgrounds, visited the gallery 
where the painting was on display. It was also reproduced on the front page of the newspaper El 
Popular.  In addition to the painting, Stein explained how Siquieros was able to take action 
against the war while he completed “The Good Neighbor” painting:  
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Siqueiros had adopted a method printing and distributing his own handbills and 
leaflets whenever he deemed events serious enough to call for such action. With 
the Korean War raging, he and his leaflets printed in a small neighborhood 
printing shop. Then, late at night, when work on the mural had finished, Siqueiros 
and a couple of artists piled into the Plymouth with a bucket of paste and the 
leaflets. [Siquiero’s wife] Angelica drove through the darkened city streets, 
making hasty stops while the leaflets protesting the Korean War were pasted on 
the poles and buildings.   
 
 
 
Like much of the work from the Mexican left, these leaflets looked to the United States’ imperial 
past to better understand the war in Korea.  
In the handbills, Siqueiros argued against Mexican support for the Korean War by asking 
the public to consider the high stakes of Mexican aid to the United States. These handbills were 
pasted around Mexico City by Siqueiros and others in the Mexican Communist Party members:  
 
 
 
Betrayal by Mexico 
 
And a Criminal Offense to the People 
 
What would you think of the position of a small country that would have sent foodstuffs 
to the French forces that invaded Mexico in 1863, or to the Yankee troops that invaded 
the territory of the Nation on any of three occasions? 
 
Judge for yourself, today, June 1951, the position of the Government of Mexico in 
sending rice, sugar, etc. (articles of prime necessity for our people who are dying of 
hunger), to the troops invading Korea. 
 
Speak out, write, telegraph or collectively demonstrate your energetic protest!109 
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Siquerios asked the Mexican public to consider the United States’ actions against Mexicans a 
century earlier while they contemplated how history would judge those who supported imperial 
warfare. In addition, in a country struggling to feed all of its citizens, how was it be possible that 
staple goods were sold to a foreign imperialist army?  
 
 
 
Mexican Migrants at War 
 
 
 
Siquerios’ artwork must have seemed prophetic as mainstream newspapers began to 
erroneously report that thousands of Mexican migrants in the U.S. had been abducted by the U.S. 
military to serve on the frontlines of the Korean conflict. Alfonso Guerra, Assistant Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs in Mexico, was forced to hold a late night press conference denouncing the 
unsubstantiated claims.110 This was not the first time that allegations had been made that 
Mexicans were being used to fight in Korea. More than a year earlier the Los Angeles Times 
lamented the persistent rumors regarding migrants being captured at the border to fight in the 
Korean War, noting that such rumors sounded eerily similar to Soviet propaganda that appeared 
in the New Times of Moscow at the start of the conflict.111 
At its core, the persistence of rumors about Mexicans’ forcible participation in the 
Korean conflict spoke to the unbalanced power between the U.S. and Mexico, as well as the long 
standing mistrust of the U.S. military among a broad spectrum of Mexican society. Rumors of 
Mexican migrants being kidnapped were occurring at a time when U.S. government officials 
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spoke openly about the possibility of combatting the “wetback invasion” by calling in the U.S. 
Army to the U.S.-Mexico border. Such talk caused an outpouring of resentment in Mexico, and 
was brought to a fevered pitch in response to a speech given by U.S. Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell in August of 1953. During a tour of Southern California to address the increase in 
unsanctioned Mexican migration, Brownell announced to reporters that the Eisenhower 
Administration was seriously considering stationing army reserves popular points along the 
border where migrants crossed into the state. Francis White, Ambassador to Mexico, vehemently 
disagreed, understanding better than most in the Eisenhower administration the outrage and ill 
will that this course of action was likely to cause among the Mexican public. White wrote to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asking the administration reconsider its plans, comparing 
the potential damage to the U.S. gunboat diplomacy of the first part of the twentieth century. 
White explained that it would take only one “trigger-happy” soldier to undermine the clear 
distinctions he had made to Mexican bankers in Mexico City between “The Iron Curtain 
frontier” and the friendly relations shared along the U.S.-Mexico border. Simply put, he worried 
that placing the U.S. Army along the border would not allow the United States to “make capital” 
out of the differences between the Soviet and U.S. policy. White wrote that “if we have bayonets 
and muskets on our frontier…This situation will be exploited throughout Latin America. It will 
be seized by Communists for anti-American propaganda here, in Latin American and in the rest 
of the world.”112   
White’s fears were well founded. Throughout the 1950s, the Mexican left, as well as the 
mainstream Mexican press printed stories about the hardships faced by braceros, the 
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discrimination they experienced in the United States, and the difficulties migrants experienced 
with crossing the increasingly militarized U.S.-Mexico border.113 It is likely that the direct cause 
for Ambassador White’s concern on this occasion was a particularly damning editorial cartoon 
drawn by Arias Bernal, published in Excelsior days before White wrote to the Secretary of State 
[Figure 26].114 The cartoon highlighted the anger and resentment to Brownell’s suggestion of 
using the U.S. Army for policing migrants along the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. It shows a 
frightened bracero, drawn with distinct characteristics meant to denote indigeneity, including a 
partial mustache, bare feet, ragged clothing, and sharply drawn facial features. Sweat drips off 
the migrant’s face as he stares upwards at an U.S. Army issued rifle and bayonet pointed at his 
left hand, which he has raised, signaling his unconditional surrender. The enormous size of the 
bayonet in comparison to the migrant symbolizes the tremendous military might of the United 
States, as well as the lack of discretion in which the U.S. military was being mobilized. The 
caption reads “Entre la espada y la pared” (Between a rock and hard place), suggesting the 
paternalistic empathy Bernal felt for the migrant, whose dangerous journey to the United States 
was now threatened by the entirely unjustifiable presence of U.S. soldiers at the border. 
Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, Bernal repeatedly drew exaggerated indigenous features 
for his migrant subjects. In this context, the indigenous portrayal is meant to amplify the 
injustices perpetrated against the nation, as their poverty and ignorance made them subjects of 
pity, making the United States’ actions even more reprehensible.  
                                                          
113 This is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4.  
 
114 Another article commenting on the possible deployment of the U.S. Army on the border, likened the conditions 
of migration to warfare. The article in Excelsior went on to compare the capture of migrants by the Army and their 
placement in immigration detentions centers in McAllen, Texas, as being reminiscent of concentration camps in 
World War II. “Nuestros braceros,” Excelsior de Jueves, August 27, 1953, 13. 
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Figure 26. “Entre la espada y la pared,” Excelsior, 8/22/1953, 7b. 
 
 
 
 The editorial cartoon powerfully demonstrates the wide disparity of power between the 
two nations. Impoverished Mexican citizens met first-hand the power of the United States’ 
military when crossing the border. This image shows that American military might was as 
powerful as it was overbearing.115 And as Ambassador White wisely acknowledged, the 
inevitable, indiscriminate force utilized against Mexicans along California’s southern border by 
                                                          
115 “Nuestro braceros,” Jueves de Excelsior, August 27, 1953, 13. 
138 
 
U.S. Army personnel, would not bode well for garnering Mexican support for further American 
Cold War policies. Ultimately, President Eisenhower denied requests by the U.S. Border Patrol 
to launch “Operation Cloudburst,” which would have used the U.S. military and National Guard 
to rid the nation of Mexican migrants. Army General Joseph Swing expressed great excitement 
over the idea, suggesting that the training opportunities in rounding up and deporting Mexican 
migrants in the desert terrain would yield tremendous training benefits for soldiers preparing for 
the Korean War. While Eisenhower ultimately denied the request, when Swing retired, he was 
appointed commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.116  
 
 
 
The fallout of Atomic Warfare  
  
 
 
U.S. military engagement in Asia combined with its destructive red scare politics served 
to heighten the belief in Mexico that the world was on the brink of total, perhaps nuclear, 
warfare. Within Mexico’s mainstream press, the nation’s inability to meaningfully impact the 
growing conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was a great concern. In a world 
where nuclear warfare was seen as a distinct—if not, likely possibility, Mexican observers 
witnessed the increasingly belligerent brinkmanship between the two worlds’ superpowers and 
realized that their country had little practical ability to prevent wider warfare.  
 In the early 1950s, Hoy closely documented the advances in nuclear technologies, while 
at the same time, lamenting that such developments could cause massive destruction in Mexico. 
In articles with titles declaring “El mundo esclavo del atomo” (The world slave to the atom)  and 
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“1 hora de terror” (1 hour of terror)—about nuclear bomb testing in Nevada—Mexican 
journalists presented their nation as being held hostage, stuck between the world’s two 
superpowers.117 A sense of powerlessness pervaded parts of Mexican popular culture in the face 
of unspeakable destructive force that an atomic bomb could cause. In the event of nuclear 
warfare, national borders would not protect the country from the foreign policies of the United 
States or the Soviet Union. An article concerning the new technologies of the hydrogen bomb 
entitled “Asi se hace la paz” (This is how they make peace) forcefully makes this point by 
demonstrating the destruction this bomb would make in Mexico City. In an aerial photo, a dark 
line was drawn around the periphery of the city, noting the projected radius the destruction a 
hydrogen bomb attack would cause on the metropolis. 118 Such a horrific scene was likely, the 
article explained, should diplomatic relations completely break down between the Soviet Union 
and the United States. For these mainstream outlets, it was precisely Mexico’s lack of power on 
the world stage that gave journalists the most cause for concern. Whereas, for the Mexican left, 
potential nuclear warfare was the result of the Mexican state too adhering to U.S. wartime 
requests, such as providing supplies for the Korean War and raw materials for atomic weapons.  
Both the Mexican left and the mainstream media paid close attention to nuclear 
developments. In one of many editorial cartoons critical of the growing possibility of expanded 
warfare, Arias Bernal depicted how Mexico had been taken hostage by the threat of nuclear war. 
In April of 1953, Bernal drew a cartoon for the cover of Hoy that showed the globe praying for 
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peace, while a plume of grey smoke covers the title of the magazine.119 Bandages on the side of 
the globe show the harm that atomic weapons have already caused to the earth. In the previous 
chapter we saw how U.S. journalists and politicans fretted over the idea that the U.S.-Mexico 
border could be subverted to smuggle atomic bombs across it, but within Mexico, middle class 
outlets expressed deep anxiety that the national boundaries between the two nations would 
provide very little security from the devastating impacts of a global war. When Mexico’s 
Secretary of Defense announced that Mexico City would implement emergency planning in the 
event of a nuclear attack, he was criticized in Hoy for falling for a U.S. ploy to bring Mexico 
more closely to its neighbor’s Cold War policies.120 
Echoing such concerns, Cecilia Calderón, a member of the TGP, suggested that the 
dangers of the nuclear threat in Mexico increased as the nation’s leaders cooperated with the 
United States. In “La nación no acepta bases extranjeras” (The nation does not accept foreign 
military bases), Calderón reaffirmed the wisdom of President Camacho’s decision to refuse the 
United States territory for military bases on Mexican soil during World War II. In the linocut, a 
woman with indigenous features places her hands along the U.S.-Mexico border, blocking Uncle 
Sam and his tanks, warplanes, and nuclear weapons from crossing into Mexican territory. While 
the image commemorates a refusal of President Camacho, it is also provides Cold War 
commentary, as Uncle Sam’s arms are loaded with both atomic and hydrogen bombs.  
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Figure 27. Celia Calderón, “La nación no acepta bases extranjeras,” 450 años de lucha: 
homenaje al pueblo mexicano, (México: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1960). 
 
 
 
In March, 1954, Mexican diplomats surprised many in the country by refusing an 
important security request by the United States. The diplomats refused to sign the United States’ 
sponsored resolution against the spread of communism in the Americas, put forth at the Tenth 
Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas, Venezuela. John Foster Dulles wanted to secure a 
binding agreement for military cooperation in the event that any nation came under communist 
domination. After two weeks, Dulles was only able to secure a water-downed version of the 
agreement, which called for “consultation and collective action” in the event of communist 
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infiltration in any country in the hemisphere. The final version, as accepted by the conference 
read, in part:  
 
 
 
That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state 
by the international Communist movement, extending to this hemisphere a 
political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the 
sovereignty and political independence of the American states, endangering the 
peace of America, and would call for the consultation and appropriate action in 
accordance with existing treaties.121   
 
 
 
Frederic Ganzert, writing for World Affairs, explained that the American Secretary of 
State “displayed acumen and persistence” in  getting most Latin American nations to sign on to a 
“resolution against Soviet infiltration that showed that Pan-Americanism and the Monroe 
Doctrine were vital forces against communist domination.” Mexico and Guatemala attempted to 
make collective action against a Latin American country only possible in the event of an actual 
invasion by a country outside of the hemisphere. Mexico, Guatemala, and Argentina were the 
only nations that refused to sign the pact. Mexican diplomat Roberto Cordova explained in his 
dissent that his country did not support international communism, but that Mexico believed in 
the democratic right for countries to choose their political institutions. Though the Mexican-left 
would have certainly questioned Cordova’s insistence on Mexico’s steadfast belief in 
democracy, they were supportive of the decision to not sign on to the resolution. Cordova 
politely only alluded to the history of U.S. empire in explaining why Mexico would abstain from 
the agreement, noting that as country that had experienced intervention not only by European 
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powers, but also from “countries on our own continent,” and thus, Mexico could not in good 
conscience support an agreement that made foreign intervention in Latin America more likely.122  
 Mexico’s refusal to sign on to the agreement at the Tenth Inter-American Conference was 
heralded as an act of bravery by the press. An editorial titled “La unidad continetal no significa 
colonialaje” (Contintenal unity does not signify colonialism) argued that signing the agreement 
would have been tantamount to ceding Mexico’s sovereignty to the United States.123 The 
American Secretary of State’s negotiating strategy was humorously depicted in a cartoon by 
Rafael Freyre, in which Dulles displayed his understanding of “pan-americano”—this is a play 
on words—as “pan” also means bread—which Dulles’ toaster had turned into a nuclear 
explosion, while a concerned woman representing Latin American is startled by the exhibition 
[Figure 28]. 
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123 “Digamos en Caracas la verdad de América,” Hoy, February 27, 1954, 4-5; Isaac Abeytua, "El Vaor del débil: 
conferencia interamericana en Venezuela," Hoy, March 13, 1954, 27-29; “La dignidad de nuestra postura 
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Caracas la auténtica verdad de América,” Hoy, March 20, 1954;  “Jornadas nacionales: Mr. Dulles integro en 
caracas,” Hoy, March 27, 1954, 52-53. 
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Figure 28. Rafael Freyre, Hoy, March 20, 1954, 7. 
 
 
 
This cartoon was not only about the difficulties of the weak negotiating positions of Latin 
American in relation to the United States, but also spoke to greater concerns about the United 
States using the specter of communism invasions and potential nuclear war to bargain in bad 
faith with Latin America.  
 
 
 
Mexico’s Red Scare and the Guatemala Coup  
 
 
 
Anxieties of nuclear warfare in Mexico increased as the politics of the red scare unfolded 
in the United States in the early 1950s. Mexican journalists saw the destruction caused by Joseph 
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McCarthy’s brand of anti-Communism as particularly detrimental to the security of Mexico. A 
number of articles, including one penned by Carlos Fuentes, compared McCarthy’s tactics to 
those utilized by Hitler and Mussolin. All three men, Fuentes wrote, thrived during a period that 
had greatly shaped modern Mexico. In September of 1953, Hoy published a drawing of 
McCarthy on its cover in the image of a scarecrow. In the background a tornado ripped through 
the earth as McCarthy looked undettered by the havoc that he had left behind him.124 Others 
compared McCarthy’s tactics to the Spanish Inquisition.125 Concerns in Mexico went far beyond 
mere lamentations about the state of U.S. democratic political culture, as the deterioration of 
American politics at the hands of McCarthy and his supporters had serious consequences in 
Mexico.126 Most alarming was that McCarthy’s anti-communist theatrics were being adopted by 
aspiring politicians in Mexico—most notably, by a Mexico City politician and fervent 
anticommunist, Jorge Prieto-Laurens. In June 1954, the following image was printed in Hoy that 
linked McCarthy’s anti-communist agenda to the work Prieto-Laurens [Figure 29]. The caption 
reads “La voz de su amo” (The voice of his master). According to Freyre’s image, Mexico’s 
politicians were little more than puppets of America’s most conservative and dangerous 
politician. Even the conservative press in Mexico worried about the United States’ “attempt to 
export McCarthyism.”127  
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Figure 29. “Carton de Hoy,” Hoy, June 12, 1954, pg 8. 
 
 
 
Unbeknownst to Mexican journalists writing in 1954, Prieto-Laurens had been working 
with CIA operatives in Mexico City for nearly five years as he sought to present himself as one 
of the premier anti-communist leaders in Latin America. In fact, Prieto-Laurens played a little 
known role in the history of Operation PBSUCCESS—the CIA’s coordinated overthrow of 
democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz.128 Based on scattered evidence 
from the CIA, it appears that Prieto-Laurens contacted the intelligence agency in hopes of 
holding a hemispheric meeting for anti-communists in Mexico City. Prieto-Laurens assured the 
agency that he would personally make sure that Joseph McCarthy and fellow Wisconsin Senator 
                                                          
128 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, N.J., 
University of Princeton Press, 1992); Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its 
Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2006.) 
 
147 
 
Alexander Wiley would attend the event. After meeting with Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles in April, 1953, Prieto-Laurens’ organization, Frente Popular Anti-Comunista de Mexico 
(Popular Anti-Communist Front of Mexico) received U.S. financial and logistical support to 
move forward with its plans. 129   
Despite some reservations by the intelligence community, the CIA decided to support 
Prieto-Lauren’s efforts. Dating back to 1949, the Frente Popular Anti-Comunista had been 
working with the CIA and the U.S. Embassy, passing out unattributed anti-communist literature 
in Mexico City that had been prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies.130 During this time, agents 
found Prieto-Laurens to inflate his sense of importance to the anti-communist project in Latin 
America, and while the agency did not doubt his convictions, CIA operatives were concerned 
that he was making “selfish” political calculations along the way. An agreement eventually was 
struck between Prieto-Laurens and the CIA in which the Frente Popular Anti-Comunista would 
be given about ten thousand dollars to arrange the hemispheric anticommunist congress in 
Mexico City. Prieto-Laurens’ organization was charged with inviting hundreds of individuals 
from across Latin America to the conference, as well as to work with Guatemalan exiles to push 
a vote on a resolution declaring that “Soviet Imperialism has established a beached in Guatemala 
and is rapidly consolidating its position to make Guatemala a Satellite.” Additional objectives 
were included in a letter addressed to the Chief of the CIA in the Western Hemisphere, and 
included:   
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A. To induce a hemisphere resolution against Soviet intervention in Guatemala 
B. To build a hemisphere mechanism for combatting Soviet influence in Guatemala; 
C. To unify the several anti-Arbenz groups in exile; 
D. To smokescreen U.S. activities in PBSUCCESS; 
E. To create maximum psychological impact on the target audience131 
 
 
 
Every step of the way Prieto-Laurens failed to satisfy the CIA. In one memo CIA officers 
wrote that Prieto-Laurens’ leadership was “highly unreliable and unpredictable,” and as the 
conference grew near, it was becoming increasingly clear that there was a good chance that the 
conference would be an utter disaster. Prieto-Laurens proved incapable of following through on 
essential tasks put forth by the CIA, failing to secure top-level participants or even finding an 
adequate location in Mexico City to host the event. Perhaps this explains why intelligence 
officers changed his top secret pseudonym from “RNSHIELD” to “PEON” as the conference 
drew closer.132     
The scant amount of press coverage that the conference received in the United States was 
not flattering. After informing readers that the anti-communist gathering was held at the 
Cervantes Theatre—a well-known burlesque house—the New York Times explained that “no 
delegates of international prominence were present.”133 This was hardly the kind of publicity that 
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the CIA had envisioned, but it was far better than the story appearing in the same paper a few 
days later, entitled “Anti-Red Congress in Mexico a Failure.” The conference had gone so poorly 
that delegates from Costa Rica and Ecuador walked out in protest, claiming the meeting had 
devolved into a shouting match of angry charges "against the Government of Mexico, against the 
United States and against practically everything."134 
For those who remained at the conference past the first day saw conditions break down 
even further. The presence of Russian, Polish, and Czech ambassadors in the Western 
Hemisphere was condemned by Prieto-Laurens.135 The Mexican delegation presented a list of  
Mexican intellectuals and artists they accused of being Soviet spies—including artists Diego 
Rivera and Alfaro Siquieros, as well as popular actresses Maria Asunsolo and Dolores del Rio, in 
addition to well-regarded scholars, Eulalia Guzman and Maria Teresa Puentes.136 After two days, 
conference attendees established eight principal agreements for the organization, most of which 
dealt with the need for greater anticommunism in Mexico. The principles included: to help 
sustain the Mexican regime; to condemn the theories of communism; to prosecute Mexican 
communist traitors and foreigners who would meddle in Mexican internal affairs; to close the 
Universidad Obrera in Mexico City; to deport “communist cells” operating in Mexico; and 
finally, to officially form the Consejo Nacional Anticomunista.137 One of the few lasting results 
of the conference was the printing of a book, El libro negro del comunismo en Guatemala 
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(1954), which focused on the work completed at the conference and the continued threat of 
Guatemala to the rest of Latin America.138 
Just a few months after the conference, the CIA began its operations to overthrow the 
democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Activists and journalists in 
Mexico were quick to condemn both the staging of the anticommunist congress in Mexico City 
as well as U.S. belligerence in Central America. The Spanish exile, Isaac Abeytua, wrote a series 
of scathing rebukes of U.S. actions as other journalists in Hoy blamed American economic 
hegemony and support for the United Fruit Company for the war. 139 Four members of the TGP, 
Angel Bracho, Alberto Beltran, Leopoldo Méndez, and Fanny Rabel, were among those named 
by the CIA as members of the Sociedad de Amigos de Guatemala, an organization created in 
December 1953 to help defend the democratic and progressives policies of the Guatemalan 
government under Arbenz.140 Members of the organization came from mostly leftist 
organizations, including from the Partido Popular, Partido Comunista Mexicano, Federación de 
Partidos del Pueblo Mexicano, and the Consejo Nacional de Partidarios de la Paz. 141 The CIA 
reported that the Guatemalan Embassy was providing these organizations with the funds needed 
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to drum up opposition to a possible American led invasion and claimed that tens of thousands of 
leaflets were passed out in Mexico City condemning U.S. intervention in Guatemala.142    
Throughout this period, U.S. intelligence agencies kept close records of the anti-
American sentiment in Mexico and attempted to bolster anticommunism in the country. The U.S. 
Embassy and the CIA kept surveillance on members of the TGP, especially as the organization 
tried to prevent the overthrow of President Arbenz. CIA agents proved no better at selecting 
political operatives in Mexico as they were in hand picking dictators, as the stumbling character 
of Prieto-Laurens proved to be an unmitigated disaster for the agency in its efforts to organize a 
continental wide anticommunist effort.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
U.S. histories of imperialism in Mexico informed a variety of critiques from radicals as 
well as moderates as the 100th anniversary of the American occupation of Mexico City 
approached in 1947.  The Mexican-left highlighted the similarities between pre-revolutionary era 
of imperialism in the country, in which a corrupt Mexican state allowed its northern neighbor to 
ransack Mexico’s wealth—and the open trade, anticommunist sentiments of the Alemán 
administration. American officials hoped that the post-war period would usher in a new era of 
cooperation between the two countries and that Truman’s visit in particular would mark a 
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renewed commitment to economic and security cooperation. While the U.S. could largely count 
on the support from Mexico’s increasingly authoritarian government throughout the early years 
of the Cold War, Mexican artists, intellectuals, and journalists proved to be skeptical observers 
of the United States effort to combat communism across the globe. The free flow of capital and 
close political relationships between the two countries informed a wide range of criticisms—
from Mexico being “Coca-Cola-ized” to fears Mexican migrants were to being kidnapped to 
fight in Korea, to concerns that the U.S. red scare was being exported to Mexico City. Each of 
these worries reflected a wider concern that Mexico was losing its political, economic, and 
cultural autonomy in a period of expansive U.S. power.  
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Chapter 4  
 
“Nosotros semos el pais”: Race, Nation, and the Anti-Imperial Imagination 
 
 
 
On August 3, 1955, India’s Ambassador to Mexico and the United States, Gaganvihari 
Lallubhai Mehta and his assistant B.A. Rajagopalan, unexpectedly found themselves drawn into 
an international debate concerning Jim Crow in the U.S. South. While waiting for their flight at 
the Houston International airport, they stopped at the Horizon House restaurant for a meal when 
the manager, Mary Allen, mistook them for “negroes.” Allen was overhead repeating to the two 
men “law’s the law,” before she escorted them to the restaurant’s segregated dining area.143 This 
likely would have gone unnoticed if not for Frank Gibler, a former managing editor of The 
Houston Chronicle, who happen to witness the scene. Gibler explained that he thought it was 
“incongruous” that as Houston celebrated its fortieth anniversary as a “world port city,” that 
there were individuals like Allen who could make the metropolis seem like nothing more than “a 
provincial Southern City."144 When news of this incident spread, Secretary of State John Dulles 
sent a telegraph apologizing to Ambassador Mehta, as well as a letter of regret to the Indian 
Government in New Dehli. Houston Mayor, Roy Hofheinz, also extended an apology “on behalf 
of every citizen of Houston,” assuring Mehta that despite what he encountered, “We are proud 
that Houstonians do not discriminate against anyone of any race.”145  
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Mehta’s treatment prompted extensive commentary on the color line in America in 
India’s press, African American newspapers, and the mainstream press in the United States.146 A 
number of African American newspapers reacted to Mehta’s experience with a mixture of hope 
that such occurrences would help gain attention to the inhumanity of Jim Crow, as well as 
resentment that it took an international incident involving a foreign diplomat to motivate some to 
reflect on the state of racial inequality in the nation.147 Writing about the widespread attention 
Mehta’s story was receiving abroad, a clearly frustrated Chicago Daily Tribune editorial asked 
its readers: "Are we alone in our impatience over having everything that happens in the United 
States evaluated on the basis of how it might be interpreted in Europe and Asia?"148 It may have 
tested these editors’ patience even further to learn that this example of Jim Crow America was 
not just fodder for European and Asian observers to criticize U.S. race relations.149 In Mexico, 
Alberto Beltrán, a member of the TGP, reflected on Mehta’s experiences with Jim Crow some 
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three months after the incident occurred. In a political cartoon titled “Cuando a Texas te vayas 
mi cuate” (When you go to Texas my friend), appearing in the radical Mexico City newspaper 
Ahí va el golpe, a skeleton is depicted advising his friend about what to expect when he entered 
gringolandia as a bracero [Figure 30]. Just moments before the would-be migrant steps foot into 
the Rio Bravo, his friend points to the examples of racism he is likely to encounter on his 
journey. Ambassador Mehta, represented here wearing a turban, has his chair pulled out from 
underneath him by a waitress as he attempts to sit down at a restaurant. Closer to the river, we 
see a man being chased down on the U.S. side of the Rio Bravo by a Texan wielding a gun. The 
skeletons, symbols widely deployed in Mexican popular culture, were often adopted by members 
of the TGP to ridicule politicians or mock explosive political situations—portraying the living in 
skeleton form was a neutralizing force that put all actors on the same level.  
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Figure 30. “Cuando a Texas te vayas mi cuate,” Ahí va el Golpe, November 1, 1955. 
 
 
 
A corrido positioned at the bottom left hand corner of the drawing reinforced the 
international concerns of the radical art collective and provided a chilling image of white 
supremacy in the United States:  
 
 
 
Cuando a gringolandia vayas, 
A fregarte de bracero 
Cuídate mucho mi cuate 
De echar chiflidos a un cuero 
 
Pues los discriminadores, 
Al mexicano y al negro 
Y hasta algún príncipe hindú  
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Convierten en esqueleto  
 
(When you go to gringolandia  
To try your luck as a bracero  
Be very careful my friend   
If you whistle at a woman 
 
Because those who discriminate  
Against the Mexicans and blacks   
And even an Indian prince  
Will turn you into a skeleton)  
 
 
 
We learn from the corrido that the would-be migrant plans to find work as a bracero in 
the United States, but as he is about to enter the waters of the Rio Bravo, his friend intercedes 
with some potentially lifesaving advice. In the first stanza, the line “Cuídate mucho mi cuate/De 
echar chiflidos a un cuero” (Be very careful my friend/If you whistle at a woman) is a direct 
reference to another incident making international news in the summer of 1955, the gruesome 
murder of Emmett Till, a fourteen year old boy who had been tortured and then shot in 
Mississippi after reportedly whistling at a white woman. The bracero is warned that Mexicans 
and black Americans, and even Indian princes are subjected to racial violence in Jim Crow 
America—or gringolandia. For the Mexican left, to speak out against Yanquis or gringos in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, was to conjure images of a lengthy history of U.S. imperialism built 
on racial apartheid and economic exploitation. The gringo in this image is a Texas law 
enforcement agent, perhaps a Texas Ranger, wielding a pistol in his hand, as he chases down a 
fleeing skeleton.150 Following the advice from his cuate could very likely be a matter of life and 
death for the bracero.  
                                                          
150 The classic study on Texas border corridos is Américo Paredes’ With His Pistol in His Hand, which documents 
the corrido of Gregorio Cortez—an agricultural laborer of Mexican descent, who seeks revenge for the murder of his 
wife and brother by a Texas sheriff.  Américo Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand (Austin: University of Texas 
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An important facet of this drawing and the corresponding corrido is that it suggests how 
Mexican radicals, like Beltrán, explained U.S. white supremacy to his working class audience. 
Rather than concentrating exclusively on a singular story of misfortune experienced by a 
Mexican migrant trying to earn a living in the United States, Beltrán depicts a wider system of 
state sanctioned white racial terror in America, in which Mexicans encounter discrimination, 
economic exploitation, and perhaps even death, alongside other non-white people. In fact, we are 
not entirely sure whether the man being chased down by the Texan is an African American or 
Mexican. It is just as likely that the figure is Emmett Till as it is a compatriot of the Mexican 
migrant. Beltrán’s drawing depicts the ease in which state violence is directed against people of 
color, suggesting to the reader that to truly understand the racial oppression faced by Mexican 
migrants, it was necessary to look at how the United States dealt with other non-white 
populations. Importantly, though the discrimination of the “Indian prince” occurred at the 
Houston international airport, and the murder of Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi—the U.S.-
Mexico border serves as the symbolic site for understanding American imperial relations and 
white racial violence.  
And yet, Beltrán’s artwork connecting Mexican migration and violence at the border to a 
much wider system of white supremacy in the United States remained very much outside the 
mainstream. Indeed, despite the widespread condemnation of the treatment of braceros in the 
United States within Mexican media, radical internationalist critiques like Beltran’s, linking the 
struggle of Mexicans to other non-white racial groups were exceedingly rare. This chapter 
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compares the criticisms of the Bracero Program in Mexico by exploring the vast differences 
between representations of migrants created by the mainstream press and those forged by the 
TGP. Mainstream outlets like Hoy expressed profound anger at the violence Mexicans 
encountered in the United States, railing against the litany of abuses committed at the hands of 
Americans, but at the same time, this outrage was tempered by their own anxieties about the 
supposed cultural deficiencies of its emigrant population.151 Migrants were targeted by the press 
for their provincial cultures and proximity to indigeneity, marked as less deserving citizens due 
to their language, clothing, huaraches, skin color, and indigenous features.152  
The second portion of this chapter shows the profoundly different ways that the Bracero 
Program was portrayed by the TGP, centering on how the critiques of the art collective 
emphasized an international understanding of U.S. imperialism and white supremacy, built in 
part through the organization’s long term commitment to working with black artists. The TGP’s 
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work on Mexican emigration focused not on the nationalistic rhetoric of abandonment, nor did it 
rely on the racist indigenous tropes that pervaded mainstream discourse, but instead sought to 
uncover the transnational crisis of emigration, which had its roots firmly planted with the corrupt 
and ineffective Mexican government’s relationship with the United States. By comparing the 
differences in representations of Mexican, this chapter adds to the growing literature that 
emphasizes how perceptions of racial and class difference within Mexico impacted the migration 
experiences of braceros before, during, and after travelling to the United States.153  
 
 
 
Migrants in caricature  
 
 
 
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the mainstream Mexican press printed 
hundreds of stories about the Bracero Program, detailing examples of racial discrimination men 
experienced in the United States, difficulties migrants encountered finding decent paying jobs, 
and the increase in the numbers of apprehensions, deportations, and deaths of undocumented 
immigrants. In a nation that had paid such close attention to its emigrant population and that 
harbored such deep resentment toward U.S. power for so long, why would these mass 
deportations fail to inspire people to mobilize in the streets to demand the end of the Bracero 
Program?154 In Mexico’s popular press, how was it possible that the draconian efforts to police 
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the U.S.-Mexico border were met not with journalists’ calls for mass protest, but rather, for 
increased numbers of officers to police the Mexican side of the border?155  
To answer these questions it is instructive to recall that the architects of the Bracero 
Program in Mexico promised that it would aid in the modernization of the country. According to 
government officials, migrants would labor on the most technologically advanced industrial 
farms in the world and once they returned from the United States, they would be able to put 
those skills to work in the Mexican countryside where farmers were struggling to produce 
enough to keep up with the demands created by the rapidly expanding population. Historian Ana 
Rosas explains that the government’s idea of modernizing the labor force through migration was 
deeply tied to notions of racial uplift. Rosas argues that “Mexican President Manuel Avila 
Camacho proposed rehabilitating allegedly racially inferior rural Mexican men into modern 
citizens by exposing them to U.S. customs, skills, and work habits that they did not know 
through temporary contract labor in the United States.”156 While architects of the program 
argued that Mexican men from rural areas would be able to better themselves through the closely 
managed operations of the Bracero Program, they were far less optimistic that this applied to the 
migrants who traveled to the United States without state sanction. It was these migrants that the 
Mexican press relentlessly lambasted—the poor, uneducated, and racially suspect—who required 
greater state policing to prevent them from being exploited in the United States. For the Mexican 
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elite and emerging middle classes, the campesinos—often derogatively referred to as “peones” 
and even occasionally “inditos”—fleeing the countryside were a national disgrace, a poor 
representation of the emerging modern Mexico.157 As the treatment of Mexicans in the United 
States worsened, as seen in the rapid rise of detentions and deportations of migrants in the border 
region—from about 90,000 in 1946 to more than one million in 1954, the Mexican mainstream 
press took increasingly harsh views of its migrant citizenry.158 These observers determined that 
the only explanation for why migrants would leave Mexico—where they were likely to 
encounter discrimination and exploitation—was due to problems with braceros themselves, 
charging that these men lacked education, patriotism, and a proper sense of familial duty.  
Arias Bernal, perhaps the best known cartoonist in Mexico, fit securely into the category 
of a member of the mainstream press who condemned U.S. border enforcement regimes while 
simultaneously blaming migrants for the violence they experienced. After World War II, 
Bernal’s previous emphasis of pan-Americanism [Figure 9] turned to a far more critical 
approach, with special attention given to how Mexicans fared in the United States [Figure 27]. In 
the cartoon below from April 29, 1950, Bernal captures the mundane, everyday violence 
experienced by Mexicans at the hands of Texas cowboys [Figure 31].159 The two men are 
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159 Rafael Freyre, another one of Mexico’s leading cartoonists, published a number of comics that depicted the 
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presented as possibly, but not necessarily law enforcement officials, who casually discuss the 
murder of Mexican men in the United States. The Texan on the left asks his friend about the 
significance of the decorative symbols on his shirt, to which the other man replies with a grin 
that the six symbols represented the number of braceros he had murdered.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Hoy, April 29, 1950. Caption: “—Y eso?—Son los braceros que llevo…”  
 
 
 
While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Bernal’s critiques of the racism and the 
concerns about the potential violence migrants experienced in the U.S., when we examine his 
full catalog of work it is clear that his cartoons cannot be read as exclusively empathetic to 
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migrants’ struggle. Bernal consistently emphasized the racial and class difference of migrants, 
producing numerous images of aspirantes that raised doubts about their capacity to comprehend 
the challenges they were likely to experience in the United States.160 The editors of Hoy must 
have thought Bernal’s observations of the Bracero Program were revelatory because in the span 
of just three years, four of Bernal’s migrant caricatures were printed on the magazine’s cover. 
According to Eric Zolov, front cover illustrations of Mexican magazines—known as carátulas—
were highly desirable for artists in that they afforded them an opportunity to provide greater 
detail in color wash and were thought of more highly than monitos—the single frame pen and ink 
caricatures typical of newspapers and magazines of the period. In assessing the importance of the 
carátulas in the 1940s and 1950s, Zolov suggests that there existed meaningful similarities 
between magazine cover art and Mexico’s mural movement “in that both used symbolic visual 
language to reach a broad, often semi-literature population. One did not need to purchase the 
magazine to ‘read’ the editorial content expressed by the cover, since magazines were sold from 
street-corner kiosks and could be browsed by ever passerby.”161 Indeed, as Mexico’s leading 
caricaturist writing for the nation’s most popular magazine, Bernal’s magazine covers were 
prominently displayed in corner kiosks throughout the country.  
In his carátulas, Bernal relied on markers of indigeneity to explain why migrants risked 
the humiliation of apprehension, deportation, and labor exploitation in the United States. For 
example, as Mexico negotiated with the United States on the updated terms of the Bracero 
Program in March, 1948, Bernal represented the humiliating experiences of indigenous migrants 
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who is ridden like a mule by a Texan to the United States [Figure 32]. Bernal identifies the 
migrant as indigenous through his poor clothing, linen pants, partial mustache, and cloth belt. 
The Texan dangles a large carrot reading “nuevos contratos” (new contracts), “mayores salarios” 
(better salaries) and “no mas discriminacion” (no more discrimination) in front of the Mexican’s 
face. The wide eyed, gullible migrant does not grasp the emptiness of the Texan’s promises, 
despite the fact that the cowboy is riding him like a beast of burden. The aspirante fails to see the 
other obvious warning signs—the Texan’s Pinocchio-styled nose and his sharp spurs, ensuring 
that despite the promises, new rounds of contract talks would not lead to improved treatment for 
the bracero.  
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Figure 32. Hoy, March 13, 1948. 
 
Bernal’s caricatures highlighted the vast class, racial, and ethnic differences between the 
middle class consumers of Hoy and the imagined gullible Mexican campesino who sought his 
fortune in the United States. In a cover appearing in May of 1949 [Figure 33], Bernal depicts a 
likely migrant, wearing linen pants, a shirt with patches, and no shoes—listening to “el canto de 
la sirena” (the siren’s song). Uncle Sam seduces the man, whose wide eyes and hand placement 
on his chin suggests his profound sense of confusion. While the aspirante struggles to 
comprehend what is happening in his world, the large dollar sign in the form of a rock implores 
that he heed the siren’s call. Such depictions were typical of Hoy. An article from May, 1951, for 
example, echoed Bernal’s concerns, lamenting the persistent “illegal” immigration and the tens 
of thousands of deportations, explaining that these were a result of “the ignorance, the dazzle [of 
the dollar] and an absence of mexicanidad” that had “prompted the laborers to abandon Mexico.”  
Making the situation even more tragic, the author noted that better work opportunities were 
beginning to become available in Mexico’s agricultural sector every day—yet emigrants were 
simply choosing to ignore the chance to better themselves and their country in the futile pursuit 
of the American dollar.162 It was absence of proper patriotism and misplaced moral values, the 
author contended, rather than material necessity that resulted in men “abandoning” their country 
in such large numbers. 
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Figure 33. Hoy, May 28, 1949. 
 
 
 
These cartoons were far from harmless caricatures of migrants as they served to reinforce 
the idea that Mexico was a nation burdened by race and the primitiveness of its migrant 
citizenry. Importantly, such drawings helped create a visual rendering of subjects whose actions 
required greater attention by the Mexican state. Left to their own accord, migrants would be 
duped by the promises of better treatment, too impressionable to ignore the siren’s call, too 
ignorant to understand that the American dollars he dreamed about were never meant for him. It 
was within this context that Mexican journalists began insisting that the humiliating experiences 
of migrants necessitated state intervention. Writing for Hoy in 1949, for example, José Rubén 
Romero questioned:  
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“¡Como un país que presume tanto de ir a la cabeza de la civilización puede 
aplicar tratas tan inhumaos! ¡Como en donde funcionan sociedades protectoras de 
animales, los hombres de nuestro raza no llegan a la categoría de perros! Y así 
pretenden que el mundo les tenga simpatía y los declare abanderados de la 
libertad.  
Nuestro gobierno no puede ejercer ninguna protección absoluta para 
nuestros braceros. No contamos con tropas suficientes para establecer un cordón 
de vigilancia en la frontera, y evitar el paso de nuestros llamados braceros, 
esclavos en la antigüedad, galeotes en la Edad Media.”163    
 
[How is it that in a country that claims to be the head of civilization they can treat 
you so inhumanely? How is it that in a society that protects its animals, that men 
of our race don’t reach the category of dogs!  
Our government cannot exercise any protection for our braceros. We do 
not have enough troops to establish a line of surveillance at the border and prevent 
the passage of our so-called braceros, slaves of antiquity, galley slaves from the 
middle ages.] 
 
 
 
While Bernal and Romero were able to capture the various machinations of border violence in 
the U.S., their work chided the Mexican government for not acting more forcefully to prevent the 
movement of Mexicans across its northern border.  
By the time that Bernal and Romero’s accounts were published in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, Hoy had established the central tropes of the Mexican migrant for the magazine’s 
readers. However, when the magazine first reported on the Bracero Program, its investigative 
reporters scrambled to understand which Mexicans were leaving the country. In March of 1944, 
as tens of thousands of migrants gathered at the National Stadium in Mexico City, Hoy asked: 
“Y… quiénes son los braceros?” (“And…who are the braceros?”).164 Journalist Horacio 
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Quiñones interviewed aspirantes who joked about the poor quality of the Mexican government 
and dismissed the popular opinion that they should somehow be blamed for “abandoning” the 
country. Instead, they argued that the nation had abandoned them as the government refused to 
redistribute land or ensure well-paying jobs. Each of the men was presented in individual 
portraits and though Quiñones did not identify migrants by name, the article did afford each the 
opportunity to explain why leaving Mexico was a rational decision that they had carefully 
weighed. As one man explained, he wanted to travel to the United States because he had no 
family and few job opportunities. Perhaps responding to the reporter’s question about lacking 
patriotism, the aspirante declared, “I wasn’t working, and even still, because I leave you say I’m 
ruining the country.” The article was unique in that the journalist conducted interviews and 
published the thoughts of men wishing to leave the country.165 Over the course of the decade 
interviews with migrants and aspirantes were almost never included in stories about the Bracero 
Program printed in Hoy.  
Nevertheless, the article managed to reinforce the racial and class difference of its 
migrant subjects. Like Bernal’s carátulas, the writer portrays aspirantes as provincial and 
lacking the ability to make rational decisions. While explaining his reasons for seeking work as a 
bracero, an unnamed migrant informed the reporter that when his mother died, he decided to 
travel to the U.S. because he was all by himself. Rather than writing his words as “murió 
dejándome así no más” (she died leaving me just like this)—the migrant’s remarks are written 
phonetically as “murio dej’andome ansina,” which was meant to demonstrate the migrant’s use 
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of improper Spanish. These ideas were reinforced by the author, who insisted that most of the 
migrants were illiterate with only a few of the men possessing basic knowledge of the alphabet. 
Importantly, when a group of men being interviewed explained that their experiences were 
representative of the majority of the country, declaring to the reporter “nosotros somos el pais” 
(we are the country)—the words are written as “nostotros semos el pais,” a clear sign that the 
writer doubted the migrants’ claims.166   
Hoy published dozens of pictures of emigrants in the first decade of the Bracero Program 
that largely reinforced the difference between readers of the magazine and emigrants. In Migrant 
Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the Mexico–U.S. Borderlands, Alicia Schmidt Camacho 
examines the photographs of migrants taken during this period by the Hermanos Mayo, Spanish 
exiles who fled the civil war and relocated to Mexico. Camacho notes that “the plurality of the 
images is astonishing when measured against Mexico’s prevailing discourse, which viewed the 
bracero as a single, simplistic figure. Instead, these men are beautifully complex—young and 
old, campesinos and urbanites, hopeful and resigned, both interacting with one another and 
contemplating their individual futures.”167 Even in articles in which the Hermanos Mayo’s 
images were reproduced, Camacho explains, the accompanying text did not correspond with the 
class solidarity that the brothers tried to evoke with their photography.168 In Hoy, while some 
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photographs provided the sorts of complexity discussed by Camacho, more often the images 
were like the ones below [Figure 34, Figure 35], in which photographs capturing migrants’ 
huaraches and dirty feet were paired with ones showing the large number of aspirantes in 
Mexico City, sleeping outdoors in public streets, park benches, and on sidewalks, all of which 
reinforced the vast cultural gulf between middle class readers and the rural migrants who fled 
Mexico.169 Most often photographs captured anonymous large groups of men from a far 
distance, showing them waiting in long lines at migrant processing stations, sitting aimlessly in 
prisons in Mexicali and Los Angeles, and wading nearly nude into the Rio Grande.170 While it is 
plausible that such images would have shocked Mexican readers into feeling empathy for the 
plight of migrant workers, the text almost uniformly found migrants responsible for their 
mistreatment, noting that despite having just experienced being apprehended or deported by the 
U.S. Border Patrol officials, most men would try their luck once again crossing the Rio Bravo. 
Indeed, images appearing in Hoy emphasized the mass “humiliation” of the campesino 
experience and the shame that such individuals brought to the nation. Importantly, anxieties 
about migration manifested in both the transnational movement of Mexicans to the United States, 
but also the internal migration of individuals from rural areas to the rapidly expanding Mexico 
City.171 While some migrants would eventually travel to the United States, many more would 
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remain in the nation’s capital. Thus, migration, as these images suggest created a host of 
potential social problems that would impact the daily lives of Hoy’s cosmopolitan readers. 
Indeed, part of the appeal of politicians like the Ernesto Uruchurtu, regent of Mexico City from 
1952-1964, was his reputation for making the nation’s capital inhospitable to rural migrants. 
Uruchutu’s commitment to urban renewal and beautification of the city led to clashes between 
police and the migrants milling about in public spaces, as well as years of largely favorable press 
in Hoy.172  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Hoy, “Profesionales de la humillación, August 1, 1953, 9. Caption: ¿Para esto fueron 
a Estados Unidos? Ilegales, humillados, pies de la miseria. (This is why they went to the United 
States? Illegal, humiliated, feet of misery.) 
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Figure 35. Hoy, “Frontera abierta,” Hoy, June 20, 1953, 7. Caption: Están esperando. Los 
braceros, tendidos en las calles, duermen y quizás sueñen con el paraíso de los hombres dorados. 
La realidad les golpeará en el rostro. (They are waiting. Lying in the streets, braceros sleep and 
perhaps dream of paradise inhabited by wealthy men. Reality will hit them in the face.) 
 
 
 
Abandonment and the Return 
 
 
 
Hoy writers clung to long standing anti-Indian sentiments in Mexico to explain and 
reinforce differences between men who travelled to work in U.S. fields and Mexican men who 
remained with their families, working hard to build the post-revolutionary nation. The act of 
abandonment was one of the most puzzling aspects of migration for middle class writers, who 
questioned what kind of men would leave their families only to encounter racism, labor 
exploitation, and possibly even death in the United States. In these accounts, the steep decline in 
the value of the peso, food shortages, and lack of land that prompted migration were replaced 
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with simple “truisms” about the inherent nature of the migrant as ignorant, unpatriotic, and 
susceptible to abandoning the nation and family on a whim.  
Arias Bernal identified sexual pleasure and adventure as a central reason some Mexican 
men were willing to leave their nation and families. In the following example from April of 
1950, the migrant wears huaraches, frayed overalls, and a straw sombrero. He grasps his suitcase 
as he dreams of the riches and sexual possibilities that await him in the United States [Figure 
36].173 In the migrant’s mirage, a blonde woman wears revealing clothing and holds a bottle of 
champagne. She is surrounded by signs posted in the clouds reading “buen trato” (good 
treatment) “muchos dolares” (lots of dollars), and “Ham and Eggs, Fried Chicken and Hot 
Cakes.”174 The aspirante allows his tools, a pitchfork and hoe, to sit unused, gathering cobwebs, 
preferring to spend his time daydreaming of sexually promiscuous blonde women and hot cakes, 
rather than cultivate his land. According to Bernal, migrants were not only travelling to the 
                                                          
173 Bernal printed another carátula similar to this one. In the cover, a migrant takes a brief break from his work, 
resting on his shovel only to see a highly sexualized blonde woman wearing heavy makeup, lipstick, dressed in 
shorts and a form fitting shirt. She presents herself as being open to the migrant’s advances. The overly excited man 
struggles to maintain his composure, wiping sweat off his brow with a handkerchief while his sombrero flies off his 
head as he looks longingly at the woman who has “dolares” printed on her shorts. Hoy, February 17, 1951. 
 
174 These concerns about migrants changing diet can be traced back to the 1920s. For example, in Daniel Venegas’ 
Las aventuras de don Chipote, o, cuando los pericos mamen (1928), the main character, don Chipote, leaves Mexico 
in search of work in the United States when he encounters Mexicans in Texas who have been thoroughly 
“gringoized.” The Americanized men make fun of don Chipote’s Spanish and “deny their country for no other 
reason than for having tasted ham and eggs.” Richard Griswold del Castillo, "Mexican Intellectuals' Perceptions of 
Mexican Americans and Chicanos, 1920-Present,"Aztlán 27, no.2 (2002): (37) 33-74. In his memoir, Aventuras de 
un bracero (1949), Jesús Topete also recounted how central food was to migration. As a writer from Mexico City, 
Topete goes to great lengths to distinguish himself from the average bracero and in one memorable scene, Topete 
writes about the deep shame he experienced while watching his countrymen attempt to eat pork with silverware, 
noting that “Muchos no sabían manejar los cubiertos, y de vez en cuando los huesos les saltaban del plato y se iban a 
estrellar en la cara de sus vecinos, lo que deba motive para que los gringos que estaban allí se rieran 
ruidosamente…” (Many did not know how to handle silverware, occasionally the bones jumped off the plate, hitting 
their neighbors in the face, which made the gringos laugh loudly…) In recounting this experience, Topete explains 
the almost unbearable shame of seeing his countrymen being laughed at. Arias Bernal was commissioned to draw 
the cover for Topete’s memoir in which the more cosmopolitan migrant does not resemble any of the Hoy covers. 
Instead, Topete is clean shaven and wears work shoes, socks, and jeans. Jesús Amaya Topete, Aventura de un 
bracero: relatos de seis meses en Estados Unidos (México, DF: Editorial AmeXica, 1949), 19.  
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United States under false pretenses, but by refusing to work on their fertile land in Mexico, they 
failed to contribute to the building of the Mexican nation. 175  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Hoy, April 29, 1950 
 
 
 
The notion that men were leaving the country for sexual adventure was advanced in a 
number of articles in Hoy. The photograph below [figure 37], for example, appeared alongside 
an article chastising migrants’ lack of patriotism and fidelity to the nation. It captures a small 
                                                          
175 The question of the degradation of the Mexican character through his lust after white women in the U.S. was a 
recurring trope in films on the Bracero Program. In Espaldas mojadas (1954), a critical film about migration of 
Mexicans includes a scene of Mexican migrants paying for sex with white women. Interestingly, the State 
Department prevented the film from being released for two years, and attempted to suppress the film from being 
shown in Latin America. In the film Bracero del año (1964), starring comedian Eulalio “El Piporro” Gonzalez, one 
of the key plot points is whether the main character will decide to stay with a wealthy American blonde woman or 
return to the impoverished woman he left behind in Mexico. On Espaldas mojadas, See, Seth Fein, “Transcultured 
Anticommunism.” 
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group of men sitting outdoors on their journey to the United States. The camera lens focuses on a 
man who sits on a rock, passing the time by looking at the photos—not reading—“Burlesk” 
magazine. This distinction between “looking” and “reading” is important, as these emigrants 
were envisioned almost always a mass of illiterate men. Another bracero sits near the man 
examining “Burlesk”—the most distinguishable characteristic is his wedding ring. Thus, the lack 
of patriotism these migrants demonstrate was made even more tragic because men were 
abandoning their families as well. What would happen to the Mexican nation if hundreds of 
thousands of men each year were to stop fulfilling their obligations to the nation and family?  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37. “Ve, oye, dice,” Hoy, May 15, 1951, 10. Caption: En un mes, 21,000 braceros 
deslumbrados por el dólar, cruzaron ilegalmente la frontera en Sonora y Baja California. Las 
autoridades norteamericanas los deportaron nuevamente a México. (In one month, 21,000 
braceros dazzled by the dollar, illegally crossed the border in Sonora and Baja California. U.S. 
authorities deported them back to Mexico.) 
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Part of the concern over the number of migrants departing the country was based on the fear that 
they might never return. A caricature by artist Rafael Freyre, for example, appearing in Jueves de 
Excelsior showed a lonely young woman in her small village—identified as a campesina by her 
bare feet and braids—she stands with a worried expression on her face, as she watches her 
husband walk away in the distance. The caption reads: “The dark swallows return to your 
balcony to nest, but the man who left as a bracero...will not return!”176 While migratory birds 
could be expected back annually, the same was not true for Mexican men who left the country. 
The moment of departure was given a special place in the cultural production of migration and 
was presented in photographs, such as the one below, in which an unnamed family is shown in 
the moments prior to when the bracero “leaves behind his self-respect and freedom” to risk his 
life with a patero—human smuggler—to get him safely across the border [Figure 38]. The young 
woman, identified as the migrant’s wife, holds on to her child and turns away from the man who 
will soon abandon her. The young woman is identified as an adolescent, whose difficult life is 
about to get considerably harder with her husband attempting to find work in the United States. 
Multiple tragedies unfold in this image. The first, which has been explored in a variety of images 
in this chapter, was the simple fact that the campesino must leave the country to make a living. 
The second, reinforced the social problem in rural areas of the nation, where such sexual 
impropriety of a grown man perpetrated against his adolescent wife went unchecked. The 
looming question which remained unanswered was whether the migrant would ever return to his 
wife and family, or whether he would simply stay in the United States. Of course, such decisions 
were not entirely up to the migrant, as the article informed the reader that the pateros were 
responsible for many deaths of the nation’s emigrants.  
                                                          
176 Jueves de Excelsior, “Carton,” June 12, 1947, 25.  
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Figure 38. “"Meto a la muerte sobre el rio bravo!,” Hoy, March 3, 1951. Caption: Con la Patria, 
que está a punto de abandonar, el bracero deja el respeto a su persona y la libertad y se arriesga a 
perder la vida a manos del “patero”—el contrabandista de la carne humana que negocia con sus 
dolores pero la esposa, aun adolescente y los niños le piden el pan que su propia tierra les niega. 
Y por el pan de ellos, el protagonista de una de las mayores tragedias de nuestros días, se 
arriesga a toda. (About to abandon the homeland, the bracero leaves behind his self-respect and 
freedom, risking his life at the hands of the "patero"- the smuggler of human flesh that negotiates 
with pain. But the wife, still an adolescent herself and the children ask for the bread that their 
own land denied. And for their daily bread, the protagonist of one of the greatest tragedies of our 
days, risks everything.)  
 
 
 
When braceros did return, they encountered unexpected problems resulting from their 
absence. Indeed, observers were equally concerned about what would happen to the family life 
of migrants when they returned from travelling to the United States. In July, 1953, Luis González 
Guzmán, who described himself as Mexico’s Norman Rockwell, depicted in a carátula a bracero 
returning to his rural mountain village after working as an agricultural laborer in Texas. The 
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magazine explains to readers that Guzmán intended to provide the magazine’s reader with 
authentic and “relatively frequent scenes in el campo.” After working in the United States for an 
extended period, the bracero—who is referred to as an “indito” (little Indian) returns home to his 
village, standing awkwardly in his new boots, jeans, cowboy hat, and western style shirt typical 
of Texas. In one hand, he carries a bulging suitcase—to his right rests a duffle bag, perhaps filled 
with goods purchased in the United States. 
The inside cover reveals that the time in the United States has transformed the man, or as 
the magazine described it, “el ambiente yanqui conquisto al inidito” (the Yankee environment 
conquered the little Indian). This buffoonish looking returning migrant has been conquered once 
again, and this transformation has been so complete that “su indita” (his little Indian woman) and 
child struggle to recognize this stranger who smiles and waves at them. An overarching theme is 
that migration is causing deep confusion in Mexico, as the indigenous woman, drawn with 
clearly racialized characteristics—an ape like face and large feet and hands—is confronted with 
a dilemma that she cannot solve. Similar to Bernal’s comics with the male migrants showing 
confusion in preparing for migration, his wife struggles to understand the transformation that he 
had undergone. Even if his transformation into an authentic Texan was not convincing, migrants 
who stayed in the United States for extended periods signaled deep and lasting changes in their 
villages and within their families.  
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Figure 39. Hoy, July 11, 1953. 
 
 
 
White supremacy and radical dissent in Mexico  
 
 
 
Prior to examining how the TGP’s work challenged the dehumanizing portrayals of 
braceros in the mainstream press, it is important to more fully understand the expansive and 
inclusive vision of race and nation held by the international members of the art collective. 
Unique for the period, TGP artists Celia Calderón, Leopoldo Mendez, Alberto Beltran, Francisco 
Mora, Elizabeth Catlett, and Mariana Yampolsky, all documented and celebrated the persistence 
of distinct indigenous and Afro-Mexican cultures within Mexico. Cesáreo Moreno explains that 
the Mexican political and popular culture “promulgat[ed] a homogenous definition of 
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Mexicanidad that was exclusively linked with ancient indigenous civilizations and Spain, the 
actual diversity present throughout post-Revolution Mexico was not only publicly denied but 
also officially eradicated.”177 Black artists who worked in a variety of capacities with the TGP 
during the 1940s and 1950s were key forces behind both the attention the collective paid to both 
black history and culture in Mexico, as well as the racial violence of the Jim Crow system in the 
United States.178 Some African American guest artists, such as John Wilson, participated briefly 
with the TGP, while Elizabeth Catlett became a permanent member, who along with her husband 
Francisco Mora, worked with the collective for more than twenty years.179 Many of these artists 
had initially been drawn to the social realism of the muralist movement in Mexico and later 
joined the TGP where their works covered a variety of themes documenting poverty, racism, and 
discrimination in both countries.180 Throughout the 1950s, TGP members created a number of 
                                                          
177 Sagrario Cruz-Carretero and Cesáreo Moreno, The African Presence in México: From Yanga to the Present 
African Presence in Mexico (Chicago: The Mexican Fine Arts Center Museum), 82. 
 
178 In the post-war period a number of African American artists and intellectuals lived in exile in Mexico City in 
order to escape McCarthyism. Rebecca Schreiber prefers the terminology of exile to describe individuals who were 
coerced into leaving the U.S. during the Cold War. Schreiber argues, “exile is significant to the particular historical 
moment examined here because U.S. national belonging during the early Cold War era was vigorously policed in 
both the symbolic and administrative terms that essentially abrogated the citizenship rights of specified 
individuals…In the case of those who fled the United States to avoid government harassment or arrest during the 
early Cold War period, their relocation to Mexico was a response to the accelerated intolerance mandated by the 
U.S. state, which excluded those who did not meet the politically normative terms that policymakers established for 
national belonging.” Schreiber, Cold War Exiles, xv.   
 
179 Melanie Anne Herzog, Catlett: An American Artist in Mexico (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005). 
Aguirre’s woodcuts of Morelos were reprinted in José López Bermúdez, Canto a Morelos (Mexico: Morales 
Hermanos Impresores, 1965). 
 
180 Charles Alston, John Biggers, Elizabeth Catlett, Sargent Claude Johnson, Jacob Lawrence, Charles White, John 
Wilson, and Hale Woodrom were drawn to Mexico City to work with the “big three” Mexican artists, Diego Rivera, 
Jose Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros. Orozco, Rivera, and Siquieros also depicted scenes of white 
supremacy and vigilante justice throughout their careers. Orozco’s, Negros Colgados (1933-34), was drawn at the 
request of the National Association of the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) anti-lynching campaigns.  
Alma Reed, Orozco, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 275-276. In 1933, NAACP president Walter White, 
tried but failed, to get Rivera to participate in the organization’s anti-lynching exhibit. While Rivera did not provide 
work for this exhibit, other work including Rivera’s Reconstruction (1933) did directly address the subject of 
lynching and the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan in U.S. Society. Dora Apel, Imagery of Lynching: Black Men, 
White Women, and the Mob (Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 157-159. Acts of white violence are also 
present in Siqueiros’ Cain in the United States (1947), Stein, Siquieros, 186-187. 
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pieces dealing with African heritage and history in Mexico, including works that celebrated slave 
revolts in Mexico, emphasized the Afro-Mexican heritage of sugar cane workers in Veracruz, 
and commemorated the leadership of Afro-Mexican revolutionary leaders.181 Other members of 
the collective drew illustrations for books dealing with the question of white supremacy and the 
continued discrimination of African Americans in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.182    
   African American artists working with the TGP created socially conscious artwork that 
often depicted racial violence in the United States. For example, in 1952, while taking a class 
with TGP member Ignacio Aguirre on fresco paintings in Mexico City, John Wilson drew a 
mural entitled, “The Incident,” depicting a lynching in the U.S. South at the hands of the Klan.183 
In a series of lithographs completed by Elizabeth Catlett titled “Against Discrimination in the 
United States” (1953-1954), the Washington, D.C. native documented the long struggle against 
anti-black violence in the United States.184 In the linocut below from the series, Catlett shows the 
influences of the TGP on her artwork, in a piece that commemorates the life of William 
Patterson, an organizer for the Communist Party and leader of the Civil Rights Congress.185 
Patterson twists back the arm of a Klan member to keep him from hurting a black child. The use 
                                                          
 
181 Sagrario Cruz-Carretero and Cesáreo Moreno, The African Presence in México: From Yanga to the Present 
African Presence in Mexico (Chicago: The Mexican Fine Arts Center Museum), 18-22. 
 
182 Aguilar de la Torre, Dolor Por La Muerte De Un Negro (México, D.F.: Fuego Nuevo, 1968); Gabriel Fernandez 
Ledesma, Negro Sam del Tio Sam (México, D.F.: Editorial Surco, 1957).\ 
 
183 While living in Mexico City, Wilson also worked with the TGP, creating “The Trial” in 1951, in which a young 
black child was drawn appearing in court in front of three white judges. Schreiber, 46-47; Lizzeta LeFalle-Collins, 
In the spirit of resistance: African-American modernists and the Mexican muralist school (New York: American 
Federation of Arts, 1996), 19-26. 
 
184 Alison Cameron, "Buenos Amigos: African-American Printmaking and the Taller de Gráfica Popular," Print 
Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1999), 252-367. 
 
185 Melanie Anne Herzog, Elizabeth Catlett: an American Artist in Mexico (Seattle: University of Washington Press: 
2000), 100. 
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of the skeleton to depict the Klan member was reminiscent of many of the projects completed by 
the TGP in the period.  Other pieces from the “Against discrimination” series included linocuts 
of Harriet Tubman, black women sitting in the “colored section” of buses, black sharecroppers, 
as well as portraits of W.E.B. DuBois and Paul Robeson, both of whom were involved in the 
American Continental Congress for Peace, held in Mexico City in 1949.186  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40. Elizabeth Catlett, “Civil Rights Congress,” 1949. 
 
 
 
                                                          
186 Report on the Communist 'Peace' Offensive - A Campaign to Disarm and Defeat the United States, Committee on 
Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, House report No. 378, April 1, 1951.   
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Importantly, for the TGP, white supremacy did not only impact those living in the United 
States, but threatened people from around the globe. Artwork from Erasto Cortés and Francisco 
Mora, published in Calaveras aftosas (1947), emphasized the global reach of white supremacy.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. Erasto Cortés and Francisco Mora, “Calaveras aftosas,” 1947, University of 
California, San Diego, Geisel Library, Special Collections Library.  
 
 
 
In condemning the actions of the Klan, Cortés and Mora tapped into a longer tradition of 
criticism against white supremacist organizations by Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.187 With 
                                                          
187 José Guadalupe Posada, for example, created “Calaveras de los Bravos Ku Klux Klanes” (c. 1913), a broadside 
depicting the racial violence experienced by Mexicans near the U.S.-Mexico border at the hands of the white 
supremacist vigilante group. Dawn Ades and Alison McClean, Revolution on Paper: Mexican Prints 1910-1960 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 11.  
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whips in hand, the Klansmen terrorize African Americans and Mexicans who are forced to flee 
from the imposing figures. Behind the Klansmen are public buildings labeled “escuelas,” 
“espectaculares,” and “restaurantes,” all which were subjected to Jim Crow policies that made 
them inaccessible to people of color.188 The symbol of a burning cross with flames shooting 
outward sent a powerful message reminding Mexicans that the anti-Catholic beliefs of the Klan 
put their lives in jeporady.189 The corrido speaks to the political uncertainty in the immediate 
post-war period, noting the profound sacrifices made by African Americans, Cubans, and 
Mexicans during World War II. Despite fighting against Hitler and his doctrine of racial 
supremacy, men returning from war were now forced to do battle with the Klan. The corrido 
reads:  
 
 
 
Para liberar a los pueblos                                                                                
de la angustia y el temor 
en todo el mundo hace poco 
la sangre derramó 
 
Por los derechos del hombre 
Murieron negros, cubanos, 
Y se vertió en abundancia 
La sangre de mexicanos 
 
Pero los hombres que un día  
lucharon con heroísmo  
                                                          
188 Mexican labor organizer and radical activist Emma Tenayuca recalled hearing stories from her grandfather about 
the terror of the Klan in Texas in the early twentieth century. Zaragosa Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights: 
Mexican American Workers in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 124-
125. 
  
189 On the Ku Klux Klan and Mexican-Americans, see, Katherine Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial 
Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 99, 
233, 248;  Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkley and 
Los Angles, California: University of California Press, 1997), 200; Carlos M. Larralde and Richard Griswold del 
Castillo, "San Diego's Ku Klux Klan, 1920-1980" Journal of San Diego History Spring/Summer 2000, Volume 46, 
Numbers 2&3. George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identify in Chicano Los 
Angeles, 1900-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 59. 
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sufren aún los horrores 
del implacable racismo 
 
Estos alumnos de Hitler 
Muy caro las pagarán 
Y con su maestro en la tumba  
Muy pronto se pudrirán190 
  
[To free people 
of anxiety and fear 
blood was shed 
recently around the world 
 
For human rights 
Blacks and Cubans died 
the blood of Mexicans 
poured in abundance  
 
But the men who on one day 
fought heroically 
still suffer the horrors 
of relentless racism 
 
These students of Hitler 
Will pay an expensive price 
And with their teacher in the grave 
They too will soon be left rotting  
 
 
 
The corrido documents the shared history of struggle against the crimes of the Third 
Reich during World War II, making the reemergence of white supremacist organizations even 
more tragic. Cuba’s inclusion in the corrido most likely refers to the TGP’s anti-fascist 
campaigns and support for a leftist international labor union run by Lombardo Toledano, the 
Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL). As Historian Barry Carr explains, 
beginning during the war and extending to 1948, “the CTAL, under Lombardo’s energetic 
                                                          
190 Erasto Cortés and Francisco Mora, “Calaveras aftosas,” 1947, University of California, San Diego, Geisel 
Library, Special Collections Library. 
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direction, extended the Cardenista project of revolutionary nationalism through the Caribbean 
and Central and South America. The promotion of antifascist national fronts in Latin America 
during the war years closely followed the strategy of the ailing Comintern and the Soviet Union 
and succeeded in building an extensive network of progressive labor movements throughout 
Latin America on the basis of the Popular Front’s principles. While Lombardo was increasingly 
marginalized with the CTM, the dean of Mexican Marxism became the most successful 
hemispheric figure in the Americas.” The image is referencing the widespread belief among the 
Mexican left that Spanish dictator Francisco Franco’s international Falangist group had taken 
root in Cuba and was working to dismantle the gains that CTAL had achieved on the island. The 
anti-imperialist American writer Harold Preece, who wrote for a variety of publications 
including The Crisis and The Nation, referred to the Spanish Falange in 1946 as the 
“international ku klux klan” and noted that in the immediate aftermath of the war the 
organization was “carrying on to turn Cuba into a second Mississippi with a white-skinned 
‘aristocracy’ doing all the bossing and Negro and poor white Cubans doing all the sweating.”191   
A central purpose of these images was to disrupt the notion that white supremacy only 
functioned within the United States, suggesting instead that U.S. imperialism brought with it 
deleterious economic and cultural institutions throughout Latin America.192 The drawing depicts 
                                                          
191 Harold Preece, “The Negro in Latin-America: Cuba Heads Towards Race Riots,” Philadelphia Tribune, May 7, 
1946, 4.  
 
192 The TGP frequently noted how anticommunism and racial oppression went hand-in-hand throughout the 
Americas. In the 1949 anti-war film produced about the Korean Conflict, ¿Quienes quieren la guerra—quienes 
quieren la paz? a caption read “Local tyrants, serving imperialism persecute such men as [Luís Carlos] Prestes and 
[Pablo] Neruda. And in the United States itself, if a single one of the thirteen million negroes in the south tries to 
struggle against the system of economic peonage, he may lose his life…” The film was accomplishing two goals 
here. First, it showed the deleterious impact of U.S.-style anti-communism in Latin America, pointing to the well-
known hardships faced by Brazilian labor leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, and the Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda. Secondly, 
it linked the irrational use of force to the treatment of African Americans in the U.S. South, noting that to struggle 
against the racist capitalist system, was likely a death sentence for black people with the courage to fight back. Later 
in the film, these points were reinforced by a mention of the Ku Klux Klan serving imperialism, accompanied by 
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both repression and resistance to the Klan—one man lays dead while another in the background 
is being choked by a whip, as black, Mexican, and Cuban skeletons attempt to escape the 
violence together. In the foreground, a skeleton wearing a sombrero and either Afro-Cuban, 
Afro-Mexico or African American—the skull has been shaded to denote the race of the 
skeleton—are among those attempting to escape the destruction. One skeleton raises his arms in 
the air, symbolizing that this terror will not passively be accepted.193 White supremacy—whether 
in Cuba, Mexico, or the United States—was best fought, according to the radical internationalist 
vision of the members of the TGP, collectively between groups experiencing racial 
discrimination and violence.  
A lithograph by TGP member, Jesus Escobedo, challenged the assumed reach of the Klan 
to the U.S. south. Titled “Discriminación”, Escobedo’s work connects the white supremacist 
organization’s activities to Cuba and the U.S.-Mexico border. Having spent years in New York 
City on a Guggenheim fellowship, Escobedo had witnessed U.S. racial discrimination first-hand. 
In this drawing three men are tied together on a stake, about to be burned alive by Klansmen. In 
the foreground, we see that there is no distinction between the police violence, the Klansmen, 
and the Texan.  
                                                          
artwork by Guillermo Monroy. See, Helga Prignitz, TGP Ein Grafiker-Kollektiv in Mexico von 1937-1977 (Berlin: 
Verlag Ricard Seitz & Co., 1981), 397-400. 
 
193 The National Federation of Cuban Negro Organizations also protested the murder of African-Americans in the 
U.S. South. Writing about the lynching of four African Americans in Georgia, for example, the group wrote a 
statement “even now in the southern part of the United States there exists…the same social evils and injustices for 
the disappearance of which we have fought.” “Protests on Lynching World Wide in Scope,” Philadelphia Tribune, 
August 10, 1946, 1.  
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Figure 42. Jesus Escobedo, “Discriminación,” El Taller de Gráfica Popular: Doce años de obra 
artística colectiva (Estampas de la Revolucion: Mexico, 1947), 77. 
 
 
 
As the police officer forcefully attacks an African-American man with a club, we do not 
see the tepid complicity of the state in the murder of its citizens, but its active engagement in it. 
A ghoulish looking Klansmen places his hand on the officer’s shoulder, directing his actions.  In 
the center of the image is a man dressed as a Texas law enforcement agent, throwing his victim 
toward the fire. On the left side of the image, a man shoots flame out of a cannon that has 
swastika engraved in the metal—an obvious point of comparison that Escobedo wants his 
audience to make between the Ku Klux Klan and the fascist movements defeated in World War 
II. The proximity of Mexico to this violence is important and seen through the inclusion of a 
Texan—such symbols were a reminder of the proximity of the border violence.  
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U.S. Empire and the Bracero Program  
 
 
 
The TGP’s international fight against white supremacy is critical to understanding the 
collective’s artwork on the Bracero Program. In contrast to the disparaging images of migrants 
and the communities they came from found in the mainstream press, the TGP focused its 
attentions on the structures underpinning the injustices of migration. A characteristic image was, 
“México en la guerra: Los braceros se van a Estados Unidos,” (Mexico in the war: The braceros 
go to the United States), created as cooperative piece. In this image, artists Leopoldo Mendez 
and Alfredo Zalce depict a diverse, multiethnic and multiracial group of Mexican migrants 
travelling to the United States. Men from different racial and class backgrounds—including 
phenotypically lighter skinned migrants as well as Afro-Mexicans—link arms with one another 
from the urban industrial workers wearing modern caps and coats to the central figure of the 
campesino wearing a serape and huarches. The distinct racial and class backgrounds of the 
migrants speaks to the vast difference in approaches to representing braceros between the 
mainstream press and the TGP. In addition, the inclusion of the Mexican police officer offers 
another important difference in how the radical artists differed from the work provided by 
mainstream journalists. The officer is an ominous figure, overseeing the movement of the men, 
while brandishing a club should anyone get out line. Whereas writers in outlets like Hoy insisted 
that the Mexican state protect its migrant citizenry by adding police to the northern border to 
prevent migration, Mendez and Zalce suggest the potential violence that the police threaten to 
keep workers in line.  
 
 
 
191 
 
 
 
Figure 43.  Leopoldo Mendez y Alfredo Zalce, “México en la guerra: los braceros se van a 
Estados Unidos,”  1947, in 450 años de lucha: homenaje al pueblo mexicano, (México: Taller de 
Gráfica Popular).  
 
 
 
An additional distinction between the mainstream press and the TGP was that the 
members of the art collective actively defined the Mexican state’s corruption as a central factor 
prompting emigration. Rather than a series of poor individual decisions by campesinos, as 
depicted in the mainstream press, braceros were responding to an exploitative global economic 
system in which the elite in the U.S. and Mexico benefitted. Pablo O’Higgins, an American artist 
living in exile in Mexico, made that clear in a drawing published in Calavera a la cargada, in 
which braceros were depicted as skeletons escaping Mexico only to find that they are being 
served “dog soup” produced by the Swift Company. Importantly, the title reads, “Without bread, 
land, or money, the bracero flees the country.” The symbolism of thousands of braceros lined up 
to be served dog meat, after just crossing the Rio Bravo, underscores the racism and exploitation 
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that Mexican migrants could expect in the United States, but as critically, the title and the 
corresponding corrido explain that these are decisions made by migrants who are not 
“abandoning the nation,” but rather, who have been forced to “flee.”  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Pablo O’Higgins, “Swift & Co. caldo de perro,” A la caragada calaveras, 1951. 
 
 
 
This distinction between “abandoning” and “fleeing” is key because it suggests very 
different causes prompting the mass migration of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Indeed, for the 
TGP, it was the Mexican state and its close collaboration with the United States that needed to be 
held responsible for the exodus of Mexicans from the country. It was, after all, the Mexican state 
that had created the social conditions that made it necessary for the Mexicans to leave in the first 
place. The accompanying corrido depicts braceros as heroic figures, as pilgrims in search of a 
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true homeland. In contrast, politicians are demonized for their corruption, for creating the 
conditions whereby migrants found themselves with few options, but to cross the border. The 
corrido explains that this forced migration had a long history in which the migrants were pushed 
off their land by Mexican leaders, half of that land had been taken by the United States in war 
under the ineffective leadership of Antonio-Lopez [de Santa Anna], and the other half sold off by 
current Mexican President Alemán.194   
 
 
 
Piensa también, peregrino, 
Al recorrer estas tierras  
Perdidas en vanas guerras 
Y que hoy son del ‘buen vecino’ 
En que es nuestro oscuro sino 
Ver a la Patria entregada: 
La mitad, satanizada  
Antonio-López vendida 
Y la otra mitad, sin vida 
Miguel-alemán-comprada  
 
 
Think again, pilgrim,   
When you explore these lands 
Lost in futile wars 
That today belong to the ‘good neighbor’ 
That is our dark fate 
To see the Homeland turned in 
Half of the land demonized 
Antonio-Lopez sold it 
And the other half, lifeless  
Miguel-Alemán let it be purchased 
 
                                                          
194 In a print by Ignacio Aguirre, the artist mocks the corrupt leadership of Santa Ana, showing the general hoarding 
U.S. dollars and liquor. Santa Ana was not only an ineffectual leader against the military invasion of the United 
States, but worse still, he was willing to sell Mexico for his own personal gain. Ignacio Aguirre, “La Mesilla” 450 
años de lucha: homenaje al pueblo mexicano, (México: Taller de Gráfica Popular, 1960). 
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This depiction of migrants as “pilgrims” is beautifully reinforced in Ignacio Augurre’s 
“Retorno del bracero” (1947). In the linocut, a Christ-like migrant returns to his humble family 
after laboring in the United States. Unlike the cartoons and the photographs in Hoy, the migrant 
makes a seamless transition back to his home. In fact, he is welcomed with open arms by a 
woman who is likely his mother. Such imagines evoked the iconic representation of Juan 
Diego’s encounter of the Virgin of Guadalupe, a symbol of motherhood and a formative image 
of the Mexican nation. Images of the barefoot woman and the huarches used by the returning 
migrant are not used to mock the migrant, the family’s poverty, or their cultural backwardness, 
but instead, articulate the centrality of the campesino to the Mexican nation. Rather than an 
object of ridicule or a subject in demand of racial rehabilitation, the return of the bracero to his 
homeland is cause for a somber celebration.  
 
 
 
195 
 
 
 
Figure 45. Ignacio Aguirre, “Retorno del bracero,” 1947. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
This chapter has examined some of the diverse responses to emigration and U.S. 
imperialism in Mexico. The mainstream press depicted Mexican migrants as simplistic figures, 
nothing more than destitute peons, whose personal shortcomings helped explain the mass 
migration from the countryside in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While many of these writers 
were quick to condemn the apprehensions and deportation practices of migrants by the United 
States, these same critics found fault among migrants for the state violence they experienced. 
Importantly, the only solution to the emigration problem for most writers in Hoy was increased 
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border policing in Mexico to prevent the humiliations experienced by its migrant citizenry. 
Standing in sharp contrast, the TGP created complex renderings of the nation’s emigrant 
population, giving its audiences an opportunity to reflect critically not only on the violence of 
white supremacy in the United States, as well as in Cuba, but also, on the racial and ethnic 
diversity that existed within Mexico. In addition, the collective sought to make clear the role of 
the Mexican state in producing migrants through its corrupt imperial relationship with the United 
States.  
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Epilogue 
 
Toward a Militarized Border 
 
 
 
Kurt Lemke and Karl-Ulrich Hagelberg ultimately left the United States disappointed 
with their tour of the U.S.-Mexico border. Arriving in the winter of 1955 at the invitation of the 
State Department, the two executive officers of the West German Federal Border Police found 
little evidence to support their hosts’ claims that the U.S.-Mexico border represented a grave 
national security threat. Occurring just months after the completion of “Operation Wetback,” the 
Border Patrol’s largest deportation campaign to date, the two men expected to encounter a far 
more militarized border. Rather than learning about elaborate preparations to prevent a Soviet 
military invasion, the Germans spent most of their trip watching immigration officials inspect 
Mexican laborers as they entered California. While the State Department may have viewed all 
unsanctioned movement across the U.S.-Mexico border as a Cold War security concern, the 
German visitors insisted that the vulnerability of the border appeared to be more rhetoric than 
reality.  
If Lemke and Hagelberg had the ability to tour the U.S.-Mexico border a half century 
later they would have been more likely to believe that the United States government considered 
border security to be an essential component of national security. Beginning under President Bill 
Clinton in the early 1990s, and accelerating under George W. Bush, the U.S.-Mexico border 
underwent a profound transformation as portions of it have begun to resemble militarized zones. 
Fueled in part by politicians in the early 1990s, the Border Patrol responded to the xenophobic 
fear of undocumented Mexican migration by enacting dramatic spectacles of border 
enforcement. The agency sought to deter migration by policing urban areas at popular border 
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crossing sites, forcing migrants into isolated deserts. The names assigned to these operations by 
the Border Patrol reflected the growing militarization of the force: Operation Hold the Line in El 
Paso (1993), Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego (1994), Operation Safeguard in Tucson (1994), 
and Operation Rio Grande in Texas (1997). Such hardline tactics were redoubled following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, as politicians and policymakers argued that border enforcement 
was essential to keeping the United States safe from terrorist threats. The size of the Border 
Patrol force stationed along the U.S. Southwest increased dramatically, from 3,555 in 1993 to 
more than 18,000 in 2014.1 In the last decade alone, there has been a nearly tenfold increase in 
the annual budget of the Border Patrol from 363 million to 3.4 billion—money that has been 
invested in more guards, immigrant detention centers, and new technologies of war and 
surveillance.2 
The human costs to border militarization have been tremendous in both the United States 
and Mexico. In response to the Border Patrol’s heightened policing in urban areas in the 1990s, 
migrants were forced into the most dangerous and isolated desert crossing points, resulting in the 
deaths of at least 6,000 people since 1999.3 Border residents, emigrants, and Central American 
migrants in Mexico have paid a terrible price as the Mexican government has strengthened 
economic, political, and security ties with the United States. After coming into office in a 
disputed election in 2006, President Felipe Calderón announced that his administration would 
offer tough and decisive action against drug cartels operating in the country. In an effort to 
                                                          
1 U.S. Border Patrol, "United States Border Patrol: Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year," 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Staffing%20FY1992-FY2014_0.pdf, (October 10, 2014).  
 
2 U.S. Border Patrol, “U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Budget Statistics,” http://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-
border-patrol-fiscal-year-budget-statistics-fy-1990-fy-2014, (January 27, 2014). 
  
3 Maria Jimenez, “Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” ACLU of San Diego and 
Imperial Counties and Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights, October 2009. 
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bolster Calderón’s drug war, the United States Congress provided 1.4 billion dollars in military 
aid, as well as technical support from the Drug Enforcement Agency and U.S. Army to combat 
drug trafficking operations. As a result of this war, at least 70,000 people have died with human 
rights’ organizations condemning widespread abuses of the Mexican military against the public.4 
Many of the victims of the drug war have been migrants caught in the middle of cartels’ 
territorial struggles and corrupt government agencies charged with dismantling them.5 Perhaps 
the most visible markers of the failed economic policies and drug wars have been the mass grave 
sites filled with the remains of Mexican and Central American migrants, a haunting reminder of 
an earlier era of the “dirty wars” in Latin America.  
 But if the failed legacies of joint border policing seem familiar, so too does the resistance 
to these practices. In the past year, immigration activists have fought for asylum rights of Central 
American children in Texas detention centers, live tweeted actions to prevent deportations in 
Chicago, and arranged transnational caravans protesting the Mexican state’s role in the murder of 
43 students in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero. Artists have installed portraits, crosses, and makeshift 
caskets along the U.S.-Mexico border wall, marking the lives of those who have died in an ill-
conceived war waged against drugs and migrants. Like the radical work of the Taller de Gráfica 
Popular fifty years earlier, these artists and activists not only condemn the most outrageous 
forms of state violence and government corruption, but insist upon the dignity and humanity of 
migrants forced to cross a dangerous border.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and Mexico Jointly Created the 
“Mexican Drug War” (New York and London: OR Books, 2015), 97. 
 
5 Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico's "War on 
Drugs" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
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